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This research investigates how, in the context of China supply management, the relationship 
between supplier and buyer influences risk, and how non-Chinese companies manage 
Chinese suppliers to minimize risk. Four streams of literature were reviewed. Themes 
emerged when the four were aggregated. 
A qualitative, interpretivist, phenomenologically-housed research methodology was applied. 
Data was obtained through case and key informant studies, principally via literature-informed 
semi-structured interviews with managers at China-sourcing companies. Most key informant 
interviews were undertaken to enrich and validate case study findings. The two case studies 
and two of the key informant studies were of global MNEs; four key informants were 
managers at UK SMEs, one key informant interview was with a Chinese MNE (for 
perspectival comparison). Non-industry key informant interviews were also conducted: two 
were supply chain academics, three were China-specialising consultants, and two were 
managers at UK SMEs who both sell and source in China. The experiences of various 
supply chain and procurement professionals were acquired through an online discussion. 
Transcripts and forum messages constituted the data obtained from key informants; 
transcripts and internal and external documentation constituted the case study data. All data 
was subjected to thematic coding and analysis via NVivo. Themes and sub-themes were 
quantified to identify dominance. Risks and their corresponding countermeasures were 
compiled in tabular form, exposing similar patterns and approaches.  
 
Five theoretical outputs were produced – two main and three minor. Output #1 shows the 
commonality in the methods of China supply risk management reported – MNE and SME 
meta-processes. Output #2 articulates the triadic nature of risk, China presence, and the 
interfirm relationship. The three minor outputs derive from Output #1: (a) three pairs of 
variables characterise China supply risk factors unique to global MNEs; (b) the relatedness 
of risk and relationship quality/formality; and (c) the relatedness of risk and buyer status/ 
supplier perspective. Two practitioner outputs were also developed: a global MNE risk 
assessment tool, and a UK SME risk assessment tool.  
 
Essential findings: in the context of China supply management, buyer risk is lower if the 
buyer-supplier relationship is strong. Buyer-supplier relationships are strengthened by 
interfirm integration and China-side presence of the foreign partner. Non-Chinese MNEs 
minimize Chinese supply risk by operating China offices; SMEs by utilising key China people. 
MNEs and SMEs can earn risk-reducing favoured buyer status through placing significant 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the motivation, questions, and premises behind this research. 
A macroeconomic argument is also made for the importance of China to global trade.   
 
This research was motivated in part by omission and in part by a mismatch between 
the popular literature of Chinese business and the academic work on the subject.  
  
On omission: few academic studies have examined risk in Chinese supply 
specifically. On mismatch: observing Chinese supply while employed at a Japanese 
multinational provided impetus. My experience spurred a literature investigation that 
proved enlightening but disappointing: the orthodox methods of risk management 
recommended in the academic literature were of limited value. Of greater practical 
utility were popular handbooks on Chinese business, which stress the value of 
relationships to Chinese business success – a topic that receives scant discussion in 
the supply chain risk literature. 
 
If the ample popular literature is indicative (its assertions are bolder and less 
finessed by caveats; its authors are usually seasoned practitioners), the experience 
of many managers from Western countries has been negative. The popular literature 
documents in unflattering terms the complexities and hazards of Chinese business: 
March and Wu (2007) concentrate on the difficulties foreigners find with Chinese 
negotiation tactics, the hazards of informal networks, and the precarious nature of 
trust and face conventions. Midler (2009) paints a bleaker picture yet – of corruption, 
trust failure, opportunism, and quality fade; Levesque (2011) describes an ever-
improving Chinese business environment, but suggests that risk in Chinese supply is 
often a cultural issue. All offer cautious advice and techniques for coping with the 
enticing yet challenging world of Chinese supply. My research was begun with the 
intention to reveal the methods by which professionals manage risk in Chinese SCs 
and to thereby add to the knowledge pool by testing the literature (both sets) against 
practice using the rigour of formal academic methods. 
 
The results of a 2009 survey from the Engineering Employers Federation revealed 
that 14% of respondents formerly operating supply bases in low labour-cost 
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countries had repatriated at least part of their manufacturing since 2007. A 2012 
follow-up survey by the Engineering Employers' Federation (2015) revealed that 40% 
of manufacturers who responded had repatriated their operations to the United 
Kingdom, with supply chain issues mentioned by many as a significant factor in the 
decision to reshore.  
High profile examples of UK companies re-shoring all or part of their 
manufacturing operations from China specifically are Hornby (2013), Jaeger (2014), 
Aston Martin (2014), TopShop (2013), River Island (2012), Ecoegg (2012), and Pot 
Noodle manufacturer Symington (2013). High profile non-UK companies include 
General Electric (2012), Rossignol (2011, 2013), and various suppliers of textiles to 
Walmart (2013-14). The author’s informal enquiries into UK companies 
manufacturing and reselling warehousing revealed a consistent picture: in 2015, 
most of the companies interviewed were manufacturing in the UK; all reported 
negative experiences with Chinese suppliers, principally rising prices and problems 
related to product quality and delivery. All reported that their UK and European 
customers have a strong preference for contracting with suppliers of products that 
are UK-made. 
 
Data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) shows that despite the 
apparent trend for reshoring and a decreasing trade gap, China in 2015 was the 
UK’s third largest source of imports, so is still a major supply base for many British 
companies.  
This data provides a macro-economic rationale for this research: Chinese 
supply remains a significant element of British business and consumption, so 
deserves theoretical scrutiny and empirically-based research that will contribute to 
improved efficiencies. 
 
The following three charts support the macro-economic case for the importance of 
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Only Germany and the United States export more by value than China to the UK. In 
cultural, ideological, and geographical terms, China is the most distant of the three 
biggest exporters to Britain. These three factors suggest that the management of 
Chinese supply likely features some degree of uniqueness. 




Compared to less developed countries, China is by far the largest exporter to the UK, 
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This chart indicates that the majority of Chinese exports (in all years >87%) to the 
UK are classified as SITC 6, 7, or 8 manufactures (most fast-moving consumer 
goods are classified under codes 7 and 8 – see Trade Data in the Appendix). The 
trend is steady annual growth between 1997 and 2010, plateau between 2010 and 
2013, and a dramatic spike in 2014. The general pattern indicates that despite re-
shoring (or because re-shoring has increased UK manufacturing and therefore the 
demand for China-sourced components and materials), China imports have 
87 88 
90 






















Class 6, 7 & 8 Imports
Other Imports
Class 6, 7, or 8 Goods as % of Total  Chinese Imports
Chinese SITC 6, 7, & 8 Imports as Percentage of Total (World) SITC 6, 7, and 8 Imports into the UK 
        0.3   0.3   0.4   0.4   0.5    0.6   0.8    1     1.2   1.2   1.5    1.5   1.7     2      2      2      2      6  
Figure 3 Chinese SITC 6, 7, & 8-Classified Exports to the UK 1997–2014 
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increased yearly and are currently at their highest level (Office of National Statistics 
website, 2015; also see Trade Data in the Appendix).  
 
Prior research into the nature of Chinese business networks, specifically the 
importance of guanxi (connections – see Chinese Terms in the Appendix) as an 
enabler of business, prompted this researcher to question whether guanxi influences 
supply management and risk.  
The worldwide proliferation of China-manufactured goods branded by non-
Chinese entities suggests that guanxi relationships are not the formidable, barely 
navigable forces the literature of the 1990s and early 2000s suggest – guanxi is less 
present between geographically disparate strangers, but the volume of goods 
sourced in China implies the situation is manageable. Nonetheless, the literature on 
guanxi (Wilkinson, 2011) paints a clear picture of its enduring necessity: guanxi 
between business people and between business people and officials enables access 
to resources, reduces various forms of supply- and demand-related risk, and enables 
control and accountability in the absence of strong formal institutions (contracts and 
law, etc.). How, therefore, can the general complexity of and cultural obstacles to 
Chinese business be reconciled with the ongoing enthusiasm of MNEs and non-
Chinese companies for China sourcing? And what are the implications for supply 
chain management, since China inevitably represents a dimension of risk and 
challenge for supply (chain) managers?  
 
The research questions that guided this project developed out of these observations 
into the following:  
 
1.1 Research Questions and Premises 
This research asks and addresses the following two questions: 
1. In the context of China supply chain management and its associated risks, 
what is the nature of the relationship between supplier and buyer?  
2. How do non-Chinese companies manage Chinese suppliers to minimize risk? 
 
Case study and key informant study data was collected, analysed and applied to 
answer these questions. Data was obtained from in-depth, semi-structured 
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interviews with practitioners and various expert key informants. When compiled and 
qualitatively analysed, the data provided a rich informational account.  
 
In its philosophy, this research is interpretivist/phenomenological: it seeks insight into 
a phenomenon within a phenomenon, i.e. a specific business process within a 
specific culture.  
 
The microeconomic case for this research is self-evident: a sound understanding of 
the risk-reducing significance of relationships with Chinese suppliers is likely to 
increase the profitability of operating China supply. 
 
The theoretical case is made thus: the concepts of supply risk management can be 
tested for trans-cultural applicability. The need for the incorporation of culturally 
specific factors in risk calculation models and risk frameworks might also arise. 
Following that, several theoretical extensions are proposed in the Conclusions 
section. 
 
Risk management in supply chains is well theorized, and popular and academic 
writing on the idiosyncrasies of Chinese business practice is extensive. Hence, the 
nature of risk in the supply and importation of Chinese products poses an issue 
worthy of investigation. The essential thesis of this research functions on the premise 
that risk in Chinese supply management is managed by relational means. That is, 
relationships between non-Chinese buyers and their Chinese suppliers are a 
significant factor in the management of supply risk. This assumption is based on the 
literature’s majority assertion that Chinese business is highly personalistic in nature 
and success in Chinese business (whether between Chinese or between Chinese 
and non-Chinese) is highly dependent on relational factors and cultural fluencies and 
skills.  
 
Hence, in abstract terms, this thesis asks the question “do relationships influence 
risk in Chinese supply management”? If the existing research into this matter were 
sufficient, justifying this study might be challenging. Similarly, if the interpersonal 
nature of Chinese business is overstated, outdated, or, for some strange reason, 
irrelevant to supply risk management, justifying this study might be challenging. 
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However, should the existing body of research be insufficient and the relationship 
consensus borne out by practitioner opinion, this research is valid and necessary. 
Preliminary exploration suggested this was the case: observations by the author 
during his time in industry presented a mixed picture on the issue of interpersonal 
Chinese business; the author’s systematic literature review (Wilkinson, 2011) 
revealed significant nuance and development concerning the role of interpersonal 
factors in Chinese business. Pilot searches of the literature (both academic and 
mass market) showed that few publications address China supply risk adequately.  
 
1.2 The Argument  
A prior systematic literature review (Wilkinson, 2011) and pre-reading of practitioner-
targeted books on Chinese business lead to the deduction that China can be 
characterised as low-trust, making trust-building relationships key to lowering risk in 
Chinese business. Logically, it follows that since supply management is a form of 
business activity, in the case of China, risk in supply management will also be 
influenced by trust and relationships. The systematic review showed that in the 
Sinitic context, “guanxi” is the principle term for relationships, particularly long-term 
relationships.  
 
The argument map (based on the format proposed by Davies, 2011) that follows 





1.3 The Structure of this Thesis 
The Literature chapter has three sections. In the Literature Review Methodology 
section, the use of a traditional narrative and three systematic searches (and the 
systematic method itself) are justified and explained. The SC Risk section of the 
review (2.2) covers definitions of risk and supply chain management (hereafter 
“SCM”), the tools and philosophy of SCM, and other dominant themes in the SCM 
literature. The Chinese Business Risk section (2.3) discusses Chinese business 
practices, guanxi, supply management in the Chinese context, and the experiences 
of foreign companies in China, among other matters. (The two review sections 







 SC risk is globally uniform ∴ 
 SCRM is exempt from cultural 
issues  
 Management adjustment is not 
required on a national basis  
 Chinese culture has no impact on 
business, including SCM  
 Due to the foregoing, the need for 
further/any research in this area 
is insignificant ∴ 
Sufficient research? 
Because 
 Transactional SCRM is sufficient 
 Formal control methods are 
adequate for China SCM 
 Cultural issues are insignificant 
 Chinese business is not unusually 
relational  
 In China, SC integration does not 
require relationship management 
  
YES 
This research not necessitated 
This research necessitated 
YES 
Therefore 
 SC risk is globally diverse ∴ 
 SCRM is vulnerable to cultural 
issues  
 Management adjustment is 
required on a national basis  
 Chinese culture has impact on 
business, including SCM  
 Due to the foregoing, the need for 
further/any research in this area 
is significant ∴ 
NO ? 
Because 
 Transactional SCRM is insufficient 
 Formal control methods are 
inadequate for China SCM 
 Cultural issues are significant 
 Chinese business is highly 
relational  
 In China, SC integration requires 
relationship management 
  
Figure 4 Argument Map 
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merge four streams of literature to obtain the essential theory and empirical work of 
most relevance. The overlap of the four streams was important and intended: the 
reviews are informed by all four streams of literature without separation, since such 
separation would complicate the review.)  
 
The Methodology chapter presents the research questions, the utility of qualitative 
methods in supply chain and management research, the philosophy supporting this 
research, and the appropriateness of the case study and key informant method. The 
protocol of data collection and analysis is described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively. The mode of the findings’ presentation is explained in 3.4. The chapter 
ends with a summary of the contributions of this research.   
 
Chapter 4 contains the two company case studies derived from relevant textual 
sources and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with MNE managers in supply-
related roles. Chapter 5 contains the industry key informant findings. The structure of 
each report is based on the case study findings, since the key informant studies 
were conducted to extract detail on matters uncovered during case study 
construction, and to provide comparisons with the case studies. Thus, the format of 
these chapters is similar. Chapter 6 summarises the case study and industry key 
informant findings. The risks and corresponding methods of mitigation are presented. 
 
Chapter 7 presents reports of interviews with other key informants (academics, 
consultants, and comparator companies – such as a Chinese MNE). Feedback from 
an online forum for supply professionals was also included. Identified in this section 
are main causes of supply risk, location and mode of risk mitigation methods, 
specific relationships, and key risk-reducing relationships. 
 
Chapter 8, the first Discussion chapter, presents the points of strongest convergence 
and divergence between the findings and the main currents of theory as espoused in 
the literature. First discussed is the compatibility of the findings with the literature on 
SC concepts. The following areas of theory are contrasted in the light of the findings: 
the fundamentals of SCM and SC risk management, supplier management in the 
context of China, the relational nature of Chinese business (guanxi), and the 
functional/procedural (i.e. non culturally- specific) methods of supply risk reduction.  
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The Discussion continues in Chapter 9, where case study and key informant 
interview findings are aggregated and synthesised to expose commonalities and 
differences. The theoretical outputs begin with a MNE supplier-buyer meta-process 
model and exposition. The models reveal the consistencies observed in the MNE 
case studies regarding global and China-side supply configuration. An SME supplier-
buyer meta-process model is also presented. This reports the commonalities present 
in the China-side supply arrangements of the UK SMEs. This is followed by an SME 
meta-sociograph. The sociograph describes commonalities observable in the human 
interaction dimension of the China supply arrangements of the UK SMEs. The 
system patterns of China supply risk management common to MNEs and SMEs 
constitute the first theoretical output. 
 
Following these, the discussion focusses on risk-influencing variables specific to 
MNEs: China strategy and supply proximity, technology and China supplier 
availability, and relationships with government. These MNE risk-influencing variables 
become another theoretical output. 
 
Buyer-supplier relationship quality and formality, and buyer status and supplier 
perspective are then examined and developed into two theoretical outputs relevant 
to MNEs and SMEs. 
  
The risk significance of China presence and its bearing on risk is the fifth theoretical 
output. Supplier-buyer integration in the context of China appears influenced by the 
foreign company’s degree of in-country presence. Building on the bowtie and 
diamond models of interfirm alignment, six variant models of alignment are 
presented. Based on the empirical findings of this research, these models are 
intended to be useful methods of understanding in theoretical terms the performance 
and risk significance of differing forms of interfirm connectivity, relationships and 
integration. 
 
Two practitioner outputs are then presented: the Four-Step China Supplier 
Establishment Tool, and the China Supply Risk Assessment Tool. The first provides 
a sequence of steps that foreign companies considering China supply can implement 
(from concept to collaboration) to reduce risk. The second tool enables companies 
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who are already operating or considering China supply to assess the level of risk that 
is likely present in their current or envisaged supply arrangements. This tool 
comprises a survey consisting of 25 questions. Because the nature of risk differs 
according to company size (SME versus MNE) and China strategy (also strongly 
influenced by size), there are two versions of the tool: an MNE version and an SME 
version. 
 
This thesis closes with a Conclusions section in which the outputs of this research, 
its methodology, and its contributions are critiqued; possibilities for future research 
are discussed; and the implications of this research on other areas of theory are 
proffered.  
 
In the following chapter, the literature of supply chain management risk and Chinese 






This chapter begins by describing the methods used to find and review the literature. 
This is followed by a discussion of the literature on risk in supply chain management 
and Chinese business.    
 
2.1 Literature Review Methodology 
The now common term “supply chain” (hereafter “SC”) seldom occurs in clear 
separation from “SCM, which, according to many accounts (e.g. Lambert et al, 1998), 
entered the literature in 1982 via Oliver and Webber. We will observe that SCM 
developed out of logistics into a philosophy championing competitive advantage 
through the holistic organisation of cooperating entities. SCM promotes a set of 
concepts and provides tools and approaches for reducing SC risk, which is 
increasing as supply globalises (Christopher and Peck, 2004).  
 
The research that this review informs seeks to reveal the nature of risk in the context 
of Chinese supply, and to identify and theorise the relational methods (if found) that 
companies use to lessen supply risk. (The term “supply” was carefully chosen for its 
incorporation of supplier management, supply chain management, and other likely 
possible descriptions of management of Chinese suppliers and risk in Chinese 
supply.)  The fundamental assumptions of the present research are that globalization 
incurs risk, and that Chinese supply risk incurs risks whose causes and solutions are 
often relational and currently undertheorized in the SCM literature. This latter 
assumption derives from the literature presented in the three-phase systematic 
review that follows this background review. 
 
We survey first the discipline’s literature for theoretical and conceptual work on the 
issues of risk management in supply chains generally, i.e. SC risk management 
methods and proposals that have acquired mainstay status in the discipline and are 
non-cultural in nature. To achieve this, the first literature review (following) was 




RQ1. What concepts are represented by the terms “supply chain” and “supply 
chain management”? 
RQ2. What is “risk” in the context of SCs? 
RQ3. What are the philosophies and tools of SC risk management? 
RQ4. How might relationships influence risk in the specific context of China 
supply? 
 
By charting the development of “supply chain” and “supply chain management”, 
section 1 answers RQ1. Section 2 of this review addresses RQ2. Section 3, by 
reviewing lean, agile, and the various other tools/philosophies of SCM, addresses 
RQ3. Section 4 presents an introductory answer to RQ4, and connects this 
discussion of the literature to the three systematic reviews, which address this 
question in greater detail. 
 
2.1.1 The Role of Literature 
Swanborn (2010) avers that researchers should possess knowledge about the 
phenomena of interest before they attempt case study construction. The phenomena 
of interest in this case are dual: risk management in global supply and Chinese 
business. Prior knowledge of both phenomena came through pre-reading, formal 
academic learning, formal academic research (Wilkinson, 2011), working experience, 
first-person cultural exposure, and three structured systematic literature searches 
(see next section).    
 
According to Niederkofler (1991), theory is confirmed if results are as expected. In 
this research, theory was extracted from the extensive literature of SCM primarily 
and related fields secondarily. The coding of the summaries of the articles returned 
by the three systematic literature searches revealed recurrent themes and theories. 
These provided the researcher with the material for a semi-structured interview 
template questionnaire (see Appendix), and gave the researcher expectations 
regarding interviewee responses and, possibly, some degree of confirmation bias.  
 
2.1.2 Traditional Narrative Review 
The Background Literature review is a traditional narrative. The Background 
Literature review is the first of a quartet that comprise the total literature review (the 
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other three are systematic reviews, which are discussed later.) Its structure is based 
on guidance from pre-reading that occurred between 2007 and 2010. The pre-
reading was of both popular and practitioner-oriented literature while working in Asia 
in various supply-related capacities. Post 2012, many articles were suggested by the 
author’s supervisory consultation panel, who recommended journals, authors, and 
specific articles that are rudimentary to the discipline. 
 
The traditional review covers the core concepts and definitions relevant to the theory 
of SCM, and provides an overview of SCM as a theoretical discipline. The 
researcher’s conceptual framework for this section of the review can be compacted 
into the terms “supply”, “supply chain” (SC), and “supply chain management” (SCM), 
with SC and SCM denoting a very specific suite of concepts and practices – primarily 
an underpinning concept of holism and synergy, a formula of advantage akin to that 
promoted by the literature on internationalization (Dyer, 1997). 
 
The Background Literature review analyses concepts deemed key according to three 
criteria: 
1. Disputation: Absence of which implies academic consensus; presence implies 
importance and development. The adoption and development of a concept in a 
body of peer-reviewed literature implies acceptance of that concept. 
2. Seminal authorship: since high citation count is incomplete as an indicator of 
quality (Meho and Sonnenwald, 2000), authorship is reasonable grounds for 
inferring worth. Concepts in articles by heavily cited authors were considered 
representative. 
3. Vernacular currency (this author’s term): refers to the extra-academic adoption 
of a term/concept; i.e., to the presence of a term/concept within relevant areas 
of industry and practice; in, for example, the non-academic literature of logistics.  
 
2.1.3 Systematic Literature Review  
Scientific, systematic literature review in the field of business studies has strong 
precedence. For example, Pittaway et al (2004), Thorpe et al (2005) (International 
Journal of Management Reviews); and MacPherson and Holt (2007) (Research 
Policy). Furthermore, Tranfield et al (2003) and Denyer and Neely (2004) have 
applied the systematic review method to management research specifically. 
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Tranfield et al (2003), Pittaway et al (2004), and Thorpe et al (2005) maintain that 
popularization of the systematic method is necessary if research in international 
business is to advance generally.  
 
The systematic method has credibility because it attempts to use objective, explicit 
criteria of article selection, and because it constitutes a tried-and-tested means of 
accumulating an evidence base. Lee (2009) claims that the systematic literature 
review leaves a useful “audit trail” of search terms and conditions of inclusion and 
exclusion, and thus reflects the scientific principles of repeatability and transparency. 
Perhaps it is for these reasons that systematic literature searching is strongly 
represented in the health sciences (Clarke and Oxman, 2001). 
 
Although systematic reviews can produce up-to-date analyses, the present research 
does not disregard the contributions (actual and potential) of the narrative approach, 
since this counters the tendency to reference some sources while neglecting 
alternatives, such as books (hence the Background Literature section). 
The systematic method also reflects the interpretivist ontology, since it has been 
shown effective in the author’s previous research (Wilkinson, 2011) for evaluating 
the component attributes of guanxi and producing objective, scientometric overviews 
of the literature in which guanxi is embedded and emergent.  
 
In the present study, systematic searching is the primary literature retrieval method. 
This is because the body of potential literature is of such high volume that a system 
enabling elimination of less relevant literature is requisite. However, to overlook the 
contribution of the narrative review would be hazardous. For this reason, and to 
advance knowledge through a broad conceptual discussion that enfolds as much of 
the literature as possible – academic and otherwise – this research also employs a 
traditional narrative review.  
 
2.1.4 Systematic Literature Review Method  
The systematic review returned literature on three specific subjects within 
international business: 
 Literature Search 1 retrieved articles relating to China/Chinese supplier or 
supply related research.  
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 Literature Search 2 retrieved articles relating to guanxi. 
 Literature Search 3 retrieved articles related to supply or supplier and risk.  
       
2.1.5 The Systematic Literature Collection Process 
Systematic literature collection involved the following sequence of three processes: 
 Step ①: the five richest citation databases (online academic journal indices) 
were identified.  
 Step ②: three sets of search terms were used to retrieve articles from the 
databases identified in Step ①.  
 Step ③: the articles retrieved in Step ② were filtered for inclusion/ exclusion 
according to specific quality criteria.  
 
Step ① involved running pilot searches on various citation databases to identify 
which databases yielded the highest number of returns for the search terms “Chin* 
and suppl*”, “guanxi”, “suppl* and risk”. Only databases that supported searching by 
wildcards were selected, since wildcards enable fuzzier searching that should 
increase catchment. For example, wildcard searches such as “chin*” and “suppl*” 
return articles that contain in their titles, abstracts, or keywords “China” and 
“Chinese”, and “supplier”, “supplies”, “supply chain”, “supply management” and so on. 
The five highest yielding databases were selected. These were Science Direct, Jstor, 
Ingenta Connect, Emerald Insight, and Web of Science.  
 
In Step ②, all five top yielding databases identified in Step ① were interrogated 
using specified Boolean search terms/keywords. Each set of search terms/keywords 
thus constituted a Literature Search.  
 Literature Search 1 search terms/keywords: “chin*” AND “suppl*” 
 Literature Search 2 search terms/keywords: “guanxi” 
 Literature Search 3 search terms/keywords: “suppl*” AND “risk” 
 
Each Literature Search required a search of all five databases. In total therefore, 
there were 15 searches (searches of all five databases for Literature Search 1, 2, 




In Step ③, the articles were sorted into three groups representing the three 
Literature Searches (and the three main areas of the literature informing the 
research question). An Excel spreadsheet containing three separate sheets was 
created. The details of each article (author, date, title, citation count, and source) 
were entered into the spreadsheet. Sheet 1 of the spreadsheet contained the details 
of the articles returned by Literature Search 1 (“Chin* and suppl*”). Sheet 2 
contained the details of the articles returned by Literature Search 2 (“guanxi”). Sheet 
3 contained the details of the articles returned by Literature Search 3 (“suppl* and 
risk”).  
 
Alongside the details of the relevant article, an evaluation/summary was written into 
the spreadsheet. The evaluation included each article’s main findings and any 
observations salient to the research question. The evaluation was developed from a 
reading of each article’s abstract, conclusion, and, in some cases, entire text.  
Articles that were returned by all three searches were considered highly 
relevant to the research question. In the spreadsheet, the details of these articles, 
along with those of other articles whose relevance was deemed high following 
evaluation, were highlighted in red for emphasis and ease of reference. In the 
preceding diagram, articles returned by all three searches so can be considered 
important to this research, are represented by the central red area.  
 
2.1.6 Filtration of Results 
Based on the evaluation and a reading of the abstract, each article was included or 
excluded according to specific inclusion, exclusion, and quality criteria (see 
Appendix). Various criteria were used to filter the articles according to articulated 
conditions of quality and suitability. These criteria were developed to limit the 
material of this research to articles that are fully compliant with normal academic 
standards, and to preclude articles originating in unrelated disciplines, or whose 
methods fall outside the orthodox triad of qualitative, quantitative, and 
conceptual/theoretical papers.  
Furthermore, all criteria were derived from the research questions, follow the 
recommendations by Harden et al (2004), and imposed in order to limit the review to 
articles meeting consistent and transparent conditions of quality and relevance, and 
thereby reduce the possibility of unseen bias in selection. Due to the specificity 
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enforced by the terms and conditions of the initial searches however, few articles 
were removed at the elimination stage. (The Appendix contains the full details and 
pre-and post-elimination article counts of each literature search.)  
 
Articles cited fewer than 40 times were excluded on the rational premise that citation 
count is indicative of an article’s degree of discourse influence. Since this biases 
selection in favour of older, not necessarily more relevant, articles however, an 
important caveat was applied: articles meeting the other inclusion criteria but having 
a citation count of fewer than 40 would be included if their title, abstract, or keywords 
indicated relevance to the research question. This way, selection was both 
intelligently encompassing and topical.   
 














 Risk Relationships Coordination 




Step ③ Elimination by inclusion, exclusion, and quality criteria  
 






 Step ① Database selection 
 
 







LS2 coded LS1 coded LS3 coded 
Literature Search 1. 
“chin* AND suppl*” 
 
1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Literature Search 2. 
“guanxi” 
 
2.2 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 
Literature Search 3. 
“chin* AND risk” 
 
3.2 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Figure 5 Systematic Literature Review: A Method with Three Processes 
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2.1.7 Data Analysis Framework 
All three sets of systematically retrieved articles were encoded using NVivo. The 
nodes were, unsurprisingly given the specificity of the search terms that had 
generated the three sets of literature, classifiable into three overarching parent 
themes: risk, relationships, and coordination. The analytical narrative reviews that 
constitute the literature review chapters of this thesis developed systematically as 
the articles, encoded using NVivo, began to expose recurrent concepts and 
commonalities; comparisons and contrasts between studies appeared, and sources 
other than the articles captured by the systematic method enriched the discussion. 
The child themes contained within the parent themes revealed areas of theory and 
observations of interest that could be explored further by in-depth interview. The 
template of the semi-structured interview was thus derived. 
 
2.1.8 Coverage and Structure 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, the streams of literature collected by the traditional review 
and the three systematic reviews are merged. The streams were purposefully 
designed to examine related areas of literature; hence there is overlap in the 
information they yielded. Recurrence of the themes that arose in the four was such 
that separating the review according to streams would incur unnecessary repetitions 
and structural complexity (for this reason, 2.2 and 2.3 are separated according to 
themes not streams). Hence the review combines the findings of all four streams, 
and separation is by subheadings that correspond to the themes of interest.  
 
The following Venn diagram (Figure 6) shows the four areas of literature examined 
and their point of common intersection. A small number of articles recurred in all 
three systematic searches (hence the relative smallness of the red area). However, 
since all four areas of literature examined related research, the coverage thus 





In broad terms, the aggregate of the literature streams indicates that in the Sinitic 
context of supply chain management, understanding key concepts of culture – 
particularly low-trust, relationships, and guanxi – help lower supply-related risks and 
improve business practice generally.    






















 2.2 SC Risk 
“Supply chain management” occurs first in Oliver and Webber’s article of 1982, 
despite no prior literature having explicitly announced “supply chain”. The present 
review is logically rather than historically ordered, so elucidates SC before SCM.  
 
“Supply chain” began receiving theoretical attention in the 1990s. To craft value- and 
demand-related concepts that required contrastive qualification, academic writers 
coined revisionist definitions (see Table 1). Gereffi (1994), for example, writing at a 
time when continued geographical diffusion of manufacturing looked inevitable and 
irreversible, argued for the replacement of “supply chain” with “commodity chain” in 
acknowledgement of technological parity across the increasingly global nature of 
production.  
 
Because “supply” infers supplier, not customer, supremacy, Christopher (1998) and 
Vollman et al (2000) proposed extension beyond the supplier-buyer dichotomy, with 
their term “demand chain”. Walters and Rainbird (2004) and de Treville et al (2004) 
later asserted that “demand” is more descriptive: the demand chain subordinates the 
SC, and thereby subjugates the SC to functional status. “Chain” invokes linear 
arrangements of nodes – a configuration that although perhaps logically envisioned 
is rarely reflective of diffuse sourcing and production. Lambert et al (1998) restate 
the linear imagining of supply by describing SCs as companies aligned for the 
purpose of bringing goods to market. Even though Christopher (1992) described SCs 
as “networked organisations”, the more realist descriptor “network” has yet to replace 
“chain”.  
 
Several definitions of SC dominate. Christopher (1992, p.10) offers a generic and 
much-cited definition: the SC is “a network of organisations that are involved through 
upstream and downstream linkages…in the different processes and activities that 
produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate 
consumers.” This definition portrays multiple organisations operating upstream and 




In the 1990s, highly-cited, representative definitions of SC, such as the above, 
emphasized the networking and connectedness elements of the SC concept. Later 
definitions describe features of the SC. Acceptance of the core concept is inferable 
when the discussion moves toward particulars. For example: Ritchie and Brindley 
(2000) call for a definition that mentions the flow of information and finance that is, 
they claim, the lifeblood of the SC. Such a claim would be groundless if the 
integrated network/relationship attribute of the SC was untenable and unaccepted. 
By 2000, influential authors were describing the traits of competitive SCs. 
 Christopher and Towill (2000) and Mason-Jones et al (2000) advocated the 
lean and agile SC – a notion that recurs heavily in the literature of the subsequent 
decade. Similarly, Christopher and Peck (2004, p.1) defined SCs as “dynamic 
networks of interconnected firms and industries” and then proposed the resilient SC 
(discussed later).  
 
Various post-1990 definitions of SC mention integration and relationships (see red 
text in Tables 1 to 3), and a steady ascension from SC-as-concept into SC-as-
paradigm is discernible.  
Streams have emerged in the literature. Articles discuss SCs from one of 
three perspectives: structural, systems, and strategic or relational. Of these, only the 
systems perspective corresponds with the concerns of traditional logistics: systems 
literature focusses on improvement in processes and efficiencies (Cooper et al, 
1997). The structural perspective focusses on competitive advantage through 
optimal configuration, in which each activity translates to customer value – making 
SC concepts similar to Porter’s “Value Chain” (1985).  
 
Later research (e.g. Ritchie and Brindley, 2000) shows deepening interest in the 
relationship aspects of SCs. Here focus is on the creation and management of inter-
organizational relationships, to enable operational and strategic integration and 








Table 1 A Chronology of Authorship and Definitions of “Supply Chain” (SC) 
 
 
Year Author(s) Term Definition/Concept 
1988 Houlihan SC 
[The SC] operates as a single process. Responsibility for the entire 
chain is centralized. Supply is the common objective of every 
function of every firm in the chain. 
1989 Stevens SC 
[The SC is] a system whose constituent parts include material 
suppliers, production facilities, distribution services and customers 
linked together by feed-forward flow of material and feedback flow 
of information. 
1992 Christopher SC  
[The SC is] a network of organisations that are involved, through 
upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services in 
the hands of the ultimate consumer. 
1994 
La Londe and 
Masters 
SC  
“[The SC is] a group of firms connected by the sequence of the 
passing onward of materials or product. 
1998 Aitken SC 
[The SC is] a network of connected and interdependent 
organisations mutually and cooperatively working together to 
control, manage and improve the flow of materials and information 
from suppliers to end users. 
1998 Lambert et al SC 
[The SC consists of] firms aligned for the purpose of delivering 
products to market. 
1998 Morehouse SC 
[Supply chains are] extended enterprises with relationships which 






[The SC] encompasses all activities associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods from the raw material stage (extraction), 
through to the end user, as well as associated information flows. 
Supply chain management is the integration of these activities 
through improved supply chain relationships to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage. 
2001 Mentzer et al SC 
 [The SC is] a set of three or more companies directly linked by one 
or more of the upstream and downstream flows of products, 
services, finances, and information from a source to a customer. 
2004 Hines SC 
[The SC] covers all activities associated in acquiring and moving 







[The SC] conceptually covers the entire physical process from 
obtaining the raw materials through all process steps until the 
finished product reaches the end consumer. Most supply chains 
consist of many separate companies, each linked by virtue of their 





[The SC] is a network of partners who collectively convert a basic 
commodity (upstream) into a finished product (downstream) that is 





[The SC] consists of all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in 
fulfilling a customer request. 
2010 Peck SC 
[SCs] comprise flows of materials, goods, and information 
(including money), which pass between and within organizations, 
linked by a range of tangible and intangible facilitators, including 
relationships, processes, activities and integrated information 
systems. They are also linked by physical distribution networks, 
and the national/international communications and transport 
infrastructures. In their totality, supply chains link organizations, 
industries, and economies. 
2010 Rushton et al SC “supply chain = suppliers + logistics + customers”  
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2.2.1 Supply Chain Management (SCM) Defined 
In the 1980s and 1990s, several theorists proposed concepts highly analogous with 
SCM (see Table 2). These concepts, because they parallel SCM, imply a burgeoning 
consensus among business academics that a SC-like phenomenon was actual and 
awaiting formalization in theory. 
 
Table 2 A Chronology of Terms/Concepts Analogous with “Supply Chain 
Management” (SCM) 
 
In the case of SCM, definitional diversity reflects the evolution of the concept/theory 
succinctly. Definitional diversity, although a complicating factor in a synoptic 
literature review such as this and in academic taxonomy generally, is not entirely 
negative: Anderson (1983) claims that diversity within a field deepens the knowledge 
base; the status of a field is enhanced if debate occurs, because diversity signifies 
epistemological precociousness and industrial relevance. 
 
Cooper et al (1997) posit that “SCM” and “logistics” were once interchangeable and 
synonymous terms. According to Sweeney (2011), the definitions of SCM are 
multiple and agreement sparse. The present author contends that definitions vary, 
but mostly by emphasis – the majority exhort cross-entity integration, relationships, 
and material and informational flow (Table 3 presents the most influential SCM 
definitions). A philosophical commonality prevails: integrated SCs provide 
performance benefits (New, 1996).  
 
Year Author(s) Term/Concept 
1984  Burt integrated purchasing strategy 
1991  Ellram an alternative form to vertical integration 
1991  Farmer and Ploos van Amstel supply pipeline management 
1992 Lee and Billington value-added chain 
1993  Lamming       buyer-supplier relationship; supply base management 
1994  Nishiguchi supply networks 
1997  Farmer supply pipeline management 
1997  Jones et al value stream 
1997  Lee and Ng management of a network of organizations or entities 
1997 Lewis et al supply base management, strategic supplier alliances 
1997  New and Ramsay lean chain approach 
1998  Tan et al supply chain synchronization 
1998  Dyer et al supplier integration 
1998  Nassimbeni network supply chain 
1999  Harland et al supply strategy 
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Table 3  A Chronology of “Supply Chain Management” (SCM) 
 





Proposed a theory of distribution management 
that advances integration as vital to 
organisational relationships. Advantage can be 
achieved by improved understanding of the 
relationships between functions within the 
company, and between companies and their 
markets, their industries, and the broader 
economic environment. Inadequate 
communication along any supply system 
generates disadvantageous outcomes, such as 








Company competitive advantage can be achieved 
by examination and improvement of logistics 
systems. Logistics is "the economy’s dark 
continent", i.e. that part of a business’s 
organisational structure most likely to evade 
scrutiny and therefore least likely to be subjected 
to profit-based reconfiguration.  
1982 Oliver and Webber SCM  
[SCs include] the flow of goods from supplier to 
end user, through the manufacturing and 
distribution chains.” [SCs have four key features:]  
 they must be perceived and managed as a 
single whole,  
 they must be governed strategically,  
 systemic integration must be rigorous, and 
 inventory balancing can occur within the SC 
only as a final measure. 
1991 Ellram  SCM 
[SCM is] an integrated approach for dealing with 
planning and control of materials from suppliers to 
end users. 
1992 Christopher SCM  
[SCM is] the management of a network of 
organisations that are involved, through upstream 
and downstream linkages, in the different 
processes and activities that produce value in the 
form of products and services in the hands of the 
ultimate customer. 
1993 Cooper and Ellram  SCM  
[SCM is] a form of vertical integration between 
separate identities, and a management 
philosophy or corporate ethos of integration, 
corporation, and co-ordinated group effort. 
1994 La Londe and Masters SCM 
[SCM involves] two or more firms in the SC 
entering into a long-term agreement”, “ the 
development of trust and commitment to the 
relationship”, “the integration of logistics activities 
involving the sharing of demand and sales data”, 
and “the potential for a shift in the locus of control 
of the logistics process”. 
1995 Berry et al  SCM 
[SCM] aims at building trust, exchanging 
information and market needs, developing new 
products, and reducing the supply base to a 
particular original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
so as to release management resources for 
developing meaningful, long-term relationships. 
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Year Authors(s) Term Definition/Concept 
1997 Cooper et al SCM 
[SCM is] the integration of business processes 
across the supply chain; an integrating philosophy 
to manage the total flow of the distribution 
channel from supplier to ultimate customer. 
1998 
Council of Supply Chain 
Management 
Professionals (CSCMP)  
 
This definition was used 
by the Council of 
Logistics Management 
(CLM), the organisation 
that became the CSMP.  
Logistics 
versus SCM 
Articulated concisely the emerging distinction 
between SCM and logistics: Logistics is that part 
of the supply chain process that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective 
flow and storage of goods, services, and related 
information from the point of origin to the point of 
consumption in order to meet customer’s 
demands.  
1998 Lambert et al  SCM 
[SCM] is the integration of key business 
processes from end-user through original 
suppliers that provides products, services, and 
information and advice for customers and other 
stakeholders. 
[SCM] deals with total business process 
excellence and represents a new way of 
managing the business and relationships with 
other members of the SC. 
1998 
Monczka, Trent and 
Handfield  
SCM  
[SCM is] a system of management that demands 
centralised coordination of all material flows and 
related processes, achieved by integration with 
suppliers in all tiers. [SCM is] a concept of 
incorporation for the purpose of control, which is 
realised via a system of total management with 
influence over all functions and tiers. 
1999 Lummus and Vokurka SCM 
[SCM] is traceable directly back to the 
introduction of Quick Response (QR) 
manufacturing techniques pioneered by the 
textiles industry and Efficient Customer Response 
(ECR) in the groceries industry. 
2000 Simchi-Levi et al  SCM 
[SCM] is a set of approaches utilised to efficiently 
integrate suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses, 
so that merchandise is produced and distributed 
at the right quantities, to the right locations and at 
the right time, in order to minimise system-wide 
costs while satisfying service level requirements. 
2010 




[SCM] encompasses the planning and controlling 
of all processes involved in procurement 
conversion, transportation and distribution across 
a supply chain. SCM includes coordination and 
collaboration between partners, which can be 
suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service 
providers, and customers. In essence, SCM 
integrates supply and demand management 
within and between companies in order to serve 
the needs of the end customer. 
 
The red text in these tables reveals the prevalence of integration and related 




2.2.2 SCM Philosophy 
The philosophy of SCM seems embodied in the concept of integration, which in 
multiple-firm scenarios is believed to generate competitive advantages for the 
aggregate. Concern with tools and techniques has not however subsided. In fact, 
SCM reveals its historical and continuing proximity with operations management and 
logistics by its borrowing of lean, agile, leagile, and other manufacturing concepts (all 
of which are discussed later).  
 
The SCM philosophy can be considered generative and/or symptomatic of a shift 
away from production-side prioritizing, push-dominant systems toward customer-
oriented, pull-dominant systems. The concept of logistics’ transformation into 
integrative systems thinking is not unique to the SCM philosophy. At least three other 
models chart a similar path: 
 Masters and Pohlen (1994): logistics management and roles of managers; 
 La Londe  and Masters (1994): three phases of logistics integration; and 
 Battaglia (1994): fragmentation-to-integration: from logistics to SCM. 
 
Despite the modernity suggested by notions of collaboration and integration, the 
SCM concept invokes systems theories of the 1950s and generalist concepts of 
holism and synergy (Cavinato, 1992). Antecedence is perceptible in early 
theorisation on holistic approaches to logistics chains (e.g. Lewis, 1956) and the 
“Total Cost” approach by Heckert and Minor (1940).  
 
Davenport (1998) and Fawcett and Magnan (2002) argue that companies fail to reap 
the benefits proclaimed by SCM proponents. They cite the increasing complexity 
incurred by the centralisation inherent in the coordination of collaborative practice, 
the increasingly global nature of SCs, and the ever compressing lifespans of the 
products that SCs deliver. The reasons why companies fail to achieve competitive 
advantage through SCM have received sparse discussion, and empirical support for 




2.2.3 Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) 
Cooper et al (1997) observed that since the “logistical chain” evolved into a SC, risks 
have multiplied and the character of risk is complicating as SCs elongate. By the 
2000s, discussion of logistics and supply management occurred within the SCM 
paradigm. The prominence of SC risk and its management has grown accordingly.  
 
“Risk” is conceptualised variously, depending on the business literature in which it 
appears (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). The SCM theorists Harland et al (2003, p.52) 
defined risk as “chance or danger of damage, loss, injury, or any other undesired 
consequences”.  
 
The sources of SC risk have become germane to the study of SCM. To Christopher 
(2000) and Cohen (2000), one key source is demand uncertainty. Ritchie and 
Brindley (2000) and Johnson (2001) attribute SC risk to a duplex composite of 
demand- and supply-side uncertainty. The foregoing are somewhat circular 
deductions: risk is rooted in uncertainty, which is risk. Perhaps the point to note is 
that SC risk – when discussed in the SCM literature – is typically countered by 
application of SCM principles: by improved integration between marketing and 
production, for example (Christopher 1998, 2000).  
 
Christopher and Peck (2004) aver that longer SCs have greater vulnerability. To 
reap SC efficiencies, organisations and their value-creating processes must have 
stable links and nodes. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) report that internationally active 
firms operate complex SCs that demand coordinated cross-border exchange of 
information, materials, capital, and goods. It is rational to assume that the 
performance of global SCs is determined by multiple factors, some of which will be 
purely logistical/operational (transportation or product quality related), structural 
(coordination and control related), microeconomic, and cultural/interpersonal. To 
date, researchers have concentrated on the logistical/operational factors in this 
matrix. The literature lacks conceptual frameworks and empirically supported 
theorization to furnish practitioners with normative guidance on cultural and country-




Svenssen (2001) believes SC risk is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, and 
divides sources of SC risk into two categories: atomistic or holistic. Atomistic sources 
concern simple, low volume, generic, or highly available materials and components. 
Such risks might be context-specific, unique, and contained. Holistic risks occur in 
complex product-generating SCs. Holistic risk is potentially contagious, structural, 
and generally impactful.  
Mason-Jones and Towill (1998) stream SC risk into three categories: 1. 
internal to firm (processes, control); 2. external to firm but internal to SC network 
(demand and supply fluctuations); and 3. purely external (e.g. environmental). 
The issue of SC risk compels consideration of the correspondent notions of SC 
resilience and vulnerability (hereafter “SCRES” and “SCV” respectively).The study of 
SCRES and SCV is a steadily developing territory in logistics and SC research. A 
report commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2001 (Cranfield) 
could be regarded as the germinating document. The report (p.2) defines SCV as 
“exposure to serious disturbance, arising from risks within the supply chain as well 
as risks external to the supply chain”. This definition indicates that its authors, like 
Mason-Jones and Towill (1998), divide risk into internal and external. Internal risk, 
we learn, concerns factors under direct management control (e.g. product 
specifications, statements of work, quality standards); external risk concerns events 
and conditions management cannot control (e.g. commodity prices, natural disasters, 
macroeconomic turbulence, disruptive sociopolitical events). 
 
Harland et al (2003) articulated the advantages of global SCs: outsourcing; 
borderless transfer of capital, information, people, products and services; expansive 
e-business opportunities; acquisition of human capital and technology; and 
exploitation of economies of location (labour costs, currency differentials, productivity 
levels, and taxes).  
 
The SC literature overlooks the general but significant “liabilities of foreignness” that 
feature strongly in the discourse on foreign direct investment (e.g. Hymer, 1960; 
Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). If the foreignness penalty is tenable, 
the global SC is an intrinsically risk-fraught apparatus, with precariousness 




Table 4 provides several definitions of risk from SCM specialists (academics such as 
Waters, and practitioner-focussed writers such as Emmett), operations management 
theorists (Schroeder and Slack et al), and generalists (The Royal Society, 1983; 
Adams, 1996). 
 
The preceding discussion and the following definitions indicate convergence on the 





Table 4 Definitions of "Risk" 
 
The selection of these definitions was purposeful: a focus on risk as it appears in 
SC(M) literature alone would be excessively narrow; in many texts, SCM and SCRM 
are discussed as disciplines and sub-disciplines under operations management; 
several key articles on SCRM cite generalists’ definitions; inclusion of definitions 





Risk is the variation in the distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, their 
likelihood, and their subjective values. (p.1404) 
Risk is probability (of a given event) X severity (negative business impact) 
(p.1405) 
1993 Schroeder 
In operations management, most risk is type I and type II error, and the possibility 
of the occurrence of negative events caused by a mixture of internal and external 
factors.    
1996 Adams 
Risk focuses on the identification, quantification, management, and reduction of 
specifically identified, quantifiably expressed, purposefully narrowed known 
knowns. 
2001 Borge 
Risk is a measure of the possible upside and downside of a single rational and 
quantifiable financial decision. (p.3) 
2003 Hetland Risk is an implication of a phenomenon being uncertain. (p.59) 
2004 Slack et al  
Operational risk is mostly external in nature: natural disasters, terrorist incidents, 
industrial disputes, and plant incidents (which could result from factors that are 
external, internal, or a combination of both). 
2005 Emmett 
In SCs, risk is the product of internal factors such as weak links and choke points, 
and external factors such as material availability and other macroeconomic 
conditions. 




Risk is related to the number of handoff stages within the SC: the risk of 
something going wrong increases in proportion to the number of handoff points. 
2007 Waters 
Risks to the supply chain are unforeseen events that might interrupt the smooth 
flow of materials. There are always risks that the delivery will be later than 
promised, the goods will be damaged or lost, the wrong product will be delivered 
the wrong amounts, the delivery will go to the wrong place, the invoice will have a 
mistake, the customer will not pay – or the many other things that can go wrong. 
(p.14) 
The main risk to supply chain is disruption to the flow of materials. (p.17) 
Risk occurs because there is uncertainty about the future. This uncertainty 
means that unexpected, risky events may occur. Some [risks] arise from external 
effects on the environment, while others arise from internal operations; some are 
long-term so might strike at any point into the far future, and others are short-term 
and soon disappear; some have minor impact, while others destroy entire supply 
chains; some appear regularly in normal operations, and others are one-off 
disruptions such as natural as disasters. But the risks can only really materialise 
when some harmful events actually occur. (p.14) 
The essential feature of risk is a quantifiable analysis, principally involving events 
with known probabilities. Risk management becomes the broad function for 
dealing with risk. (p.18) 
2010 Waters 
Risk to supply chains is any threat of an event that might disrupt normal flows of 
materials or stop things happening as planned. (p.474) 
Risk management is the process for systematically identifying, analysing and 
responding to risks throughout an organisation. (p.477) 
2014 
Manners-
Bell et al 
Emerging markets/less developed and developing countries pose a greater 
source of threat [risk] to supply chains than developed regions.  
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from various sources reveals definitional commonality across a broad spectrum of 
literature. 
 
Because SCs are becoming leaner and more agile, and because suppliers are 
increasingly globally dispersed, today’s SCs are fragile and prone to interruption 
(Emmett, 2005). Potentially, the risk of disruption has increased dramatically as a 
result of excessive focus on the efficiency of SCs, at the expense of effectiveness 
(Christopher, 2002). For example, the cost-savings alleged to derive from reduced 
inventory systems can be neutralised by the risks that such minimalist practices 
impose on system-wide performance. Unless management recognises the challenge 
and acts upon it, the implications could be “chilling” (Christopher, 2002). For Slack et 
al (2004), such “chilling” effects are natural disasters, terrorism, industrial disputes, 
and plant incidents, i.e. external factors. Like Schroeder (a fellow operations 
management theorist), Slack et al (2004) omit mention of the internal complexities 
and human factors that must arise when SCs globalise.  
 
Manners-Bell et al (2014) claim that manufacturing in emerging markets is 
intrinsically more risky than manufacturing in developed countries. Of particular 
relevance to this research is the issue of risk in China-operating SCs.  
 
3.1.3.1 SCRM Defined 
Paulsson, in his extensive review (2004) of SCRM, defines SCRM (p.80) as “to, 
collaboratively with partners in the supply chain or on your own, apply risk 
management process tools to deal with risks and uncertainties caused by, or 
impacting on, logistics related activities or resources in the supply chain.” This is an 
enlargement of Norrman and Lindrith’s definition (2002,  p.7): “Supply chain risk 
management is to, collaboratively with partners in a supply chain apply risk 
management  process tools to deal with risks and uncertainties caused by, or 
impacting on, logistics related activities or resources.” 
 
SCRM is defined by Jüttner et al (2003, p.9) as “the identification of potential sources 
of risk and implementation of appropriate strategies through a coordinated approach 




2.2.4 Supply Chain Resilience (SCRES) 
Christopher and Peck (2004) maintain that resilience in SCs requires flexibility and 
agility. SCRES is contingent on efficient and reliable transportation and 
communication systems. These rudimentary variables are commonly overlooked by 
SC theorists and usually absent from management concepts. These authors propose 
four basic conditions of SCRES: 
1. Resilience must characterize the entire SC design. This demands deep 
understanding and analysis of the SC. Mapping tools should be used to locate 
and manage “pinch points” and “critical paths”. 
2. High level collaboration helps identify and mitigate risk. 
3. Design of the SC must enable agility – the ability to respond rapidly to 
disruptive, unpredictable events. 
4. A risk-awareness culture must be inculcated at all levels of the organization, 
and a management culture of collaboration established. 
 
Christopher and Peck (2004) profess that SCRM is the antecedent of SCRES. 
Empirical support exists for SCRM, but for SCRES there is only conceptual support. 
To its credit however, SCRES is premised on the probabilistic position that resilience 
planning is sensible because risk is natural and disruption inevitable.  
Ponomarov and Holcomb, (2009, p.131) provide a precise definition of 
SCRES: “the adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected 
events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them and maintain continuity of 
operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over structure and 
function.” Later, Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) identify four capabilities as key to 
resilience:  
1. Flexibility: described by Peck (2005) as an elemental aspect of resilience, and 
by Skipper and Hanna (2009) as the capacity of the SC to effectively respond 
to adverse events. Tang and Tomlin (2008), among others, argue that 
flexibility must be designed directly into the SC. Sheffi and Rice (2005) 
encourage SC designers to include redundant systems to enhance resilience. 
2. Velocity concerns the efficiency of SC response and recovery. In recent years, 
velocity has gained ground as a credible alternative to SC inventory and/or 
redundant systems (Walden, 2006). Advocating timeliness as preferable to 
quantity (just-in-case) for the purposes of economy, velocity thinking invokes 
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just-in-time (JIT) and lean principles, and has thus acquired centrality within 
the SC orthodoxy. In terms of resilience however, velocity refers to the 
speediness of the SC’s response (Stevenson and Spring, 2007). 
3. Visibility: the identity, location, and status of entities and product in the SC. 
Visibility enables preventative planning and real-time corrections in proportion 
to the magnitude of the disruption. Visibility enhances SC responsiveness and 
recoverability. Several authors (e.g. Christopher and Peck, 2004; Chopra and 
Sohdi, 2004; Faisal et al, 2006) include visibility with flexibility as elements of 
agility (discussed later). 
4. Collaboration overlaps visibility since SCRES is a network-wide philosophy of 
practice. Individual organisations create SC visibility by exchanging 
information. Collaboration between organisations reduces uncertainty and 
increases readiness. Richey (2009) defines collaboration (p.623) as “the glue 
that holds supply chain organisations in a crisis together”.  
 
2.2.5 Supply Chain Vulnerability (SCV) 
To Jüttner and Maklan (2011), supply chain vulnerability (SCV) is the managerial 
counterpart of SCRM. Similarly, to Blos et al (2009) and Christopher and Peck 
(2004), SCV is the susceptibility of the SC to the possibility and ramifications of 
disruption. Since anything at risk is vulnerable, the existence and validity of SCRM 
declares SCs vulnerable. Thus, SCV and SCRM are commonly considered 
complementary (e.g. Wagner and Bode, 2006).  
 
2.2.6 Untangling SCRES, SCV, and SCRM 
Although SCV reduction is a major preoccupation of SCRM (Peck, 2006), SCV 
reduction does not necessarily increase SCRES. Suppliers might be located in 
politically stable countries, but SCV measures do not automatically improve SCRES. 
The only certain effect is reduction of the SC’s vulnerability to particular types of risk 
(political, economic etc.). However, knowledge of SC risk improves event readiness 
(SCRES), because it increases end-to-end visibility and shortens the time required 
for detection of events (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).  
 SCRM decreases SCV; SCRM increases SCRES (resilience↑ =  vulnerability↓) 
 SCRES decreases SCV  
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 SCV can be reduced by knowledge sharing, supplier collaboration, and other 
SCRM initiatives. SCRES increases as a result of such initiatives. 
 SCV does not increase SCRES. The inverse is the case: SCRES decreases 
SCV.  
 SCRM can decrease SCV directly, or indirectly through SCRES.  
 
2.2.7 Critiquing SCRM 
The literature of SCRM is coherent in its promulgation of SCM-compliant solutions to 
risk. Mitigation methods involve deeper application of SCM precepts. The possibility 
that risk might be addressed by adoption of an alternative philosophy awaits 
presentation.  
There is ambiguity concerning the applicability of SCRM. Can SCRM describe 
risk in SCM theory-compliant SCs alone, or in legacy systems and hybrids also? 
Does SCRM have value to non-SC systems or non-SCM supply arrangements? Is 
risk in non-integrated systems also an issue tackled by SCM theory? Christopher 
and Peck (2004) contend that lack of understanding among managers of their wider 
supply/demand network is strongly evident: managers envision their supply networks 
as linear configurations. This implies deficient comprehension of SCM principles on 
the part of managers, and prompts two questions:  
 How well are SCM and SCRM principles applied and understood by 
practitioners?  
 To what degree are the theories and concepts of SCM and SCRM applicable 
to (and reflective of) real world scenarios?   
 
2.2.8 Collaboration  
A conceptual paper by Christopher and Lee (2004) argues that in every industrial 
sector, demand volatility is higher than in the past and SCs are increasingly 
vulnerable to disturbance or disruption as they extend globally. The adoption of lean 
practices and outsourcing, along with general trends toward supplier base reduction, 
are typical responses to SC risk – but can actually increase SC risk. A key element 
in SC risk management is end-to-end visibility. SC confidence increases directly in 
proportion to SC information quality. The two principal factors of SC resilience are 




The question of whether collaboration – a core tenet of SCM – is necessarily 
beneficial was raised by Finch (2004), whose examination of the literature found the 
benefits to be acutely conditional on the composition of the collaborative 
membership. According to Finch’s summation, large companies can increase their 
SC risk by partnering with SMEs and engaging in inter-organisational networking. 
Also challenging the collaboration principle, Ellegaard (2008) revealed the 
following defensive supply risk management practices to be commonplace: 
knowledge protectionism (antithetical to the sharing ethos of SCM), local sourcing, 
and (more compliantly) relational methods, such as fairness, loyalty, and 
identification of responsive and dependable partner companies. Ellegaard proposed 
that relational practices are of value to purchasing and SC managers because they 
are feasible alternatives to formal methods of SC risk reduction.  
 
Working on the premise that SC risk management via formal means (i.e. contractual) 
is prevalent practice, Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) applied agency theory to case 
studies of logistics services SCs. Their study revealed four factors for consideration 
in the management of contractual relationships and the various interactions that 
occur inside SCs: 1. performance “attributability” (visibility); 2. balancing provider risk 
against reward; 3. provider’s freedom to transfer risk to subcontractors; and 4. 
relational governance along the SC. They concluded that service performance 
measurability can reduce risk, that performance influencing factors should be 
identified (roles, inputs, and requirements of customers and other relevant parties), 
that inputs from customers and third-parties are unambiguous and manageable, and 
that quality conditions in performance-based contracts are clearly stipulated. Of most 
significance to this research (and Ellegaard’s proposal) is these authors’ conclusion 
that relational governance can be used in conjunction with formal practices but is 
effective only in lowering particular types of risk. 
 
Further complicating the picture is the investigation by Dekker et al (2013) into how 
buyers manage risk in inter-firm transactions. Their study of Japanese manufacturing 
companies revealed that transaction-based relationships are less effective than 
competence trust as control practices. This conclusion is predicted by the SCM 
paradigm, since it favours extra-transactional collaboration. However, these authors 
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also deduced that contractual and other formal measures can reduce (not 
supplement) supplier cooperation. 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the consensus of the research into SC risk is that 
collaborative relationships offer more positives than negatives. The study by Zhai et 
al (2013) is exemplary: SC risk associates negatively with SC integration; the 
relationship between SC integration and performance is contingent. The key drivers 
of schedule attainment, competitive performance, and customer satisfaction are 
supplier performance, internal integration, and customer integration. 
 
Support for risk reduction through structural management involvement came from 
Blos et al (2009), who found that SC risk in the Brazillian automotive and electronic 
industries is managed by a set of specific activities: improved communications, risk 
and continuity planning and training, and creation of a chief risk officer to coordinate 
SC risks and responses. 
 
The findings of a survey by Lavastre et al (2012) were supportive: SC managers at 
French companies showed that to be effective, SCRM must be intrinsically inter-
organisational and tightly incorporated into the strategic and operational activities of 
all involved organisations.  
 
In strategic supplier relationships, the main form of risk management is collaborative 
learning (Hallikas et al, 2004). Mutual risk management and collaborative learning 
help SC members attain efficiencies. Collaborative relationships develop into 
strategic learning, joint measurement and innovation, protection of relationship-
relevant knowledge, and increased communication.  
Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) recorded the high value of cooperative 
learning, and found that SCs that combine learning with strong market- and agility-
orientation achieve reduced risk. They define SC “agility” as the capability (internally 
and with key suppliers and customers) to respond to market place change through 
effective SC partner interaction. Three practices influence agility positively: internal 
integration, external integration (with customers and suppliers), and external 
flexibility. Companies that are closely integrated with their suppliers and customers 
are better poised to react to market changes and SC disruptions. 
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The notion of flexibility through collaboration also appears in the work of Skipper and 
Hanna (2009), who consider flexibility a construct of top management support, 
resource alignment, usage and exchange of information and IT, and external 
collaboration.  
 
A qualitative study by Fawcett et al (2002) prompts a powerful meta-conclusion: 
formal management activities improve collaboration, innovation, and competitive 




Survey findings by Zsidisin and Smith (2005) showed that perceived SC risk 
decreases if Early Supplier Involvement (ESI) in product design occurs – because 
ESI intertwines partners’ outcomes and activities. Similarly, information exchange 
and relationship building was found to be key to supplier performance.  
 
Olaja and Hallikas (2006) investigated the effect of power disparity on relationships. 
They found that in buyer-dominant supply networks, most risks relate to supplier 
responsibility and information reliability. Four important factors were identified: 
openness, trust, power, and dependency. 
Leverick and Cooper (1998) found that adversarial relationships between 
suppliers and competitors become uncommon as collaboration increases. Their 
study of supplier-manufacturer relationships in the UK car industry identified a 
significant degree of collaborative supplier-manufacturer partnering.  
In supply networks, relationships and risk interact strongly (Hallikas et al, 2004). The 
optimal strategy is to achieve effective relationships by balancing the rewards and 
risks across related organisations. Partners must work collaboratively to identify risks 
that can be resolved by joint effort.  
 
Srinivasan et al’s survey of American firms (2011) yielded a conclusion that is 
representative: buyer-supplier relationship quality influences SC risk and 
performance strongly. Mutualist, non-adversarial relationships are optimal for the 




2.2.10 Supplier Selection 
Federgruen and Yang (2008) maintain that while SCM emphasises the benefits of 
consolidating suppliers, the problem of supplier selection is persistent. The 
distributed risk advantages of SCM are realizable only if selection is effective.   
 
According to Trkman et al (2010), identifying which suppliers pose greatest risk is the 
first step in SC disruption management. These researchers propose a method of 
identification that is consistent with post-Taylorian contingency theories: SC strategy 
associates closely with supplier non-performance risk. Suppliers must be closely 
monitored and replaced if their performance falters. The focal firm must not bind 
itself to suppliers that cannot cope with environmental turbulence or fail to comply 
with strategy (which has implications for collaboration). When selecting a supplier, 
firms must consider four variables: SC type, supplier type, geographical dispersion, 
and business structure. Suppliers’ shock absorption and resilience to tier 2 supplier 
disruption are also significant factors. 
 
Levary (2007) proposed a model that simplifies the selection of reliable overseas 
suppliers. Attributes of supplier risk are measured using a set of characteristics that 
represent risk and reliability. Connected suppliers are ranked for risk, so a general 
measure of risk in the “reliability chain” becomes ascertainable. Levary identified the 
following reliability criteria: 1. supplier reliability – trust in the supplier’s management, 
potential for labour issues, and intellectual property protection; 2. country risk – 
political environment, exposure to natural and man-made disasters, and currency 
risk; 3. transportation reliability – the efficiency of transport connections between 
supplier and the manufacturer; and 4. reliability of tier 2 suppliers. Of relevance to 
this research is Levary’s omission of interpersonal, cultural, and other human factors 
of SC risk. 
 
Wu and Olson (2008) offer an analytical tool for supplier/vendor selection based on 
simulations and calculation of risk. The tool enables trade-off analysis (expected 
costs, quality, on-time delivery, etc.). Kull and Talluri (2008) theorise a combination 
of analytical hierarchy process (AHP) with goal programming to assist in supplier 
selection. The combination acts as a supply risk reduction model that applies 
integrated multi-criteria decision making to help purchasing managers overcome the 
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supply risk-related problems of definition, operationalisation, and incorporation of risk 
measures into supplier selection.  
Olson and Wu (2011) claim that global outsourcing is increasingly important 
as e-commerce develops international business. Outsourcing has many advantages, 
but incurs risk due to real-time communication challenges and problems in enforcing 
supplier/vendor compliance and production standards. Data-based methods allow 
SC core organisations to select supply partners effectively.  
 
2.2.11 Contracts 
According to Li and Kouvelis (1999), contractual flexibility in sourcing agreements 
can reduce sourcing costs when price conditions are uncertain. In risky supply 
contracts, time flexibility provides major advantages, so is useful in environments 
where holding costs are low. Multi-supplier sourcing can reduce sourcing cost by 
offering quantity and flexibility. When risk-sharing windows are sufficiently wide, firms 
benefit most from exercising quantity and supplier flexibility.  
Xu et al (2014) proposed that SC coordination can be achieved via two-way 
revenue sharing contracts. Risk perception positively influences the parameters of 
the coordinating contract. Also, manufacturers could persuade retailers to enter 
cooperative relationships with them, so that win-win situations become possible. 
 
2.2.12 SC Complexity  
Risk increases in proportion to supply network complexity (Harland et al, 2003).  
Wagner and Bode’s investigation (2006) into SC vulnerability showed that executives 
regard SC vulnerability as comprising the following factors: dependency on particular 
customers and suppliers, intensity of single sourcing, and dependency on global 
supply. SC design must consider the variables related to these so that risk can be 
reduced. Organisations operating SCs should attempt to reduce SC complexity. 
Single and global sourcing are both useful and powerful when environmental factors 
are stable. However, during instability, both become sources of risk.  
 
According to Choi and Krause (2006), complexity is a key managerial consideration, 
particularly complexity of the supply base, which has three dimensions: 1. number of 
available suppliers; 2. extent of differentiation between suppliers; and 3. degree of 
interrelatedness between suppliers. Reduced complexity can lead to lower 
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transaction costs and greater supplier responsiveness (agility), but also to increased 
supply risk (resulting from reduced supplier innovativeness). Supply base/supply 
complexity reduction can lowers costs but negatively impact overall competitiveness 
if not applied selectively. 
 
A few researchers have investigated the conditionality of complexity factors: when 
suppliers are reliable, sole sourcing is the most cost-effective approach (Ruiz-Torres 
and Mahmoodi, 2007). With unreliable suppliers, more suppliers are required to 
achieve low costs. In extreme conditions (highly unreliable suppliers, high per- 
supplier losses, and inability to mitigate failure), a large number of suppliers 
constitutes optimum strategy. 
 
Thun and Hoenig (2011) aver that while reducing supplier numbers can enhance 
supplier relationships, excessive rationalisation increases dependency and its 
resultant risks. Offshoring increases SC vulnerability because global SCs are 
vulnerable to faults and complexity-related issues.  
 
2.2.13 Quality 
Risk-averse suppliers typically deliver high quality products, but supplier capability is 
not always indicative of high-quality – high capability suppliers sometimes deliver low 
quality goods (Starbird, 1994). Threat of rejection compels suppliers to 
improve/maintain quality. Starbird recommends acceptance sampling even when 
statistical justification is lacking. 
    
2.2.14 Intermediaries 
Wiengarten et al (2013) identified contextual factors as determinative of outsourcing 
success: legal risk decreases outsourcing performance on both cost and quality; 
supplier risk decreases quality. A combination of contracts and management of 




















2.3 Chinese Business Risk 
2.3.1 Chinese Business Patterns 
According to Limlingan (1986), Chinese business is highly relational. This is 
succinctly represented in the structure of the typical privately owned Chinese 
company system (in which institutional influence is negligible and private preference 
is determinative).  
 
Figure 7 (adapted from Limlingan, 1986) illustrates the strong tie/in-group dominant 
profile of the traditionally patterned Chinese company. Outsiders provide only those 
functions not available in the strong tie-bound in-group, so have no controlling stake 
in the organisation. For foreign companies seeking SC relationships with Chinese 
companies, this preference presents a challenge: can untrusted outsiders gain the 
influence and control available to strong tie-bound, in-group members? According to 
SCM principles, mutualism rewards all participants, but the in-group/out-group 
dichotomisation appears to oppose this tenet.  
 
2.3.2 Chinese Business Relationships 
Styles and Ambler (2003) claimed that China is a “highly relational society”, but 
found that transactional approaches to marketing in China coexist alongside the 
more commonly reported relational methods. The two approaches are compatible; 
their utility varying according to situation. Hence, elements of both approaches can 
be synthesised for advantage.  
 
In that they emphasize the relational nature of Chinese business, the foregoing 
studies are generally representative of the bulk of the literature. Wiley et al (2006), 
Figure 7 Structure of the Typical Private Chinese Company 
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however, claim the Chinese case is not unique. After reviewing theories on the 
impact of network relationships and conducting a survey of international B2B 
relationships in Swedish, German, and Chinese companies, they found no evidence 
to support the belief that Chinese firms are fundamentally different from European 
firms with regard to initiation of relationships, which relationships are important and 
why, and the nature of affect in important relationships.  
Further support for the non-uniqueness counterclaim comes from Björkmann 
and Kock (1995), whose survey showed that both Chinese and non-Chinese 
respondents reported social relationships as important in the marketing of goods and 
projects – relationship networks generally function as information and business 
exchange facilities. 
 
Su et al (2008) found that SC relationship quality (“SCRQ”) can influence 
cooperative strategy. Survey data from Chinese manufacturers showed that SCRQ 
can be considered a construct of communication, cooperation, trust, adaptation, and 
atmosphere; SCRQ also impacts significantly on the longevity, frequency, and 
diversity of relationships. 
 
Relationship quality was explored by Song et al (2012), whose survey of 
manufacturing firms in China found that the business relationship function impacts 
indirectly on buyer performance via the mediating effect of relationship quality. The 
business relationship function influences relationship quality more than buyer 
performance; a high level of availability of alternative suppliers weakens the 
influence of the business relationship function on relationship quality. This finding 
introduces conditionality into the business-by-guanxi and relationship notions: when 
suppliers are plentiful, relational factors become less determinative.  
 
In 2005, Wong et al investigated supplier-buyer dyads in Xian (China) to measure 
the long-term orientation of their relationships: when mutual commitment to quality 
improvement exists among supplier and customer, the partnership becomes 




Studies such as the foregoing investigated the role of SC relationships in the context 
of Chinese-to-Chinese SCs and found that relationship quality and trust were strong 
influencers of SC performance.  
 
For comparative purposes, the study by Coote et al (2003) of trust in the context of 
Chinese marketing is informative. Findings showed that relational commitment 
relates to trust (defined as “integrity and reliability”), communication quality, conflict, 
and similarity (social, ethnic, economic). By analysing 150 marketing relationships 
among overseas Chinese firms, support for trust, communication quality, conflict, 
and similarity was found – factors that these authors consider to be predictors of 
relationship commitment. They also note that ethnic similarity between interacting 
parties is likely an influencing factor. The study supports theories such as transaction 
cost economics that claim that trust, although a term with multiple interpretations 
(Williamson, 1975) is key to successful cooperative endeavours (Arrow, 1972), 
relational exchange, and reduced transaction risk.  
 
Such studies prompt a logical supposition: the relational and informal (i.e. trust-
based) management methods that are characteristic of Chinese business are 
discernible and active in China SC activity; hence, China SCM involves intangible 
but irreducible human interaction factors that facilitate the growth of the positive 
supplier relationships that, when mature, return the advantages of SCM. 
 
2.3.3 Trust 
To Buttery and Wong (1999), guanxi is Chinese relationship- and trust-building. 
Favour and face represent key attributes of business interaction, and, through trust-
building guanxi, outsiders evolve into insiders, who become business partners. A 
systematic review of “guanxi” in the business literature by Wilkinson (2011) showed 
that the discourse reports a distinct guanxi process: outsiders becomes insiders via 
trust-building interaction; when insider status is obtained, mutualism is assured, 
resources can then be exchanged and business advantages result.    
Wang (2005) asserts that China is a low trust society; hence, trust is the key 
component of guanxi, which is particularistic trust in the Chinese context. 
Introductions (via intermediaries) permit participation in networks, through which 
transactions can be enacted and resources exchanged. Guanxi-tied individuals are 
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expected to show mutual empathy. Guanxi trust involves bilateral confidence in the 
ability and willingness of a party to carry out expected behaviours in the appropriate 
manner. Exchange requires reciprocity, and trust can be extended by introduction 
from third-parties (intermediaries). The rules of renqing (which Wang interprets as 
“reciprocity” and “empathy” – see Chinese Terms in the Appendix) facilitate long-
term relationships and commitment.  
 
Ramasamy et al (2006) found that trust and communication are the main channels of 
knowledge transfer. Inter-organisational rules, if formal, impede resource allocation 
between firms and incentivise opportunistic behaviour. Trust and communication (i.e. 
a functioning guanxi relationship) are necessary for knowledge transfer and must 
exist before effective knowledge transfer can occur.  
 
Kriz and Keating (2010), in a concept paper that advocates business-by-guanxi, 
recommend foreign managers attempt to emulate the trust that is a central, albeit 
undertheorised, fundamental of Chinese business. Trust in Chinese business 
exchange is culturally encoded in the concept of xinren or “deep trust” (see Chinese 
Terms in the Appendix), which is achieved through reciprocal behaviour and 
emotional bonding. Such behaviours precede trust-based transactions. Once 
developed, trust generates guanxi networks whose power can be harnessed for the 
purpose of resource and information exchange.  
 
Several studies on trust in Chinese business confirm the assertion by earlier 
researchers (e.g. Guthrie, 1998) that guanxi is in retreat as formal institutions 
improve. Tan et al’s (2009) argument is representative: guanxi is fading as market 
system trust, supported by increasingly potent institutions, improves. Increase in 
system trust is also reforming Chinese management style, which increasingly reflects 
market economics and closer incorporation of the customer (findings that correlate 
with Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009, and Zhai et al, 2013).  
 
Chua et al (2009) found that trust and network size/guanxi-connectedness 
correspond. For Chinese managers, a relationship’s embeddedness in third-party 
ties increases his/her trustworthiness – a finding that supports the studies that 
recommend the use of intermediaries. Concepts and practices of trust, although 
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important to both Chinese and Western managers, differ in cultural expression. In 
Chinese scenarios, personal relationships influence business decisions significantly, 
to an extent that Westerners may perceive cronyism and underhandedness in 
Chinese business practices. In China, well-connected people are perceived as 
trustworthy and reliable, and transactional relationships are usually suboptimal.  
 
2.3.4 Guanxi    
The paper by Lee and Humphreys (2007) offers the earliest instance of specific 
discussion of guanxi in relation to supply. These researchers surveyed Hong Kong-
based electronics companies to assess the impact of guanxi on three aspects of SC 
management: strategic purchasing, outsourcing, and supplier capability development. 
Responses indicated strongly that guanxi exerts significant influence on all three. 
The authors conclude that guanxi proficiency is a valuable asset for Chinese supply 
managers. 
 
Cheng et al (2012) investigated the impact of guanxi on supply risk, exploring 
supplier management through the relational approach that, according to influential 
earlier papers (such as Xin and Pearce, 1996), characterises the Chinese business 
environment. When supply risk exists, suppliers utilise their guanxi networks to 
achieve continuity: purchasing firms leverage guanxi networks with key suppliers; 
through guanxi development, community business interests improve, and these in 
turn enhance performance. Supply risk in the Chinese context can thus be 
considered moderated by guanxi. These two studies typify what can be labelled the 
“business-by-guanxi” recommendation.  
 
Developing the premise that Chinese business is relational and that guanxi can be 
defined as “connections” (Xin and Pearce, 1996); “networking” in the sense of 
Chinese business is the pursuit or utilisation of guanxi for business gain.  
 
Jansson et al (2007) claimed networked firms operate as “institutionalised actors”. 
Chinese business networks exhibit high patience and long-term orientation, but often 
feature weak, unpredictable, and opaque institutions. Western businesses are 
expected to make deep investments in Chinese business networks and demonstrate 
61 
 
strong commitment before obtaining acceptance as valid partners. Trust is earned 
through demonstrations of commitment.  
 
Ren et al (2010) maintain that guanxi-like relationships develop business-essential 
interpersonal trust. As tools of control and performance guarantee, explicit contracts 
are redundant in China, which is a low-trust, collectivist society, i.e. a culture in which 
high trust is extended to in-group members, but very low trust extended to out-group 
members. Nonetheless, weaker partners in asymmetrical relationships can benefit 
from formal contracts. Trust between retailers and suppliers can reduce conflict and 
improve performance. Trust is crucial to exchange relationships (as observed by 
transaction cost theorists such as Arrow, 1972); and in China, trust and guanxi 
associate strongly.  
However, a survey of Chinese buyer-supplier dyads by Liu et al (2008) 
challenges this deduction: while relationship length and solidarity reduces buyers’ 
perception of relational risk, guanxi can weaken buyers’ trust in suppliers’ 
competence. The implications of this are counterintuitive: guanxi does not 
necessarily predict trust in competence.  
 
Extending Granovetter’s embeddedness theory (1985), Su et al (2009) argue that 
performance of companies in emerging markets is strongly influenced by economic 
and sociocultural factors. Foreign companies operating in such environments require 
strategies that concentrate on interpersonal influence. Interpersonal influence in the 
case of China is embodied in the concept of guanxi. As argued by other authors (e.g. 
Gu et al, 2008; Arribas et al, 2013), guanxi is the Chinese equivalent of social capital. 
Guanxi-oriented companies show high levels of dependence, have boundary 
spanners that represent and utilise social capital, and organise on the basis of 
cultural values. Guanxi-oriented companies encourage personnel to build trust and 
exploit their personal resources for business advantage.  
 
Barnes et al (2011) found empirical support for the importance of guanxi in the 
Chinese supply business. These researchers disaggregate guanxi into three 
dimensions: ganqing (feeling), renqing (emotion), and xinren (trust), all of which, they 
posit, are influential in cooperation and coordination, lead to improved supplier 
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performance, and must be adopted by Western companies working with Chinese 
suppliers (see Chinese Terms in the Appendix). 
 
Sternquist and Wang (2010) disagree. They detail the various penalties of guanxi 
and rebut the oft-heard advice that international business people in China should 
develop business guanxi. They allege that guanxi is increasingly regarded 
pejoratively – retailers, for example, often forbid buyers to build guanxi with suppliers.  
 
The dark side of guanxi includes excessive mutual obligation and group blindness. 
Relationships between buyers and salespeople can foster corruption via gift giving 
and other informal practices. Firms with central buying systems, such as state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), are more likely to have buying committees, which reduce 
the influence of guanxi on purchasing decisions. By broadened implication, this study 
confirms the claims by other researchers (e.g. Guthrie, 1998; Anderson and Lee, 
2008) that preference for non-guanxi business dealings is increasing as the efficacy 
of formal institutions improves.  
 
The study by Cai et al (2010) is supply-relevant and similarly confounding: guanxi is 
only one in a trinity of China’s institutional environment features influencing the 
integration of trust and information flow between suppliers and buyers, the others 
being legal protection and formal government control.  
 
2.3.4.1 Guanxi: Advantages and Disadvantages 
A 1995 study by Davies et al reported that Hong Kong and Western executives both 
perceive guanxi creation and maintenance as essential for business in the Chinese 
market. Westerners reported that the real decision maker is often elusive – an 
observation possibly explicable by the tendency of Chinese business to operate 
collectively. Westerners must establish their own guanxi networks, and transcend 
transactional methods in order to cultivate personal relationships with facilitating 
individuals.  
 
A conceptual paper by Standifird and Marshall (2000) describes several transaction 
cost advantages of business-by-guanxi and makes a highly conditional (and 
somewhat convoluted) recommendation: where guanxi networks are well-developed, 
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guanxi-facilitated transactions are advantageous to the degree that the incorporation 
of guanxi-based and market-based exchange mechanisms should be adopted. 
Ambler and Styles (2000) argue that guanxi should be regarded not as a business 
enabler in its own right, but as a conduit through which information and Keynesian 
“animal spirits” can flow. 
 
Su and Littlefield (2001) distinguish between forms of guanxi, finding two: favour-
seeking, which is culturally embedded, and rent-seeking, which is institutionally-
derived. They identify three distinct benefits for business: guanxi provides 
information on market trends, policies, regulations, and opportunities; guanxi enables 
access to resources (transportation, bureaucracy bypassing etc.); and guanxi 
smoothens transactions and establishes trustworthiness. 
 
Defining guanxi as “a process of social interactions”, Fan (2002b), contends that the 
presence of a “guanxi base” (special relationship) does not necessarily entail 
production of guanxi. The author makes five assertions: 1. the advantages of guanxi 
are tactical (i.e. short-term) rather than strategic; 2. guanxi alone cannot provide 
sustained competitive advantage (the same is argued by many researchers); 3. 
guanxi between business people and government are intrinsically ethically 
problematic; 4. guanxi impacts on the wider public so should be evaluated in the 
context of all stakeholders (direct and indirect); and 5. guanxi is waning as China’s 
formal structures improve and its markets open (this was the deduction of Guthrie 
and others). 
 
Luo’s conceptual paper (2008) argues that the intertwinement of guanxi and 
corruption over the last 30 years has impacted negatively on business performance, 
culture, and practice. Guanxi takes two forms: weak and strong (see Chinese Terms 
in the Appendix). Between these are webs-of-friendship guanxi (see Chinese Terms 
in the Appendix), which can include distant relatives and acquaintances. In Chinese 
tradition, kinship-based social bonds and cliquism are well-established relationship 
norms (also observed by Limlingan, 1986, in relation to overseas Chinese economic 




Warren et al (2004) describe guanxi as the “double-edged sword” of “social 
exchange”. Two studies of Chinese business people showed that guanxi is both 
advantageous and disadvantageous for key persons and groups, but not equally so, 
depending on the context. Guanxi ties have a “wrong side” and a “right side”. They 
conclude that guanxi both benefits and harms Chinese society. 
 
Chen and  Chen (2009) critically analysed close guanxi and found that favour 
exchanges benefit guanxi partners but create significant negative externalities for 
non-guanxi parties (outgroup members) and organisations as a whole. “Relationalist” 
values can worsen negative externalities, but individual and institutional factors can 
reduce them. Yi and Ellis (2000) also examined the insider/outsider implications of 
business guanxi - their survey revealed business-by-guanxi yields three times more 
benefits than losses.  
 
Nie et al (2011) found that a distinctly negative side of guanxi exists: obligations and 
commitments prevent optimal decision making in business processes.  
 
2.3.4.2 Guanxi: Evolution and Decline 
According to Wank (1996), China’s post-Mao market economy is characterised by 
inefficiency and statist involvement. Property rights and legal structures function 
alongside social institutions such as trust and morality. Business people pursue 
advantage through networks rather than company strategies. Collectivism and 
tactics are major features of guanxi.  
 
Guthrie’s heavily cited conceptual paper (1998) proposes a notion that evidence 
from later studies supports: guanxi is declining as China’s economy transitions 
toward a free market and its institutions improve. Guthrie notes that managers in 
China do not view Chinese networking as significantly different from networking 
elsewhere (claims supported by Puffer et al, 2010 and Smith et al, 2012). Guthrie 
concedes that guanxi and gift-giving remain significant, but are not majorly 
performance-determinative.  
Guthrie sees guanxi as dynamic, its power and utility changing in response to 
external developments. At the time of its writing, the paper interrupted the consensus 
of the literature, which held that guanxi is a rigid trait of Chinese life that will obstruct 
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economic development and complicate the venturing of MNEs. Guthrie claims this 
describes the pre-reform era, but is less true in the present urban-industrial era. 
Hitherto, the literature documented the presence and complexities of guanxi deeply, 
but nuanced discussion of guanxi practice was scarce – cultural emulation and 
business-by-guanxi recommendations appear to have proliferated largely 
unchallenged.  
 
Fan (2002a) states that although guanxi can benefit individuals and organisations, 
such benefits are often obtained at the expense of other (i.e. outgroup) individuals 
and organisations. As an institution, guanxi, impacts the wider public, usually 
negatively. Guanxi remains an indispensable necessity of business, but its power is 
declining as China strengthens its market system and institutional infrastructure.  
 
The guanxi-in-decline argument has dissenters. Yang (2002) proposes that decline 
advocates perceive guanxi incorrectly – i.e. as static and fading as China introduces 
legal and commercial change. According to Yang, guanxi is evolving in response to 
changes in social institutions and globalisation – an assertion supported by 
Michailova and Worm’s 2003 study of Russian blat. (Interestingly, given the 
methodological stance of this research, Yang argues that positivist methodologies 
are uninformative in the study of guanxi.) 
 
Dunning and Kim (2007) attribute guanxi to Confucianism, particularly the Confucian 
emphases on human interdependence and properness in social conduct. Few 
studies situate guanxi theoretically, but their literature review reveals six traits: 
guanxi is utilitarian, reciprocal, transferable, personal, long-term, and intangible. 
Collectivism strengthens guanxi: collectivist societies are inclined to create and 
remain bound by guanxi-like institutions. For these authors, Hofstede’s “power-
distance” is another source of reinforcement – Chinese society is characterised by 
high power-distance relationships. In developing economies, informal modes of 
regulation act as an effective alternative to weak formal institutions (a claim made 




The Chinese business environment is characterised by inconsistently applied 
regulations and weak formal power (contracts etc.) – an assertion made by many 
other researchers.  
 
Anderson and Lee (2008) investigated how guanxi is evolving in the era of 
globalisation. China’s Confucian heritage influences Chinese organisational values, 
practices, and working behaviour. Hong Kong and mainland Chinese respondents 
reported guanxi as still important, but no longer solely determinative of business 
success. Hong Kong Chinese expressed dislike for business through guanxi. 
Supporting Guthrie’s guanxi-decline assertion, both groups reported guanxi decline 
as a force of regulatory control, it being gradually displaced by market environment 
improvements. These authors conclude that guanxi today operates in conjunction 
with market forces and formal regulations.  
 
Also supporting the decline argument, Mackinnon (2008) claims that the traditional 
values (typified in the business-by-guanxi tendencies) of Chinese managers are 
declining, as is Hofstede’s “power-distance” characterisation of the Chinese. 
Methods of countering competitive challenges in Chinese business should 
emphasise flexibility, dynamism, and heterogeneity. A “transvergence” toward 
Western management systems and strategy is occurring: competitive advantage in 
the Chinese scenario is no longer contingent on relationships alone; management 
according to Western strategic thinking in addition to existing relationship protocols is 
required. 
 
Trimarchi et al (2010) showed that the dealings of mainland Chinese with Western 
buyers are Confucian in practice but short-term in orientation (unexpectedly perhaps, 
considering the common assertion that long-term orientation typifies Chinese 
preference). As Chinese businesses globalise, guanxi appears to be evolving from 
traditional, social, and personal trust into a guanxi-inflected transactional hybrid. A 
tangential implication of this study is that business interaction between Chinese 





Interviews by Nolan (2011) revealed that Western managers are contributing to 
Chinese companies’ adoption of international business norms. However, some 
foreign managers adjust significantly for Chinese conditions, i.e. practice business-
by-guanxi. Western managers perceive guanxi as decreasing in significance due to 
China’s growing more market oriented.  
 
2.3.5 Social Capital 
Findings by Szeto et al (2006) indicated that social capital development and inter-
organisational relationships constitute vital business assets. These researchers 
recommend that foreign MNEs delegate responsibility for China-side operations 
across multiple managers, and define a “China team leader” to act as key contact for 
Chinese business associates. 
 
A conceptual paper by Yang and Wang (2011) identified three separable, business-
relevant dimensions of guanxi: 1. guanxi balances three elements – qing (emotions 
or feelings), li (reciprocation), and liyi (instrumental benefits); 2. guanxi represents 
dynamic relationships between individuals and organisations; 3. guanxi is the 
irreducible root of the Chinese concepts of networking (quanzi) and social capital. 
(See Chinese Terms in the Appendix for details about each term.) 
 
According to Wang et al (2014), “boundary spanners” (of the sort defined by Wenger, 
1998) are a major resource of interpersonal influence and in-channel communication. 
In collectivist societies, personal ties (guanxi) enable the solidification of embedded 
inter-firm networks and relationship-specific investment (RSI), which is inter-
organisational but occurs through interpersonal means. MNEs operating in the 
Chinese market must adopt local business culture by extending inter-organisational 
relationships beyond transactions and contracts, i.e. conduct business-by-guanxi.  
 
2.3.6 Supply  
Millington et al (2006) reported that many Western MNCs express the desire to 
localise supply inside China, but inadequate information and deficient knowledge 
complicates supplier selection. They advise foreign MNCs to exploit market channels 
in conjunction with guanxi networks to acquire knowledge about supplier viability. 
Interfirm information exchange is based on relational contracting, which is based on 
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long-term supply relationships – not guanxi alone. Guanxi can, however, facilitate 
information exchange with competitors or OEMs. Foreshadowing the claim by 
Berman and Swani (2010) that management of China risk begins with MNEs 
assuming responsibility for selection of appropriate suppliers, Millington et al 
recommend use of guanxi in supplier identification and recruitment of local managers 
or China-experienced ex-patriate managers who possess option-generating guanxi. 
Such managers are a valuable China supply-risk moderator. 
 
Leung et al (2005) claim that two uniquely Chinese cultural variables – guanxi and 
xinyong (trust) – feature alongside competence, commitment, conflict management, 
and satisfaction as influencers of the relationship between Chinese and Western 
partner firms. Western firms create xinyong (see Chinese Terms in the Appendix) 
with Chinese buyers by demonstrating product knowledge and conflict resolution 
through adaptation. For foreign companies, competence is prerequisite to generating 
trust; guanxi cannot replace competency. 
Shin et al (2007) found three cultural factors – “Confucian dynamism”, guanxi, 
and collectivism to influence information sharing. Guanxi impacts more strongly on 
in-group sharing than on out-group sharing – a result that is predictable according to 
social network theory (according to Burt, 1992 and Granovetter, 1973, ties function 
as conduits of information and other resources). Guanxi can facilitate boundary 
spanning and, thereby, enhance crossflow of information and resources. In a SC 
scenario, guanxi-connected individuals are more likely to share information when, for 
example, a manager has found a way to reduce costs. Such information can be 
shared with guanxi ties working in upstream and downstream organisations.  
 
Sternquist and Chen (2006) revealed that buyers’ decisions are influenced by 
performance, price, trade assistance, and the supplier-buyer relationship (guanxi). 
Foreign producers lack guanxi and therefore lack knowledge about the internal 
operations of China’s retail chains. Product selection decisions are not fully 
understood by foreign entrants. This observation implies that in the area of selling to 
Chinese retailers, knowledge and guanxi are synonymous, hence lack of either 




According to Jia and Rutherford (2010), Chinese-Western cultural differences can 
create SC risk. Cultural differences manifest as relational risk for Western buyers. 
Relational risk can, they argue, be mitigated by mutually beneficial partnerships. 
Importantly for SC risk theories, these authors declare a relational-cultural dimension, 
which they call “Supply Chain Relational Risk” (SCRR). 
 
In their study of cultural adaptation in China-Western SC partnerships, Jia  et al 
(2013) make a triple recommendation: success in China supply requires guanxi, 
cultural adaptation, and mutualism. Parties in SC relationships must harvest rents 
from spillover. Relationships attract spillover and grant access to resources beyond 
organisational boundaries (effectively “boundary spanning” in the sense proposed by 
Tushman, 1977). Cross-organisational learning is also relationship-enabled.  
 
A study of collaboration in the Taiwanese shoe industry (Lee and Koh, 2009) 
revealed a tripartite collaborative strategy between OEM supplier, machinery 
manufacturer, and end-user (branding party). The end-user and machinery maker 
have no direct interaction, but the flow of material between the two ties them closely. 
This investment ensures that flow between OEM and end-user, and flow between 
OEM and machinery maker remain efficient. This study shows that, in this context, 
cross-investment, more than guanxi, facilitates collaboration. 
 
Research by Kong (2011) into key suppliers and customers in China showed that 
companies with low social capital (low guanxi connectedness and low trust among 
workers) are more vulnerable to government intervention. Supporting Xin and 
Pearce (1996), Kong’s study demonstrates that network involvement (guanxi) lowers 
informational asymmetry, which reduces transaction costs. Social capital/network 
connectivity also lowers the impact of industry shock by functioning as a 
bonding/buffering mechanism. Implications: social networks provide protection 
against supply risk, namely by increasing proximity to government and cushioning 
firms against macroeconomic and business environment turbulence. 
 
Case study analysis by Ranfagni and Guercini (2014) attribute Ferrero’s China 
growth to its practice of business-by-guanxi. Interdependence between foreign 
companies and local, indigenous companies is a fundamental contributor to China 
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success. The Ferrero case shows that relationships with local distributors featured 
symmetrical interdependence and high levels of inter-firm power. This is especially 
true of the primary distributor, upon whom Ferrero relies to increase brand 
awareness and create business relationships with other distributors. Thus, MNEs 
can achieve China brand presence and market penetration by forging mutually 
beneficial relationships with local partners. 
 
2.3.6.1 Global Sourcing and Outsourcing 
According to Kotabe et al (2008), outsourcing of components and finished goods to 
lower-cost producers on OEM-based contracts, although popular with US and 
Japanese companies, carries risks such as quality erosion and unpunctuality. 
Outsourcing can be advantageously exploited if modest; excessive outsourcing 
degrades performance.  
 
Lau and Zhang (2006) revealed the economic factors that motivate China 
outsourcing by MNEs: efficient production, cost savings, and reduced capital 
investment. Strategic advantages were also identified: acceleration of re-engineering 
benefits, core competence concentration, flexibility enhancement, and improved 
prospects for eventual domestic market penetration. China outsourcing is however 
characterised by problems such as relative lack of proficient service providers, loss 
of control, immature transportation infrastructure, deficient IT connectivity, legal 
protectionism, and absence of general post-outsourcing evaluation. 
Huang et al (2013) cite currency appreciation, rising labour and fuel prices, and 
declining VAT rebates as general cost pressures on multinational manufacturers 
operating in China, but Liu and Wang (1999) argued that China risk factors vary by 
region. Compared with inland China and surrounding Asian countries that also offer 
relatively low labour costs, coastal China offers risk-reducing benefits such as 
industry clusters and logistical advantages.  
 
Research by Andersen et al (2009) indicates that outsourcing to China by SMEs can 
be challenging and offer only marginal competitiveness improvement. Relationships 
with and between Chinese suppliers enhance performance. Relationships with 
Chinese suppliers have four components: quality, coordination and role specification, 
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frequency and scope of communication, and trustworthiness. Culture is inadequate 
as explanatory of expectation-versus-performance discrepancy. 
 
Closely mirroring Berman and Swani (2010), Olson and Wu (2011) emphasize the 
criticality of vendor selection: selecting vendors within the greater China area lowers 
SC risk due to lower costs and higher efficiencies. Local outsourcing within SCs 
moderates risk inside the Chinese SC. This proposition invokes Meredith-Smith’s 
(1999) recommendation that local sourcing can support risk-reducing timeliness, and 
corresponds with findings by Ivarsson and Alvstam (2005) that indicate efficiencies 
occur when proximal Chinese suppliers interact. Olson and Wu (2011) proffer that 
local sourcing within China is optimal: national cost advantages are achieved, and 
the benefits of local supply reduce risk.    
 
Qu and Brocklehurst (2003) showed that in the decision to outsource offshore, 
transaction costs are as important as production costs. China’s increasing 
transaction costs have led foreign companies to outsource information technology 
work to India. Chinese competitiveness can, these authors contend, be increased by 
lowering transaction costs, many of which are government imposed. 
 
A study by Lau (2003) demonstrated that outsourcing to China by companies within 
the Chinese culture-sphere is unlike outsourcing to China by companies outside the 
Sinosphere. Interviews with 22 Hong Kong clothing manufacturers revealed that the 
internationalisation processes of Hong Kong firms differs significantly from those of 
companies from advanced economies. Hong Kong multinationals emerged as a 
result of the outsourcing practices of multinationals. Many Hong Kong firms were 
thus exporting from inception and benefit from low “psychic distance” with mainland 
partners. 
 
2.3.6.2 Strategic Supply Management  
Proceeding on the premise that corporations are defined by their purchases and 
partnerships with suppliers, and that sourcing is an increasingly critical factor in firm 
performance, Zeng (2000) presents China as a global sourcing case. Since sourcing 
markets are global, opportunities in China continue to evolve, and China’s role as a 
global business actor is expanding. For the following reasons, Zeng describes China 
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as a “great supplier”: 1. China’s huge markets are attractive to makers of consumer 
products and suppliers of raw materials; 2. China is a major supplier of industrial and 
agricultural products; 3. China has the ability to attract investment due to its 
competitive labour and raw materials rates, and China’s foreign investment outranks 
other emerging economies; 4. China’s economic environment is stable; and 5. Joint- 
ventures and private international companies are preferred by China’s graduates, 
which develops the competitiveness of these companies. In sum, the business case 
for China as the global centre for outsourcing, procurement, and manufacturing is 
strong; population, potential markets, and favourable macroeconomic factors make 
China a priority candidate for FDI. 
 
A study by Steinle and Schiele (2008) challenges the assertion that the continuation 
of global supply is inevitable. Their case studies revealed that, contrary to 
expectation, competitiveness is not necessarily improved by highly global sourcing – 
firms must become the preferred customers of their strategic suppliers. In addition, 
achievement of preferred customer status is simpler for firms that are located 
geographically close to suppliers, e.g. in the same region or national cluster. Foreign 
firms trying to access remote suppliers will struggle to achieve preferred customer 
status. Global sourcing decisions are thus influenced by clusters – possible and 
actual. Resources that enable sustained competitive advantage can be sourced 
outside the legal boundaries of the company (i.e. overseas). 
Similar, earlier dissent comes from Meredith-Smith (1999), who showed that 
although internationalisation of business activities has accelerated improvement in 
communication, transport, and logistics, JIT and speed-related SC pressures are 
driving companies toward local supply.  
A best-of-both-worlds scenario is proposed in a concept paper by Schiele 
(2006): technically proficient, highly specialised companies that are in geographical 
proximity to the buyer and enmeshed in a relationship of trust and frequent 
interaction are most likely to become the buyer’s core suppliers. 
 
Cannon et al (2010) investigated international market contexts to test the notion that 
supplier-buyer relationships flourish when partners are long-term orientated, as per 
the literature’s consensus. Crucially for the present research, this study found that 
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cultural differences are important considerations in the development of purchasing 
strategies between parties from collectivist and individualist cultures. 
 
After investigating the current and future role of purchasing and supply management 
as a strategic function within organisations, Zheng et al (2007) found that e-business, 
globalisation, and outsourcing mean that purchasing and supply are increasingly 
strategic. Also, “people effects” are of growing significance but skills gaps, 
particularly at senior management level, are evident. E-procurement and 
multifunctional/multicultural teams are commonplace, but increasingly integrated 
business processes, automation, and globalisation mean that although fewer 
purchasing and supply specialists are required, their decisions will be increasingly 
strategically significant, which, presumably, will impact on risk in terms of both SC 
performance and general competitiveness. 
 
Sarkar and Mohapatra (2006) argue that a rationalised (i.e. reduced) SC/supplier 
base is critical to the creation of the strong supplier relationships/partnerships that 
engender SC effectiveness. 
  
2.3.6.2 Strategic SC Management  
Li et al (2006b) tested the essential SCM premise, i.e. that competitive advantage 
and performance improvement are obtainable through effective SCM. The premise 
(probably first asserted by Drucker, 1962) is that SCs, not organisations, can be the 
determinative mechanisms of competitive advantage. The survey by Li et al revealed 
that high levels of SC integration and successful SC were supportive: SC 
management can indeed generate gains in competitive advantage and 
organisational performance.  
 
With global supply however, comes risk, the basic forms of which were isolated by 
Wagner and Bode (2006) who revealed a set of key SCM characteristics –  
dependence on particular customers and suppliers, degree of single sourcing, and 





The integration and mutuality principles of SCM suggest that China, where business 
is relational and traditionally cooperative and collectivist, should provide fertile 
ground for developing SCs and reaping their advantages. However, Handfield and 
Nichols (2004) discovered that non-Chinese organisations operating SCs in China 
struggle to create the necessary business relationships with Chinese suppliers. For 
MNEs, Chinese SC success involves fundamentally different challenges to achieving 
the same in Europe or the USA. Managers need frequent, personal travel in order to 
achieve direct contact with Chinese suppliers.  
 
2.3.9 Logistics 
Meixell and Gargeya (2005) argue that despite global sourcing trends, few academic 
models present the problems of global SCs completely. Required is a SC model that 
is both forward-looking and practical in orientation. One of the aims of the present 
research is to partially address this absence by creating a China-specific model.  
On the evolution of Chinese logistics, Luk (1998) contends that distribution reform 
has reshaped channel structures in the Chinese market. The Chinese market 
requires international managers to adjust strategy and change operational systems 
in order to improve the provision of the value-added services desired by Chinese 
customers.  
 
Jiang (2002) begins on the premise that foreign firms face multiple SC-related risks 
in China: underdeveloped infrastructure, expertise deficiencies, fragmented 
distribution and logistics, and local protectionism. To harvest returns from the cheap 
labour costs offered in China, companies are strengthening their SCs through three 
methods: use of non-Chinese 3PLs, use of local carriers, and preference for cluster-
based suppliers. 
 
Olson and Wu (2010) reviewed Chinese SC risk and identified the following 
specifically Chinese factors: floods and other natural disasters; malicious activity; 
government limitations on air pollution affecting factories and transportation in and 
around Beijing; the ability of Chinese companies to engage in cross-border 
collaboration following the financial crisis of 2008; the necessity of increasing 




The findings of a survey by Rahman and Wu (2011) showed that foreign customers 
prioritise different services than local Chinese companies: both foreign and Chinese 
companies appreciate logistics IT capabilities, but operational visibility is emphasised 
more heavily by foreign companies. For manufacturers outsourcing in China, 
providing logistics services to both local and foreign companies, organisational 




Wong et al (1999a) reported that quality improvement is achieved by suppliers and 
buyers creating a cooperative and competitive relationship. Such relationships 
produce trust and a long-term orientation that reduces quality risk. In a later study, 
Wong et al (1999b) observed that developing  the long-term relationships that 
manufacturers recognise as contributory to product quality improvement can be 
challenging. Manufacturers and suppliers who share cooperative goals are able to 
communicate openly on quality issues – openness strengthens trust and reinforces 
the long-term orientation that creates quality-enhancing operations. 
 
Somewhat contradictorily, Feng et al (2010) found that product quality, delivery 
reliability, and other supply performance indicators are unaffected by supplier 
involvement, which impacts significantly on cost leadership alone. Supplier 
involvement reduces costs, but customer involvement increases quality, reliability 
delivery, flexibility of processes, and customer services. Zhai et al (2013) and 
Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) also stress the importance of including customers 
in the SC collaboration. 
 
Salmi (2006) found that strong commitment by the Chinese partner can reduce and 
counter SC risks, including product quality issues. This author reports several 
important summative observations that correspond strongly with those of other 
researchers: a long-term, relational orientation characterises Chinese sourcing; 
supplier relationships solidify incrementally over time; the effectiveness of non-
Chinese managers’ interaction with Chinese suppliers is enhanced by cultural 
literacy, social skills, and an appreciation of Chinese culture. The utility of non-
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cultural assets – SC skills and management tools – as means of reducing “psychic 
distance” was also noted.  
Reflecting similar sentiment, Lyles et al (2008) proposed that relationships, 
trust, and cultural understanding constitute a triadic formula of risk moderation in 
China supply. Theorising and emphasising the role played by SCs in the recent 
recalls of Chinese-made products, these authors suggest that future research should 
investigate three aspects of “deep SCs”, i.e. SCs spanning long distances and 
incorporating a dozen or more organisations: visibility; trust – its creation and 
management; and depth – how it might be reduced and what types of product justify 
the complexity that characterizes deep SCs. 
 
Several studies posit that Chinese supply risk is the product of China (supply-side) 
conditions and foreign buyer (demand-side) pressures: Jiang et al (2009), for 
example, claim that the main China-side factors are high staff turnover at suppliers, 
low productivity, and order failures; while buyer-side factors are frozen price 
demands, deadlines, flexibility, and lead time compression. Such pressures force 
suppliers to employ migrant labour, since it is relatively flexible/casual and 
inexpensive.  
 
Berman and Swani (2010) cite product recalls and food scares that have highlighted 
issues in Chinese supplier quality, and attribute “quality fade” (a term coined by 
Midler, 2010, p.96) to upward cost pressures imposed by local conditions (labour 
and upstream supply), downward cost pressure from foreign buyers, and, in some 
instances, cynical opportunism by the supplier. For foreign companies, most China 
SC risks can be avoided by implementation of a robust safety/quality assurance 
strategy and careful supplier selection facilitated by China-based audit firms. 
 
2.3.11 Intermediaries 
Liu and Wang (1999) recommend the trading office as a strategic intermediary 
between foreign buyer and Chinese supplier. Vedel and Ellegaard (2013) discovered 
that intermediaries reduce the hazards of global sourcing – to which novice buyers 
are particularly vulnerable. Pressey and Qiu (2007) concur: they demonstrated that 
in China, the involvement of third parties in business relationship dissolution is 
typical and usually beneficial. 
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2.3.12 Collaboration and Integration 
Core to SCM principles are a triad of concepts: 1. holistic management of entities 
within the SC (Oliver and Webber, 1982; Monczka et al, 1998); 2. active, mutualist 
collaboration and integration between all SC-connected entities (Forrester, 1958; 
Cooper et al, 1997); and 3. synchronisation of flow between SC entities for improved 
supply-demand balance (Stevens, 1989; Ellram, 1991). Through SCM, value is 
enabled by close interaction, information exchange, and cooperative problem 
resolution between SC members (Christopher, 1992; Cooper and Ellram, 1993). 
Several studies have observed collaboration and integration in the context of 
Chinese SC participants:  
 
Li et al (2006a) demonstrated that information sharing – a key collaboration/ 
integration SCM activity (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) – improves the stability and 
general performance of Chinese SCs.  
 
Liu et al (2004) investigated business-to-business interaction between members of a 
Chinese SC and found that operations were enhanced by an internet-enabled 
system of information exchange. The system’s success was due to strong 
management support, “deep cooperation”, fair negotiation with both suppliers and 
retailers, open source hardware and software systems, and adaptability to suppliers’ 
requirements.  
 
Echoing the assertion that integration is critical to SC performance, Lockström et al 
(2010) identified the factors that enhance and inhibit integration between Chinese 
automotive SC members. Buyer-side leadership is important for the formation of 
supplier motivation, trust, relationship commitment, and a “collaborative mindset”. If 
achieved, these facilitate supplier-buyer strategic alignment and enable suppliers to 
improve their collaborative capability and general SC performance. 
 
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2005) demonstrated that dealing with remote suppliers incurs 
higher transaction and communication costs compared to local (cluster-based, 
coastal) suppliers. In China, local suppliers exploit their interaction with their foreign 
buyers more effectively than distant suppliers. This last observation lends credence 
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to the recommendation by Olson and Wu (2011) that local sourcing within China 
provides optimal SC advantages to internationally sourcing organisations. 
 
2.3.13 Liabilities of Foreignness 
Liu and Wang (1999) showed that distribution channel management is critical to the 
success of foreign companies operating inside China. Overdependence on a single 
distributor incurs risk. Relationships, although important in Chinese business 
dealings, have to be initiated as formal business relationships – an assertion 
opposing the many studies that argue that Chinese business begins and continues 
informally. Overreliance on interpersonal relationships incurs unfavourable burdens, 
destructive alliances, and suboptimal outcomes. Management of conflict with 
Chinese organisations requires a learning process. Experience of conflict in other 
international scenarios can be helpful, but a template approach to China problem 
solving is not recommended. Applying practices used in other countries or even in 
different regions of China is also of limited utility: conflict resolution should be ad hoc 
and situation-specific.  
 
Commonality of objectives is proposed by Li et al (2010b) as a key facilitator of 
Chinese supplier-foreign buyer activity: when foreign subsidiaries and local Chinese 
suppliers share common goals, the subsidiary obtains high levels of explicit and tacit 
knowledge. Lack of such knowledge represents a formidable liability. Access to the 
local suppliers’ network through the partner supplier allows the foreign subsidiary to 
obtain higher levels of explicit – but not tacit – knowledge. Formal contracts can 
facilitate the acquisition of explicit knowledge and reinforce the effects of relational 
mechanisms on the acquisition of both tacit and explicit knowledge. For foreign 
subsidiaries in China, acquisition of local knowledge must occur through formal and 
informal methods. This dual approach recurs throughout the Chinese business 
literature (e.g. Yang et al, 2011, discussed later in this section). Risk management by 
collaboration is also a common recommendation (e.g. Hallikas et al, 2004). 
 
2.3.14 UK Companies in China 
A study by Towers and Song (2010) showed that the greatest challenges facing UK 
garment companies sourcing in China are delivery risk, negotiation rigidity, language 
barriers, and Chinese business style and practices. Three out of these four are 
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human/cultural factors. Similar findings were obtained by Wilkinson et al (2005): UK-
owned Chinese subsidiaries actively seek close cooperative relationships with their 
local suppliers, but significant human resource barriers impacted on partnership 
sourcing agreements. Staff recruitment and retention, cross-cultural communication 
issues, substandard working practices of suppliers, and corruption by key staff were 
identified as the main problems in partnership sourcing. 
 
2.3.15 Ownership 
In the reform era, International Joint-Ventures (IJVs) were the only mode of China 
entry available to most MNEs. Since 2000, WOFE (Wholly-Owned Foreign 
Enterprise) status has become the preferred mode (Wilson and Brennan, 2003; Child, 
2009). Ostensibly at least, IJVs – if by nothing more than definition – invoke 
collaboration and international/cross-cultural interaction, so should therefore embody 
the advantages espoused in SCM theory. However, Lee et al (1998) found 
discrepancies between majority ownership and dominant control in China IJVs – 
discrepancies possibly attributable to bilateral bargaining that is influenced by both 
contextual and resource-related variables. Chinese law grants the Chinese partner 
majority control (at least 60%), but product knowledge and marketing expertise 
provide the foreign partner with bargaining power in the ownership/control trade-off.  
 
2.3.16 Informal Control is Insufficient  
A study of buyer-supplier exchanges in China by Zhou and Poppo (2010) indicated 
the following: 1. when managers believe the legal system can protect their 
company’s interests, explicit contracts are preferred over relational safeguards for 
risky transactions; 2. when managers believe the legal system cannot protect the 
company’s interests, relational reliability is preferred over explicit contracts. 
 
A survey of Chinese manufacture-distributor dyads by Liu et al (2008a) showed that 
although relational mechanisms are powerful, performance improves most when 
both contracts and relational practices are used. Performance improvement is less 
significant when either is used in isolation.  
Similarly, a survey by Li et al (2010a) of domestic and international buyer-
supplier dyads showed that formal (contractual) and informal (social, interpersonal) 
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control influences risk in buyer-supplier relationships. In international relationships 
however, formal and social control operate in a complementary manner. 
 
2.3.17 Ethnicity and Cross-Cultural Implications 
Alston (1989) showed that Japan and Korea have guanxi-like concepts. In Japan, wa 
(harmony) emphasises group and social cohesiveness; in Korea, inhwa is harmony 
based on hierarchy and obedience to authority; in China, guanxi codifies work and 
conduct according to interpersonal relations. Although each has differentiating 
nuances, all connote harmony through appropriate behaviour (see Terms in Other 
Languages in the Appendix).  
 
Findings by Hui and Graen (1997) showed that Western leader member exchange 
theory (LMX) is of limited applicability in China. Guanxi – which, to these authors, 
constitutes the Chinese relational system – is framed in Confucian/feudal/family-
oriented relationships. Research into China’s “international joint-ventures” (IJVs) 
shows that a bicultural approach to management is most beneficial. This observation 
foreshadows but conflicts somewhat with the “ambicultural” management style 
proposed by Chen and Miller (2011). Hui and Graen (1997) claim that if a company 
possesses sufficiently culturally proficient individuals on both sides, a third cultural 
approach is possible. Chinese networking is exclusivist and determinist: since only 
insiders receive respect and trust, only insiders can expect reciprocation of favour.  
A concept paper by Lovett et al (1999) argues that native systems are intrinsically 
better adapted to their host environments. Because guanxi developed under distinct 
socio-historical conditions, it is rooted in ethical protocols unlike those of Western 
systems. Many countries – most of the non-Western world – operate guanxi-like 
systems. These authors contend that the Chinese economy is moving toward 
“network capitalism” more than “market capitalism” in the Western sense. The 
eastern system should obtain the ability-seeking strength of Western recruitment; 
and Western systems could incorporate specific relational features – the best of the 
east should eventually merge with the best of the west. 
 
Hung’s survey (2004) of multinational corporations (MNCs) in China revealed that 
several aspects of Chinese culture (family orientation, guanxi, and relational 
orientation) significantly influence the relationship cultivation strategies of MNCs.  
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Western MNCs also exert their own cultural values in relationship building practices, 
and more strongly than Asian MNCs. Western MNCs in China show awareness of 
Chinese culture and apply Chinese practices in some behaviours (e.g. socialising 
with local officials to cultivate favourable relationships). However, Western MNCs 
remain bottom-line oriented, and practice guanxi less than Chinese companies. On 
the other hand, Asian MNCs adapt better to the Chinese guanxi culture, perhaps not 
surprisingly, given Alston’s observation (1989) about Japan and South Korea. 
However, like Western MNCs, Asian MNCs show resistance to influence by guanxi. 
Like Alston, Hung argues that concepts of guanxi, face, and favour are not uniquely 
Chinese – they are practised in the United States for example, and Goffman (2014) 
claims “face” issues (“face-work”) are universal. However, insider/outsider 
differentiation has greater emphasis in Chinese societies (Leung and Bond, 1984). 
 
A survey of Chinese senior executives by Jiang et al (2011) showed that ethnicity is 
an important factor influencing trust between Chinese business people. Senior 
executives are more trusting of overseas partners who belong to the same ethnicity. 
This prompts the question – could the term “guanxi” be a culturalized euphemism for 
ethnic-commonality bias? Appointing a manager who is ethnically similar to the 
executive who is managing the Chinese partner maybe a rational application of this 
observation. 
 
Intermediary guanxi is underutilised by foreign firms in China (Li and Wright, 2000). 
Expatriate managers are typically rotated, so valuable guanxi fade with repatriation. 
Enduring inter-firm guanxi can be created by use of a continuously present third-
party/intermediary. The social and professional status of the intermediary influences 
the quality of the relationship that can be achieved. 
 
Tung and Worm (2001) attribute the weak performance of European companies in 
China to their inability to develop the requisite business-facilitating guanxi with 
officials. European MNEs acknowledge the importance of China but note that 
preference for non-Chinese managers lacking guanxi connectedness is likely a 
limiting factor. Use of well-connected intermediaries can compensate for this, but few 




Guanxi, trust, and social dependence play key roles in creating and maintaining 
robust channel relationships in Chinese markets, where collectivist values, high 
levels of government involvement, and weak legal frameworks dominate (Jia and 
Wang, 2013). Guanxi with government officials can improve general firm 
performance, and inter-firm guanxi can offset the deficiencies of underdeveloped 
legal structures (as claimed by Xin and Pearce, 1996). Foreign companies operating 
in China require cross-cultural guanxi networks. These are particularly necessary for 
foreign partners from culturally distant nations. Foreign companies must recognise 
that guanxi and its associated concepts (see Chinese Terms in the Appendix) are 
powerful social mechanisms that reward adopters. Foreigners who comprehend and 
apply these mechanisms can operate successfully within networks and thereby 
access the resources and markets available to Chinese business people. 
 
Pearce and Robinson (2000) exhort foreign companies to devise and operationalise 
China-relevant strategies – especially guanxi-based network strategies – as a 
rational response to the increasingly competitive Chinese business environment. 
They reason that emulation of Chinese patterns is necessary, since Chinese and 
Western business practices feature striking differences: Chinese business venturing 
is fraught with risk that stems from cultural practices and in-group preferences. Lack 
of understanding of those preferences creates risk and is the main impediment to 
China success. Guanxi creation requires sizeable investments in time and energy, 
but such investments ultimately pay dividends.   
 
Lee et al (2001) discovered that uncertainty in decision-making and perception of 
similarity affect guanxi positively, while perceived opportunism affects guanxi 
negatively. They concluded that guanxi can influence firm performance positively, 
and guanxi is mediated by relationship quality and interdependence. Echoing Pearce 
and Robinson (2000) and Huang (2000), they also recommend guanxi practices to 
foreign firms attempting to acquire resources and reduce risk. Relationships between 
Western and Chinese firms require nurturing, and Chinese partners are likely to 
reciprocate investments in time and effort.  
 
Luo et al (2002) suggested a more nuanced, syncretic approach: MNCs operating in 
China should apply a combination of contracts and guanxi to offset their liabilities of 
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foreignness. Their study revealed that Chinese companies acquire local business 
contacts and practice guanxi networking as an offensive mechanism against foreign 
MNCs attempting to enter Chinese markets. Guanxi lowers liabilities by enhancing 
indigenous capability, organisational legitimacy, and cooperation with local 
businesses. For foreign firms, contracts in conjunction with guanxi can offset 
liabilities – contracts safeguard against operational uncertainty and coordination cost 
escalation, and protect resource investments. These observations refute guanxi as 
the sole enabler of Chinese business. 
 
The possibility that guanxi can be adopted and applied by non-Chinese is suggested 
in Hutchings and Weir’s (2006) comparison of networking in China and the Arab 
World. Despite globalisation, both guanxi and wasta (the Arab near-equivalent of 
guanxi) remain potent in their native environments. Both wasta and guanxi 
emphasise insider preference and third-party introductions (i.e. intermediaries), and 
both feature ethical complexity. Unlike wasta, guanxi is adapting to globalisation – 
guanxi can be practiced by foreigners and extended overseas. Guanxi with local 
officials remains essential for business, but technically or organisationally superior 
Chinese firms are far less guanxi-dependent. In the Arab world however, there 
appears to be no substitute for wasta. 
Puffer et al (2010) also demonstrated that guanxi-like institutions exist in other 
emerging countries. Both Russia and China are unlikely to experience a complete 
switchover to formal institutions, the informal institutions of both (blat or svyazi in 
Russia; guanxi in China) are too socially embedded and effective as 
countermeasures of formal institutional weakness (as argued by Xin and Pearce, 
1996).   
 
2.3.19 Government 
According to Xin and Pearce (1996), business-by-guanxi counteracts institutional 
weaknesses, particularly China’s underdeveloped legal environment. Executives at 
privately owned companies are more guanxi-dependent than executives at state-
owned or hybrid companies. The Chinese business and economic environment is 
largely informal, hence managers of private businesses depend on government 




Findings from a survey of Chinese firms by Park and Luo (2001) showed that 
institutional, strategic, and organisational factors are critical elements of guanxi and 
competitive force. Use of guanxi enhances firm performance, but the effect is not 
general: guanxi increases sales, but impacts negligibly on profit growth. Guanxi’s 
greatest benefit is its ability to expand markets and achieve competitive positioning. 
However, guanxi does not correlate with internal operations efficiency. 
 
Buckley et al (2006) propose that foreign investors practice guanxi and mianzi (face) 
to develop stakeholder trust. They argue that understanding China requires 
familiarity with the concepts of guanxi and mianzi (see Chinese Terms in the 
Appendix), which although by no means uniquely Chinese (cf. Goffman, 2014), are 
interpretable as powerful interpersonal phenomena and descriptive of the 
relationships between firms and government. Government support and common 
vision is obtained when trust exists between key stakeholders; trust is achieved 
through long-term interaction with key people, particularly officials. 
Luo et al (2011) demonstrated that business and government guanxi are 
determinative of the economic and operational performance of firms in China. 
Business gianxi improve operational performance; government guanxi improve 
economic performance. In state-owned organisations, government guanxi are more 
important. The importance of government guanxi is however declining as institutions 
improve. 
Sheng et al (2011) concur: business ties have a stronger positive effect on 
firm performance than political ties, but the effects of both forms of tie are contingent 
on market and institutional conditions. Business ties are superior when laws are 
inadequately enforced and technological change is swift; political ties are superior 
when official support for business is lacking and technological turbulence is low. 
Businesses seeking sustained advantage must utilise both forms, applying each 
when appropriate. 
 
2.4 Definitions Used in this Research 
This research employs the following operative definitions, since they are 




Risk: “chance or danger of damage, loss, injury, or any other undesired 
consequences” (Harland et al, 2003, p.52).   
 
Supply chains: “dynamic networks of interconnected firms and industries” 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004, p.1). 
 
Supply chain management: “management of a network of organisations that are 
involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the 
ultimate customer” (Christopher, 1992, p. 15). 
 
Supply chain risk management  is “to, collaboratively with partners in a supply chain 
apply risk management  process tools to deal with risks and uncertainties caused by, 
or impacting on, logistics related activities or resources” Norrman and Lindrith’s 
(2002, p.7). 
 








This chapter describes and justifies the research methodology applied in this 
research. The methods of data collection, analysis, and presentation are also 
discussed. 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
This research employed the case study methodology to acquire two forms of primary 
data:  
1. Eight focal (manager) in-depth, semi-structured interviews. Interview 
transcripts were analysed, and then presented as case studies (the protocols 
of collection, analysis, and presentation are discussed later);  
2. Eight supplementary (key informant/expert) interviews. The transcripts of 
these interviews were analysed and then presented as referential substance. 
The findings of the focal material (case studies) were compared for 
convergence and divergence against the pertinent opinion of purposefully 
selected experts. 
Both focal and supplementary data were analysed in light of the theory and empirical 
findings that emerged in the literature review. 
 
Figure 8 depicts the fundamental steps of the methodology applied in this research.   
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3.1.1 Research Questions  
The following research questions guided this research:  
 
1. In the context of China supply chain management and its associated risks, 
what is the nature of the relationship between supplier and buyer?  
2. How do non-Chinese companies manage Chinese suppliers to minimize risk? 
 
To answer these questions, deep insight into the influence of relationships on risk in 
Chinese supply management was required. For this reason, a qualitative case study 
method was adopted. In alignment with major theorists of the case study method 
(such as Stake and Yin), this researcher believes that qualitative methods are better 
suited to answering questions of “how?” than quantitative methods. 
 
3.1.2 Qualitative Research and Case Studies in Logistics and SCM        
In the fields of logistics and SCM, case studies as pedagogic tools are well endorsed 
(e.g. Stock and Lambert, 2001; Chopra and Meindl, 2010). However, according to 
Flynn et al (1992) and Hamel et al (1993), case studies as a research method are 
underutilized in business studies generally; according to Ellram (1996) and Mentzer 
and Kahn (1995), case studies are especially underutilised in purchasing and 
logistics research, although a handful of studies have used the case study method in 
materials management research (Ellram, 1996). The dates of these claims are worth 
noting. The systematic literature searches that revealed the dominant currents on 
which the present project is carried show that post-2000, numerous heavily cited 
supply-related research articles have employed a qualitative case study 
methodology.  
 
The early absence of case study research in logistics and SCM is possibly 
attributable to the misconception that case studies are necessarily qualitative. 
Although the typical case study emphasises qualitative, in-depth investigation of one 
or a handful of cases (Larsson, 1993), case studies can gather quantitative data. 
This complexity might explain the philosophical ambiguity surrounding case study 
research. Major proponents of the method (e.g. Stake and Yin) have diverging 
philosophical assumptions that, to philosophical purists, strain the method’s validity. 
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Rarely disputed however is the method’s utility in diverse contexts and its exploratory 
potential for a broad span of research questions (Farquhar, 2012). 
 
The notion that the typical supply chain is a series of vertically integrated, linear 
processes punctuated by definite points is a quantitatively biased model. That each 
node is isolable and discreet yet elemental to an integrated whole is simplistic, if not 
notionally contradictory, but reflects a positivist assumption – complex systems are 
best understood through systematic isolation and observation of interacting elements. 
In the case of a network whose nodes are managed by independently motivated 
humans, reduction to the level of variable for the purposes of prediction and 
quantification is precarious, and theory generated thereby of limited or questionable 
value. Positivist/quantitative research models attempt to describe, explain, predict, 
and understand SC risk management activities as they are practised, but qualitative 
methods such as in-depth interviews and case studies can explain how human 
factors influence risk.  
The issue of human relationships as influencers of risk in international supply 
chains is relatively undertheorised. The use of case study methods to research 
human-centred phenomena such as cultural differences and social relationships has 
strong precedence. Two examples of direct relevance to this research are Yang 
(2002): a positivist methodology is inappropriate for the study of guanxi, which is 
intrinsically social and not easily confined to isolable variables; and the qualitative 
work of Brand and Slater (2003) that revealed the ethical issues confronting foreign 
managers in China.  
 
Hence, an exploratory method that enables obtainment of a complex, qualitative 
depiction of a number of informative business instances was desirable. For research 
into relatively unexplored social phenomena, qualitative methods are apt: they 
provide depth and insight and demand relatively little pre-theorisation, giving the 
researcher freedom to probe how and why questions (Bonoma, 1985), and to create 
Kantian idiographic knowledge (Hoaglin et al, 1982; Larsson, 1993), which reveals 
insight into subjective processes and for that reason is favoured by many social 
researchers. This research seeks ideographic knowledge because the phenomena 
of interest are a particular mode of culturally influenced human interaction and how 
that interaction influences risk in a specific business activity.  
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Data derived from interviews with individuals must entail some degree of subjectivity, 
and this research has two dimensions that make it social: it examines business 
interaction (a social phenomenon) in the context of a particular culture. Thus, 
required was a qualitative data-generative method and general approach that is 
extractive of deep, rich information concerning a relatively novel aspect of supply 
management, namely the impact of relations on risk in Chinese supply.  
For these reasons, and for philosophical compatibility, this research employed 
the case study method, which comprised collection by in-depth interviews and 
analysis by literature-informed thematic coding of interview transcript analysis – both 
operationalized under the interpretivist/phenomenological paradigm. This research, 
in approach, application, analysis, and outcomes remains paradigm-conformist; that 
is, no attempt at triangulation by quantitative methods was undertaken.  
 
3.1.3 Case Studies as Research Method 
There are multiple definitions of case study (Swanborn, 2010). Gragg (1954, p.10) 
provides an appropriate, albeit early definition:  “a record of a business issue which 
actually has been faced by business executives, together with surrounding facts, 
opinions, and prejudices upon which executive decisions had to depend. These real 
and particularised cases are presented to students for considered analysis, open 
discussion, and final decision as to the type of action which should be taken.” 
 
There are three main theorizers of the case study as a research method: Yin (1981, 
1984, 1994, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2005) Stake (1978, 1994, 1995, 2005, 2008), and 
Merriam (1998). Reflecting their epistemological and disciplinary variance (policy, 
education, and education, respectively) the three authors’ definitions and emphases 
vary.  
 
Yin (1984, p.23) defines case studies thus: “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.” (Brown, 2008, classifies Yin 
as a “methodologist” for his meticulous articulation of the processes of case study 
design and analysis.) Yin (2003b) proposes three overarching principles of case 
study practice: in order to focus attention on the relevant data, the theoretical 
premises of the research must steer case study design; alternative explanations for 
case study findings must receive discussion; and case study analysis must be 
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thoroughly descriptive, i.e. robust analysis demands that the researcher is “able to 
develop strong, plausible, and fair arguments that are supported by the data” Yin 
(2003b, p.137). 
 
To Stake (1978), the case study is methodologically flexible, and its definition 
likewise: “a form of research, [the] case study is defined by interest in individual 
cases, not by the methods of inquiry used”. (Brown, 2008, labels Stake the 
“grounded interpretivist”.) Stake suggests that case studies are a naturalistic, 
personal experience-validating method (2000, p.19): “case studies are useful in the 
study of human affairs because they are down-to-earth and attention holding.” Stake 
(2005) stressed that cases must be organised around issues – complex, problematic 
relationships that expand the theme of the case and “go a long way toward making 
relationships understandable” (p. 444) – a notion that suggests the method is highly 
appropriate to the present research. Although suited to the exploration of humanistic 
concerns, the case study is a tightly bounded system. The interpretive and “ever 
reflective” (p. 450) researcher has to extract meanings and relate these to context 
and experience. Case studies thus generate valuable “thick description” (1995, 
p.102). On generalisability, Stake claimed that the purpose of the case study is not 
representation of the world, but representation of the case, and “the utility of case 
research […] is in its extension of experience.” (1994, p.245).  
 
According to Merriam (1998, p.27) “the single most defining characteristic of case 
study research lies in delimiting the object of study: the case”, which is “a thing, a 
single entity, a unit around which there are boundaries”. The researcher’s task is to 
describe and explain holistically (also stated by Stake, 2005); hence the case study 
is typically qualitative and optimal for research questions answerable by qualitative 
methods. The case study is intuitive in practice and heuristic in analysis, capable of 
illuminating phenomena by explaining a situation’s background, formative events, 
and explicatory factors, i.e. case studies are capable of answering the “how?” and 
“why?” questions (Merriam, 1998). 
 
The three preceding interpretations are sufficiently coherent to provide the following 
synthetic definition: 
 Case studies examine specific instances or bounded phenomena.  
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 Case studies produce thick description, i.e. they generate a rich informational 
picture so are able to answer complex questions such as “how?” and “why?” 
 Prior understanding of relevant theory and literature primes the researcher 
and focuses the data collection process. 
 Case studies are methodologically flexible, but are typically – but by no 
means only – used in qualitative research. 
 
In social contexts, a single phenomenon rarely occurs in pure isolation, so revelation 
of collateral phenomena as undertheorised contributory factors is desirable, and their 
collection is enabled by the in-depth qualitative method that the case study provides. 
In the case of the current research, the specific phenomenon is management's 
experience of supply risk mitigation via relationships.  
 
3.1.4 The Case Study Epistemology 
Inductivism is common in case study research, which is typically qualitative. The 
researcher attempts to generate theory from data by detecting patterns within it 
(Maylor and Blackmon, 2005). Inductive methods are exploratory and therefore 
usually coherent with the objectives of qualitative research. Phenomena that exist in 
“a vacuum of theory” are ideal material for inductivist research questions (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007). In the discipline of supply chain and risk, theory is plentiful, but 
theories that accommodate cultural considerations are yet to be fully developed. The 
phenomenon of relational Chinese business practice is well documented (making the 
“vacuum of theory” description probably excessive) but is understated in theories of 
supply. Nevertheless, this research is inductivist because the research questions 
prompt exploration and the prima facie case for relational Chinese business practice 
is strong.   
 
Since the case study method is syncretic, theory produced from it is notionally better 
supported than theory derived from research based on a single source. Use of 
reinforcing, complementary data collection methods provides intra-paradigm 
triangulation. Paradigm breach is thereby avoided. 
 
Reflecting the inductivist approach, this research generates theory by identifying 
patterns in the data collected. A process of literature-informed encoding occurred 
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following collection, and patterns, when evident, were built into the question set on 
which the semi-structured interviews were conducted. Also in keeping with the 
interpretivist tradition, subject sampling was deliberately specific and based on the 
research questions – managers of non-Chinese companies whose supply base 
involves Chinese companies.  
 
3.1.4.1 Theory and Practice in the Philosophy of this Research 
In the Platonic conception, theory and practice interrelate thus: theory represents a 
perfected model that practice approximates (Rowland, 1999). In the Aristotelian 
conception, theory and practice are mutually, simultaneously informative, integrative 
forces within a growing whole that generate understanding and insight. This research, 
when considered in terms of these two (not too distant) conceptualisations, is closer 
to the peripatetic perspective, because its research questions developed from 
experience of and reading on practice, and because it seeks to enrich and sensitize 
both theory and practice by presenting a discussion of the literature and primary 
case study and key informant data.  
 
3.1.5 A Question of Numbers 
Multiple case studies, like multiple experiments, provide deeper evidence from which 
to develop theory. Favouring the theory-generative capability of inductive, qualitative 
methods, this researcher rejects the generalizability offered by quantitative methods, 
but still seeks very modest representativeness. A single case study, like a single 
experiment, is ideal if the case is critical, exemplary, or revelatory of inaccessible 
phenomenon (Yin, 2009), but cannot yield the representativeness of multiple case 
studies. At outset, envisaged were six well-selected case study samples that would 
provide a good body of evidence to address the research questions. However, 
circumstances permitted eight industry interviews to be conducted, but lack of 
literature and other sources meant that only two could be developed into case 
studies. The two case studies were however extremely large (global) MNEs and are 
leaders in their sectors, so can be considered “exemplary” in Yin’s terms. The 
industry respondent sample set comprised two full MNE case studies, two MNE key 
informant cases, and four UK SME key informant cases. Thus, these eight industry 
cases are divisible into two homogeneous groups (MNEs and UK SMEs), differing by 
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scale, degree of Chinese supply activity, and general local-versus-international 
strategy and ambitions.  
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), eight studies are adequate for empirical projects 
whose purposes are primarily explorative. This study seeks insight into different 
experiences and risk-management approaches adopted by a variety of companies, 
so that findings across various industry types and scales could be identified. The 
industry sample was theoretically composed: cases and key informants were 
selected due to their possessing the conditions for understanding relationships 
among the relevant constructs (foreign company, Chinese supply, and risk etc.), and 
because their lack of industry and home state commonality enabled some, albeit 
minor, degree of representativeness. Information from non-industry key informants 
was also used (discussed in detail later). 
 
3.1.6 Case Studies and Key Informant Studies: Rationale and Methods 
Flyvbjerg (1998, p.7) cites the Wittgensteinian approach: it is the details in a case 
study that create the most complete picture possible. What qualitative research loses 
in generalizability, it gains in informational depth and specificity. Case studies give 
“empirical depth and attention to detail” (Flyvbjerg (1998, p.1). 
 
The key informant method has been endorsed by significant social researchers, such 
as Flyvbjerg (1998), and important business researchers, such as Pettigrew (1985). 
A famous study by the former was a single case study centred on a European city 
grappling with democratic, social, modernist personal-versus-traditional 
organisational power issues. A major study by the latter investigated the case of ICI’s 
response to rapidly evolving economic, technological, and social conditions. In both 
studies, the majority of data came from key informant interviews. This study applies 
a similar method: the bulk of its data derives from key informant (manager) 
interviews that took place face-to-face, online, and by telephone. Both case studies 
were reinforced by press releases, website content, news articles, and published 
books.  
 
Instead of a single city or organisation, the cases exposed in this study reveal 
varying aspects of a single phenomenon, i.e. Chinese supply – itself a sub-
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phenomenon of exchange/business, which resides within the overarching 
phenomena set that is human social interaction. The cross-cultural dimension of the 
Chinese supply phenomenon and the allegedly highly interpersonal/social nature of 
Chinese business further rationalise the phenomenological and interpretivist 
perspective framing this research design and the methods thus selected. 
 Alternatively, the case data explicated by this research could be considered a 
layered “metaphor” (Flyvbjerg, 1998 p.4), i.e. a metaphor for the Chinese supply 
phenomenon, China supply risk management, global business, Chinese-western 
business interaction, east-west business interaction, supplier-buyer interaction, 
developed world MNE involvement in developing countries, and the interaction of 
global MNE with small scale domestic partners, etc.  
 
The key informant method has been used in the study of phenomena that are 
directly relevant to important issues in this research. For instance, in his research 
into the Chinese family firm (2001), Tsang used key informants to provide data on 
relational contracting, networking, and other interpersonal dimensions of Chinese 
business practice. Research in operations management – arguably a parent 
discipline of supply [chain] management – has also utilised the key informant method. 
For instance, Adler et al (1999) used key informants to investigate changeovers at 
Toyota. 
In both of these examples, the key informants were managers, semi-
structured interviews were employed, and transcript analysis was performed – a 
protocol that was also adopted in this research.   
 
Because many of the key informants were managers at small firms, supporting 
documents (internal and especially external) were sparse. The companies of all the 
industry informants operated websites, so these were cross-referenced to obtain 
details not recalled by the informants or understood by the interviewer at the time of 
the interview. Facts found in catalogues, brochures, and publicity material were 
digested at both the pre- and post-interview stages to achieve familiarity with the 
industry, products, and geographical operations of the informant’s company. In the 
majority of the industrial key informant instances, the author researched each 
company prior to the interview in order to develop pertinent questions and illicit 
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favourable impression regarding the seriousness and preparedness of the 
interviewer.   
 
3.1.7 The Intrinsic Case Study 
According to Stake (1995), the intrinsic case study is the case that is itself of primary, 
interest (P.171). The intrinsic case study occurs when a particular phenomenon or 
opportunity of interest occurs. Its value is particular to instance and resides in its 
ability to reveal uniqueness and complexity, embeddedness in context, clarity of 
focus, and, if possible, cause-and-effect linkages (vital connections that quantitative 
research would likely overlook). In the intrinsic case study, the case reveals the 
issues (Stake, 1995, p.25). Through the intrinsic case study, the researcher forgoes 
generalisation for the sake of examining the workings of a particular specimen 
(Stake, 1995, p.37).  
 
Instrumental case studies are relevant when, for example, we choose a company 
and examine its methods and outcomes to ascertain how that company copes with 
the particular issues that engage us.  
Seen in this light, our case study approach could also be considered 
instrumental, in that its examination permits the researcher to obtain understanding 
of the efficacy of methods in addition to obtaining a detailed specific case. Such 
reasoning is supported by Gomm et al (2000) who argued that case study research 
need not be distracted by generalisation.  
Stake (1994) argues that the intrinsic case study (by dint of its pertinence to 
the research issues) has intrinsic value to researchers and practitioners seeking 
insight into a very specific phenomenon. There is also the argument that a well-
chosen case study presents in microcosm issues that are symptomatic to broader 
wholes (a claim exemplified by Geertz, 1973). In this research, the microcosm 
argument appears to have weight: the findings of the case studies were generally 
supported by data derived from key informants, as indicated by aggregated theme 
tallies).  
Stake (1995, p.64) stresses that the more intrinsic the case study, the more 
significant context becomes, and that interviews to obtain vital context must be 
planned strongly (a recommendation applied in this research, where extensive pre-
interview investigation was conducted). Also in alignment with Stake’s 
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recommendations (1995, p.74), themes were created and supported by tallies for the 
purpose of generating an aggregated picture (the same was extended to informant 
case studies in order to perceive macro patterns between the themes revealed and 
their relative frequencies). 
 
The third form of case study identified by Stake is the collective case study, in which 
a particular phenomenon is investigated using information and perspectives derived 
from multiple cases. 
 
Aspects of all three case study approaches are presented in this research: 
 Intrinsic: each case and industrial key informant study is of interest: each case 
is influenced by context and variables specific to instance. 
 Instrumental: each case and industrial key informant study presents data that 
allows insight into a particular phenomenon, i.e. management of risk in China 
supply. 
 Collective: the aggregated findings of the case the industrial key informant 
studies revealed commonalities in the types of risk and countermeasures 
employed (through qualitative coding, these emerged as themes that were 
tallied). 
 
Despite these overlaps, of the three types of case study approach identified by Stake 
(1995), the intrinsic case study best describes the approach employed here. The 
intrinsic case study parallels Creswell’s “bounded system”/single case approach 
(2007) closely. As is typical in intrinsic case studies, data sources in the bounded 
system approach are purposefully few and focused, generalisability is a low priority, 
and the implications of its findings are modest and caveat-laden. 
 
3.2 Data Collection  
A degree of accessible domain bias was unavoidable: success cases are more 
easily found (Farquhar, 2012). All the SME interviewees spoke favourably of their 
Chinese sourcing partners. The Hornby interviewee refused a promised interview 
following the media’s reporting of his company’s quality failures. Interpretivist 
researchers accept that bias of this sort is likely.  
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3.2.1 Access and Unit of Analysis 
At project outset, the researcher decided that respondents would not be selected 
according to industrial sector. This was done for three reasons:  
1. to avoid the possibility of factors and circumstances unique to the chosen 
industrial sector being explanatory of the data obtained;  
2. because the researcher is not seeking insight into how relationships 
influence Chinese supply risk in the context of a specific industry; and 
3. to enhance (modestly, with caveats) the applicability of any patterns 
uncovered by the study’s findings.  
 
Although generalizability of findings is seldom a high priority in qualitative research, it 
is nonetheless advantageous if attainable. The case and key informant studies came 
from several industrial sectors. Any cross-case commonalities are unlikely therefore 
to be specific, and can be more reliably perceived as broadly characterising the 
Chinese supply environment as seen from the perspective of UK SMEs and non-
Chinese headquartered MNEs. Nationality criteria were however applied: sought 
were UK SMEs, primarily because their being headquartered in the UK allowed the 
researcher physical access and reduced the possibility of cultural and language 
factors causing interpretation error on the part of the researcher. In a project that 
engages with various hermeneutic issues stemming from language and culture, such 
precautions seemed sensible. Less control was possible when selecting MNEs, who, 
by their international nature, could be managed by people of any nationality. 
However, all the MNE case study interviewees were native English speakers, so the 
possibility of interpretation error due to language issues was slight.  
 
The overarching unit of analysis is the firm, specifically the China-sourcing non-
Chinese firm. However, because two categories of respondent were sought, two 
subunits of analysis are identifiable: UK SMEs that manufacture or procure in China, 
and non-China-headquartered MNEs that manufacture or procure in China.  
The managers of all firms were involved in China sourcing. MNE managers 
had various titles: “Head Purchaser Europe” (American Food Conglomerate); “Global 
Risk Manager” (Swedish Furniture Manufacturer); “Supplier Coordination Manager” 
(FEM); and “International Sourcing Manager” (Canadian Transportation). The UK 
MNEs were similarly varied. Two managers (D2C and OEM) were owner-director 
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CEOs; the R-UK interviewee was a “Director”, and the P-S interviewee was 
“Commercial Manager” and “Purchasing Manager”. 
 
Most respondents were contacted by telephone initially. Some requested details in e-
mail. Tables 5-7 show how each informant was contacted initially. The ordering of 
the following tables indicates the chronological order in which the interviews were 
conducted. 
 
Table 5 Methods by which Case Study and Industry Key Informants were Initially 
Contacted 
 
(In these tables, yellow shading indicates case study interviewees. Non-shaded 
areas are industry key informant interviewees. The ordering of the table’s contents 
reflects the chronological order of the interviews. Data collection occurred between 
December 2013 and May 2015)  
Organisation Type Method of Initial Contact 
French Electrical Manufacturer 
(FEM) 
MNE (France) Personal acquaintance (Tokyo expat) 
CT MNE (Canada) Introduction via FEM 
   
Direct 2 Customer (D2C) SME (UK) 
Introduction via academic (MMU) 
contact  
OEM Products (OEM) 
SME (UK) Introduction via family business 
contact  
Swedish Furniture Manufacturer 
(SFM) 
MNE (Sweden)  Personal acquaintance (Tokyo expat) 
American Food Conglomerate (AFC) MNE (US) CIPS meeting (Manchester) 
R-UK SME (UK) Cold call and e-mail – details obtained 






Table 6 Methods by which Other Key Informants were Initially Contacted 
 
The interviews were semi-structured. The key informant interviews were undertaken 
to add data, validate the case study findings, and allow comparison. The structure of 
the key informant interviews was derived mostly from the findings of the case study 
interviews. The case study interview questions were derived from recurrent themes 
identified during the NVivo coding of the summarised findings of the literature (see 
Table 7).  
 
Table 7 Parent and Child Themes Recurrent and Emergent in the Literature Review 
 
Figure 9 describes how the question template used for the interviews was derived 
from the literature.   
Organisation Type Method of Initial Contact 
Cargo East Asia  MNE (Hong Kong) 
Multimodal UK Exhibition 2014: 
“China Risk” seminar and workshop 
China-Britain Business Council 
(CBBC) 
NGO (UK) 
State China Manufacturing Group 
(SCMG)  
MNE (China) CIPS meeting (Cheshire) 
Logistics Training International Ltd 
(Stuart Emmett) 
SME (UK) LinkedIn, e-mail 
Cranfield School of Management 
(Prof Martin Christopher) 
University (UK) LinkedIn, e-mail 
360C SME (UK) Introduction via MMU contact 
Anderson Consulting SME (UK) Web search; cold call and e-mail 
UKCeram Products SME (UK) Introduction via Anderson Consulting 
Various (supply chain and sourcing 
professionals worldwide) 
Various  LinkedIn discussion forum 
Parent Themes Child Themes 
Risk 
Quality (control, failure, “fade”), low quality reputation of “Made 
in China”, supplier opportunism, key individuals, corruption, 
logistical, procedural, legal, managerial, unethical practices, 
methods of quality assurance, importance of physical 
presence, other forms of risk mitigation 
Relationships 
Connections, key individuals, networks “guanxi”, ties, “face”, 
political/governmental, personal, professional, managerial, 
ethical, gift-giving, corruption, socialising, language factors, 
cultural factors 
Coordination 
China offices, key individuals, physical presence, language 
factors, cultural factors 




The use of specific search criteria increased the probability that the searches would 
return only pertinent articles. It is for this reason not surprising that thematic coding 
of the resultant articles generated parent themes that reflect the literature search 
criteria. The disaggregation of the parent themes into sub nodes or child themes 
revealed more particular instances of informative observations and events. This 
specificity primed the researcher with foundations for questions and an array of 




Literature Search 1. 
“chin* AND suppl*” 
Literature Search 2. 
“guanxi” 
Literature Search 3. 




















Quality (control, failure, 
“fade”), low quality reputation 
of “Made in China”, supplier 
opportunism, key individuals, 
corruption, logistical, 
procedural, legal, managerial, 
unethical practices, methods 
of quality assurance, 
importance of physical 




Template of Questions for 
Semi-Structured Interview  





















Parent Themes (LS1, 2, 3 combined) 
 
 
LS2 coded LS1 coded LS3 coded 
Risk Relationships Coordination 
Figure 9 Derivation of Template of Questions for Semi-Structured Interview 
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avenues by which the larger issues could be approached – this indirect method was 
particularly useful with laconic interviewees. All the parent themes overlap to some 
degree. The child themes identify separable manifestations of the overarching issues, 
so provided subjects for exploration via interview.  
 
3.2.2 The Interview Method 
According to Yin (2014), interviews are one of the most important methods of 
acquiring case study evidence. The interview method is one of Yin’s four 
recommended sources. The others – archival material, documentation, observations, 
and artefacts – although desirable, were not uniformly available. In all cases, 
documentation was requested, but all MNE respondents referred to their corporate 
websites. Two UK SMEs provided documentation in the form of supplier catalogues 
and brochures, but these contained only addresses, prices, and product details, so 
were of limited value to case study development. Two interviews were via Skype. For 
these, the guidelines of James and Busher (2009) were followed. (The same text 
was used to devise interview scheduling and structured question sets; it provided 
guidance regarding laddering of questions in online discourse, such as that required 
when steering the LinkedIn discussion).  
 
Because data from multiple respondents would have built a deeper, more 
perspective-rich account of each company, at the conclusion of each interview, the 
researcher asked for additional contacts within the company. Three of the eight 
managers interviewed said they would talk to relevant individuals but no further 
communication followed. Follow-up e-mails thanking the interviewees for their time 
and contribution yielded no more internal or external leads.     
 
A question template was built from emergent and recurrent themes revealed by 
qualitative coding of the findings of the literature searches. Abstracts of articles that 
passed the exclusion/inclusion criteria were first collated in an Excel spreadsheet 
and then transferred to NVivo for coding and analysis. In accord with Saldaña’s 
recommendations (2009), two cycles of coding were performed – to reveal “parent” 
and “child” themes respectively. The first coding cycle produced three dominant 
parent themes: “Risk”, “Relationships”, and “Coordination”. The second coding cycle 
disaggregated the parent themes to reveal greater specificity. The child themes 
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identified in the second cycle became material that the researcher deployed to 
prompt interviewees and thus address the research question.  
 
According to Cassell (2015), theory can be investigated via semi-structured 
interviews: the “theoretical interview” – as employed by Dennis and Parkhe (2002) 
and Willman et al (2006) inter alios.  In Cassell’s terms, the theoretical interview is 
derived from a review of the relevant literature. This corresponds with Swanborn’s 
claim (2010, p.10) that knowledge of the phenomena of interest should precede case 
study research. This project used literature-informed semi-structured interviews, so 
can be considered compliant with both Cassel and Swanborn on this matter. 
 
3.2.3 Case Study Sampling 
As mentioned earlier, if the researcher’s access to the details and locations of UK 
SMEs constitutes a convenience, then convenience sampling influenced interviewee 
selection.  
 
A total of 277 companies in the United Kingdom were identified by web searches and 
then contacted. The details of around 50 of those companies were obtained through 
the China-Britain Business Council (CBBC). For reasons of physical access, SMEs 
located geographically near the researcher (the English North West) were prioritised. 
Managers at two companies – P-S and R-UK – agreed to interviews. Of the 277 
contacted, around 70 managers (25%) expressed willingness to be interviewed, but 
only two (the aforementioned) made themselves available. Time constraints 
(exacerbated by unanswered e-mail requests and unreturned phone calls) and the 
evidently commonplace resistance to cold calling researchers requesting what many 
likely perceived to be sensitive information forced a change of tactics: the remaining 
six interviews were obtained through introductions via personal and academic 
contacts.  
 
Sampling was predominantly purposive (Cassell, 2015), since respondents were 
chosen for their compliance with specific criteria: SC or purchasing managers at UK 
SMEs that manufacture or procure in China, and SC or purchasing managers at non-
China headquartered MNEs that manufacture of procure in China.  “Snowball” 
sampling (Cassell, 2015) accounted for one case: CT. The FEM interviewee 
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connected the researcher to a contact at CT (mutual acquaintances via a 
Montréal business network). Since the CT contact fitted the purposive criteria and 
was willing to be interviewed, the interview was conducted and a case study thereby 
acquired.   
 
3.2.4 Key Informant Sampling 
Key informant selection was also purposive but this purposiveness derived from 
informants’ potential to illuminate phenomena of interest (some tangential, some 
focal) that emerged from the analysis of the case study interview transcripts. For 
example, because the importance of negotiation protocol and insight recurred in 
several case study interviews, the researcher found and contacted a UK company 
(360C) currently negotiating with Chinese suppliers. This way, overlooked issues 
could be explored in depth and their significance to the research questions judged 
thereon. The three consultants were sought for their experience of matching UK 
SMEs with Chinese suppliers and their insights into the challenges of China sourcing. 
Consultants, since their clients represent various industries in various locations, have 
a depth and breadth of knowledge beyond that of a single company and are able to 
discuss issues without naming the companies involved.  
 
In the interests of lessening, if only slightly, the cultural-perspectival imbalance of the 
research design, the Chinese view on supplying non-Chinese companies was sought. 
A representative of a Chinese MNE (SCMG) was interviewed. Similarly, because the 
case studies focussed on the issues of non-Chinese companies buying from 
Chinese suppliers, the experiences of a UK company (UKCeram) selling UK-made 
goods into China seemed an informative complement. These reverse-perspective 
accounts were sought for their potential to enhance the informational picture, and 
expose the complexities and idiosyncrasies of Chinese business outside the 
dichotomous enclosure that is the China supplier-foreign buyer context. Such 
accounts, it transpired, became a means of identifying consistencies and exceptions.  
 






Table 8 Case Study/Industry Key Informant Sampling 
 
The key informant interviews were not common template-based. Each case was 
selected to provide expansion on a particular area of interest uncovered in the 
literature review or mentioned by a case study respondent. Table 9 explains why the 
other key informants were selected. The questions asked during the interview were 
based on those reasons.  
 
  
Organisation Type Industry Sampling Type 
French Electrical 
Manufacturer (FEM) 




Rail vehicles & railway 





MNE (Sweden)  





MNE (US) Food & agricultural (B2B) Purposive 
Direct2Customer (D2C) SME (UK) Garments (B2B) Purposive 
OEM Products (OEM) SME (UK) 
Domestic & medical electrical 
appliances (B2C, B2B, B2G) 
Purposive 
R-UK SME (UK) Agricultural mechanical (B2B) Purposive 
P-S SME (UK) Glass making products (B2B) Purposive 
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Table 9 Selection of Other Key Informant Respondents 
 
3.2.5 Transcription  
Audio recordings were made of all interviews (cases and key informant), and an 
additional video recording was made of the consultant group interview/workshop 
seminar at Multimodal 2014. Interview transcription was performed along the 
guidelines provided by the Saunders et al checklist (2012, p.552). 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Coding was via NVivo, which was selected for its usability, storage capabilities, and 
data generation functions (such as word clouds and other forms of frequency-
illustrating diagrams). According to Easterby-Smith et al, (2012), code-based 
applications such as NVivo or ATLAS.ti provide better identification of emerging 
themes than text-based packages such as MAXQDA.  
 
An institutional licence and institution-wide access was another practical advantage 
of NVivo. On functionality, notes and memos made during and after the interview 
Organisation Type Reason Why Selected 
360C SME (UK) 
Provided insight into negotiation processes and 
relationship formation and maintenance with 
Chinese suppliers. 
UKCeram Products SME (UK) 
Recommended by Anderson Consulting: 
experience of selling UK products to Chinese 
companies; experience of difficulties of buying 





Provided the Chinese perspective on supply risk 
when selling to non-Chinese companies; 
provided insight into organisational structures 
and activities of a major Chinese MNE; provided 
contrast and comparison with non-Chinese MNE 
case studies. 
Anderson Consulting+ SME (UK) Extensive experience helping multiple UK SMEs 
manufacture and procure in China. 
+ third-party consultant and intermediary 
* logistics and supplier-buyer liaison specialist  





International Ltd (Stuart 
Emmett) 
SME (UK) 
Strong advocacy of relationships as critical 
determinants of supply (chain) performance 
Cranfield School of 
Management (Prof Martin 
Christopher) 
University (UK) 
Extensive record of influential articles on 
general, i.e. non China-specific, supply (chain) 
risk – causes and solutions; authoritative source 
of SCM literature  
Various supply chain and sourcing professionals 
(n=26) worldwide (via LinkedIn discussion forum) 
Provided an overview of professional opinion 
from as diverse a range of sources as possible. 
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and during and after the transcribing and coding processes could be included. NVivo 
permits inclusion of appended data as coded material. This feature invokes the 
phenomenological and interpretivist epistemologies that are operative in the 
research design, since it attempts via humanistic methods (i.e. coding of in-depth 
interviews) to get as close as possible to the phenomenon of interest (Remenyi et al, 
1998). 
 
3.3.1 Within-Case and Cross-Case Analysis 
Within-case analysis (Farquhar, 2012) occurred in the Findings section: case and 
key informant studies were reported individually – their intrinsic meaningfulness re. 
the research questions extracted and reported. Cross-case analysis (Yin, 2014) 
occurred in Discussion II: the most salient aspects of each case and key informant 
study were matched against comparable aspects in associable case and key 
informant studies, i.e. MNE cases and key informant studies were cross-compared, 
and UK SME key informant studies were cross-compared. Similarities and 
differences were thus revealed.  
  
3.3.2 Quantified Results of Thematic Analysis by Coding 
Coding revealed themes that could be divided into three main groups: 1. 
Relationships; 2. Macroeconomics; and 3. Strategy. In Figure 10 (following), the first 
figure inside parentheses indicates the number of sources in which a code was 
reported. The second figure indicates the frequency of the code across all sources, 
i.e. the total number of instances to which the code was applied.  
 
Inductive analysis requires that categories, themes, and patterns emerge from data 
itself, and are not imposed prior to data collection (Janesick, 1994). The preliminary 
literature search did however pre-inform the researcher regarding issues of 
relevance to risk management in Chinese supply. Hence, reviewing of the literature 
elicited research questions and the design of the semi-structured case study 
interview template. However, in the coding of the research, themes and patterns 
were allowed to emerge without deliberate imposition; that is, no fixed or formal 











Strategy > China >  
Cultural Issues (17; 223) 
1. Trust problems (12; 51) 
2. Language issues (12; 44) 
3. Face (6; 13) 
4. Good work ethic (6; 11) 
5. Interpersonal factors (2; 7) 
6. Cultural ignorance (1; 7) 
7. Pride (2; 5) 
8. Cultural learning (1; 2) 
Strategy > China >  
Manufacturing (15; 148) 
1. Intellectual property issues (12; 33) 
2. Technology lag (6; 21) 
3. High tech (9; 15) 
4. Reshoring (4; 12) 
5. “Made in China” reputation (5; 8) 
6. Manufacturing power (2; 7) 
7. Highly varied products (4; 6) 
8. Lead time reduction (2; 5) 
9. Cost cutting & fair price (1; 5) 
10. Product imitating (3; 4) 
11. Flexibility reduces risk (1; 4) 
12. Inventory (1; 3) 
13. Efficiency lag (2; 2) 
14. Agile (1;2) 
15. One-stop 3rd party solutions (1; 2) 
16. Lean & agile (1; 2) 
17. OEM partnerships (1; 1) 
18. Focused factories (1; 1) 
19. Just-in-time (JIT) (1; 1) 
20. Quality & low price (1; 1) 
Strategy > China (17; 678) 
1. Cultural issues (17; 233) 
2. Manufacturing (15; 148) 
3. Government involvement (10; 42) 
4. Long-term China strategy (8; 33) 
5. China standards improving (11; 32) 
6. China office autonomy (4; 26) 
7. Chinese managers (10; 22) 
8. China office (5; 18) 
9. Human resource lag (7; 14) 
10. China-savvy strategizing (7; 12) 
11. Expat managers (4; 11) 
12. China as buyer (3; 11) 
13. Chinese ambitions (4; 10) 
14. Foreign company prestige  (3; 10) 
15. China-made for China market (4; 9) 
16. China staff training (3; 8) 
17. Early China entry (5; 6) 
18. Human capital wealth (4; 6) 
19. Joint venture problems (2; 6) 
20. Work conditions (4; 5) 
21. Foreign expectations unrealistic (1; 5) 
22. Foreign impatience (1; 4) 
23. Joint ventures (2; 3) 
24. Export model (1; 3) 
Macroeconomics (17; 221) 
1. Corruption (8; 34) 
2. China low cost attractive  (9; 25) 
3. Government connections (4; 25) 
4. China market growth (5; 20) 
5. China costs rising (8;19) 
6. BRICs (7; 19) 
7. China not unique (6; 18) 
8. China growth (6; 16) 
9. Chinese not yet international (2; 7) 
10. China infrastructure (3; 5) 
11. China not Asian priority (2; 5) 
12. Emerging country threat (2; 5) 
13. Government double standards (1; 4)  
14. China stability (2; 3) 
15. China attraction decline (1; 1) 
16. Rapid China changes (1; 1) 
2 
3.1 
Relationships (17; 674) 
1. Cooperative working (8; 57) 
2. Key China person (10; 54) 
3. Trust (positive) (11; 46) 
4. Communication (8; 41) 
5. China presence (10; 40) 
6. Relationship building (8; 38) 
7. Valuable expertise (6; 36) 
8. Business networks (9; 33) 
9. Contracts (11; 29) 
10. Informal practices (6; 25) 
11. Long-term relationships (9; 24) 
12. Intermediaries (7; 21) 
13. Hands-off management (5; 19) 
14. Dispute resolution (7; 18) 
15. Buyer power (6; 17) 
16. Negotiation (5; 17) 
17. Personal factors (6; 15) 
18. Consultants (7; 13) 
19. China visits (6; 12) 
20. Chinese staff (3; 11) 
21. Relationships as risk management 
strategy (2; 7) 
22. Formal power (1; 7) 
23. Soft skills (1; 5) 
24. Matchmaking (1; 4) 
25. Ethnic divisions (2; 3) 
26. Arms-length relationship (1; 3) 
27. Word-of-mouth (2; 2) 
28. Relationship-driven supply chains 
(1; 2) 
29. Short-term relationships (1; 2) 
30. Mutual advantage (1; 1) 
31. Face-to-face interaction (1; 1) 
1 
3.1.1 3.1.2 







    Strategy > Supplier 
Management > Suppliers >  
Supplier selection (10; 44) 
1. Supplier background 
checking (1; 4) 
2. Supplier auditing (2; 2) 
3. “Due diligence” (1; 2) 
Strategy > Supplier Management  
(17; 309) 
1. Suppliers (17; 214) 
2. Ownership (10; 38) 
3. Supplier control (5; 14) 
4. KPIs (2; 7) 
5. “Integrator” (2; 7) 
6. Adversarial supplier 
management (1; 5) 
7. Supplier push (2; 4) 
8. Iceberg costs (1; 4) 
9. Customer pull (2; 3) 
10. Supplier opportunism (1; 3) 
11. Overseas supplier visits (1; 3) 
12. Demand risk (1; 2) 
13. Decoupling (1; 2) 
14. Supply chain resilience (1; 1)  
Strategy > Risk >  
Quality (17; 222) 
1. Quality failure (10; 41) 
2. Unsophisticated work (7; 30) 
3. QC visits (9; 23) 
4. Quality (positive) (10; 22) 
5. In-house quality standards (7; 22) 
6. Quality standards (11; 21) 
7. On-site QC people (8; 21) 
8. China quality ahead of ROTW (6; 
11) 
9. QC by specs (5; 10) 
10. Quality (general) (5; 8) 
11. Global QC practice (4; 4) 
12. Reworking outside China (4; 4) 
13. China quality is mixed (2; 2) 
14. QA companies (3rd parties) (1; 1) 
Strategy > Supplier 
Management > Suppliers  
(17; 214) 
1. Supplier selection (10; 44) 
2. Transparency (12; 40) 
3. Unethical practice (10; 32) 
4. Strategic management (7; 13) 
5. Monopoly supplier (3; 13) 
6. Supplier power (5; 12) 
7. Strategic acquisition (3; 10) 
8. Supplier monitoring (4; 9) 
9. Supplier investment (6; 8) 
10. Collective bargaining (3; 7) 
11. Regional variance (4; 6) 
12. Tier 2 involvement (2; 6) 
13. Reverse marketing (3; 5) 
14. Specialist suppliers (3; 4) 
15. Selective suppliers (3; 4) 
16. Mutual visibility (1; 1) 
Strategy > Risk (17; 385) 
1. Quality (17; 222) 
2. Supply chain (11; 56) 
3. China-specific risks (3; 10) 
4. China easy for business (4; 9) 
5. Risk planning (1; 7) 
6. Disintermediation (3; 5) 
7. Extended supply chain risk (1; 5) 
8. Risk spreading (2; 4) 
9. Resilience (1; 3) 
10. Other China risks (2; 2) 
11. Risk limitation by design (1; 2) 
12. Buying on price (1; 2) 
13. Customs problems (1; 2) 
14. Environmental issues (1; 1) 
15. Expat flight (1; 1) 
16. Risk management team (1; 1) 
Strategy (17; 1477) 
1. China (17; 678) 
2. Risk (17; 385) 
3. Supplier Management (17; 309) 
4. MNEs (14; 105) 
Strategy > MNEs (14; 105) 
1. Global practices & 
standards (10; 32) 
2. Corporate culture (2; 21) 
3. HQ authority (3; 8) 
4. Global markets (5; 7) 
5. Local compliance (4; 7) 
6. Local procurement  (3; 5) 
7. Design services (3; 4) 
8. Ethical business policy 
(1; 4) 
9. Highly global presence 
(2; 3) 
10. Global procurement 
model (1; 3) 






Strategy >  
Supplier Management  
> Ownership (10; 38) 
1. Wholly owned (5; 20) 
2. Joint venture (2; 2) 




In Figure 10, each theme (NVivo: “node”) is ranked according to frequency. In many 
cases, the frequency reported for the parent node was greater than the sum of the 
child nodes (full tables providing rankings by frequencies according to every theme 
and source are provided in the Appendix). This is because some areas of transcripts 
were coded with the parent node alone – when the parent node was more 
descriptive than the child nodes or the text too general to merit the specificity of an 
available child node.  Table 10 reports the ranking of the parent themes. 
 
Table 10 Parent Themes: Ranking by Frequency 
 
In cases where multiple codes were reported with the same frequency, the first 
number in parentheses (the number of sources) determined the ranking. The code 
reported by more sources is ranked higher.  
In cases where multiple codes were reported in the same number of sources 
and with the same frequency, a qualitative approach was applied to determine 
ranking. The transcript was reassessed for broader thematic messages, and the 
code that corresponded most closely with the dominant or most emphatically 
expressed messages elsewhere in the same source was ranked higher. When there 
was insufficient thematic correlation or support, similarity to or deviation from other 
codes was considered. Codes that corresponded to similar themes or discussions 
outside the source were ranked higher. Only six codes had to be ranked this way. 
The purpose of code ranking is to raise to prominence, and thereby focus the 
subsequent theoretical discussion on the themes that dominated the information 
obtained from all seventeen sources.   
  
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) Sources Frequency of Codes Ranking 
Parent 
Strategy all 1477 1 
Relationships all 674 2 
Macroeconomics all 221 3 
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3.4 Presentation of Findings 
3.4.1 Verbal Logic Models 
For the purposes of illustrating its case study and key informant findings, this 
research makes extensive use of verbal logic models. These models are diagrams: 
purposefully simplified, graphic descriptions of the phenomena of interest. The 
findings of each case study are illustrated with a diagrammatic, verbal logic model 
showing the main elements of the supply system. Industry key informant findings are 
illustrated with a system diagram too, but also with a sociograph showing the 
relationships that enable that system (MNEs are too complex to depict 
sociographically). The potential advantages and drawbacks of use of models in 
social sciences do however merit comment.  
 
Deutsch (1966) notes the following advantages of models in the social sciences: 
Firstly, by ordering and relating systems to each other and thereby providing images 
of gaps and crossovers otherwise imperceptible, models have an organising, 
expository quality; models create a general picture of a range of different 
circumstances. Secondly, models, by simplifying information that is complicated or 
ambiguous, assist explanation. This gives models a useful heuristic function: models 
guide the practitioner or researcher around the focal elements of a system.  
 
Models can describe the structure of phenomena. In this sense, a diagram of the 
components of a device could be described as “structural”. Other models, which 
McQuail and Windahl (1994) term “functional”, describe systems in terms of energy, 
forces and their direction, the relations between the various parts, and the influence 
of one part on another.  
The models presented in this research fall into both the “structural” and 
“functional” category. “Structural” because supply is a highly organized activity 
conducted to yield definite outputs; “functional” because supply management is a 
business activity and business entails social-economic interaction that must, to some 




Although models can be purely verbal/diagrammatic or mathematical, only 
verbal/diagrammatic models were – the mathematical model is logically more suited 
to positivist research. 
 
Critics allege that models are excessively confining and abbreviated, resulting in 
advocates of theoretical models becoming side-tracked by defence of their models 
(McQuail and Windahl, 1994). A similar risk is that a model, or even a succession of 
models, can perpetuate questionable fundamental assumptions about the model’s 
components or processes. An example in the field of supply is the tendency to 
represent activities as unidirectional processes, in which conveyance occurs 
between nodes in a discreet, linear manner. Such representations overlook the 
circularity, negotiability, flexibility, and openness of supply arrangements, which in 
the digital age are characterised by information loops and communication between 
nodes. 
 
This research regards models primarily as explanatory devices useful in the 
comprehension of the social and organisational processes and linkages that 
characterise supplier management activity. Conceptually, their usefulness could 
derive from the notion that business – particularly supply – is a force that is bound 
within, facilitated by, and manifested in relationships that are interpersonal, social, 
and economic in nature, and thus have consequences for the aggregate and all 
organisations and individuals therein.  
 
The simplification required by diagrammatic modelling imposes limitations; however, 
the complexity of possibility necessitates that simplification. For illustrating case 
study findings, the model is a logical choice: its reductionist language is its flexibility; 
its non-prescriptiveness permits adaptability. Philosophically, the use of models is 
coherent with the overarching ontological perspective and methodological choices 
upon which this research is based. 
 
3.4.2 Business Process Models 
Verbal models are heavily used in operations management andragogy (e.g. Slack et 
al, 2004). Influential supply management theories are succinctly represented by 
models too, such as the “Integrated Business Processes within a Supply Chain” 
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model (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). There are simpler, but influential, concept block 
models also, such as that used in Christopher’s “Agile Supply Chain” theory (2000).   
 
3.4.3 Sociographic Models 
Each SME supply system model is complemented by a sociographic model. Based 
on Moreno’s human network-describing diagrams and their visual language (1953), 
these models show the interconnectedness between persons (when explicitly named 
by interviewees) or organisations/roles (when specific persons were not named or 
unknown). Network structures, and what Crandall et al (2010) term “relational flow”, 
are thus revealed. Ties are represented by lines between actors/individuals. In the 
models, line thickness indicates tie strength; line length indicates frequency of 
interaction between ties. Ties, tie strength, and interaction frequency are concepts 
derived from Putnam (1993), and Granovetter (1973). 
 
The strength and weakness of ties were qualitatively inferred from interviewees’ 
comments and their subsequent analysis – not quantitatively derived from Likert 
scales or other methods common in sociometric research. Similarly, in the supply 
system models, the volume/scale of the information and product flows was also 
qualitatively inferred from interviewees’ comments and their subsequent analysis, not 
quantitatively derived from numerical data. Thus both models reflect two-modes of 
interpretive analysis, for the purpose of illustrating two interrelated dimensions of the 
supply network – business processes and the corresponding relationships between 
individuals and organisations. The juxtaposition of the two models is intended to 
reveal comparative and contrastive features of each, and, ideally, expose any 
reflection.  
 
According to Conway and Steward (2009, p.75), networks can be regarded as a form 
of “analytical lens” through which theoretical analyses can be elucidated and 
phenomena in situ explicated. Also according to these authors, network analysis 
since the mid-1990s has helped business researchers reveal and theoretically 
situate the role of organisational networks in business. Scott (2000) claims that the 
network perspective can be traced to three important strains of origin: the 
sociometric analytical work done by Moreno (1934, 1953) that resulted in the 
development of graph theory, a method of representing network structures 
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graphically using basic elements such as circles to represent individuals and lines to 
represent connections between individuals; Harvard researchers of the 1930s who 
investigated the networks of relationships and cliques; and the Manchester social 
anthropologists of the 1950s and 1960s (Barnes and Mitchell, for example).  
 
For Easterby-Smith et al (2012), social network analysis (SNA) allows social 
relationships and the importance of relations to be explicitly delineated.  
Granovetter’s theoretically pivotal concept of “strong” and “weak ties” was derived 
from the mapping of social connections.  
 
Themes analogous with the mainstay concepts of social network theory – ties, trust, 
structural holes, and boundary spanning (Granovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988; Burt, 
1992) – have rich presence in the literature on Chinese business “guanxi” networks 
(Wilkinson, 2011).  Based on their recurrence in the literature, these themes appear 
to characterize Chinese business interaction, with implications for transaction cost 
economics, cross-cultural business, and integration based business concepts such 
as SCM.  
 
3.4.4 Report/Narrative Structure  
The case study/key informant findings that constitute the core primary data of this 
research are conveyed in a structure that is in general alignment with the combined 
recommendations of Janesick (1994), Stake (1995), and Yin (2014), and exemplified 
by Motwani et al (2005). 
 
As with qualitative coding, there exists no single, universal, or proven best system of 
case study or key informant report/narrative structuring (Janesick, 1994). “Staying 
close to the data” (p.215) is generally considered the most effective method. Hence, 
both case study and key informant reports are divided by headings that reveal the 
main topics discussed in the interviews.  
As would be expected, the headings of the reports broadly reflect the themes 
revealed by node/theme counts during the coding process. Because the semi-
structured interview template was designed to elicit detail on the themes and 
theories that emerged during the literature review, the themes of the interview – and 
the resultant report structure – reflect that design.  
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In all case and key informant studies, interviewee data is the primary source around 
which each report is structured. Data from textual sources is referred to where it 
supports or contrasts with interviewee input. Each case study and key informant 
report contains company details and other helpful information not predicted by the 
literature. It is for this reason, among others, that the interview was semi-structured; 
and it is for this reason that a rigid structuring according to themes alone was not 
applied – such an imposition would have excluded valuable details.   
 
Most report content focusses on aspects of company strategy: supplier management 
strategy, China strategy, and quality and logistics risk management strategy among 
others. Relationships and macroeconomic concerns arise through these lenses of 
strategy. Consequently, the case study reports’ major foci are strategic primarily, and 
concern macroeconomic and relationship factors incidentally. This is borne out by 
the coding frequencies (Table 11). Three overarching themes were identified during 
the coding process and the subsequent summing of frequency counts: 
Macroeconomics, Relationships, and Strategy. So dominant among these was 
Strategy, it was disaggregated into sub-themes.All parent, child, and sub-themes are 
shown in Figure 10 (the schematic). 
 





It also emerged during coding that Relationships as a theme was indivisible from 
strategy. For this reason, the reports are separated into sections dominated by 
Strategy and China-specific methods of risk management, in which the 
embeddedness and centrality of relationships to strategy can be perceived. Table 12 
shows the overlapping in the parent themes within the various headed sections of 
the reports. 
 
Other sources (press releases, books, internal documents, and other textual content) 
that support interviewee input are referenced using numbers inside square brackets 
[ ]. Where no numbers inside square brackets appear, the reader can assume that 
Parent Themes Frequency of Codes (all sources) Ranking 
Strategy 1477 1 
Relationships 674 2 
Macroeconomics 221 3 
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the information comes only from the interviewee. Such cross-referencing is intended 
to boost validity, which in the case of qualitative research is (according to Wolcott, 
1990), solid explanation and description.  
 
Table 12 Correspondence of Report Headings and Parent Themes 
Report Heading 
Parent Themes Present and Overlaps 
Strategy Relationships Macroeconomics 
x.x.1. Company Overview n/a n/a n/a 
x.x.2. Internationalisation    
x.x.3. Supplier Management Strategy    
x.x.4. China Strategy    
x.x.5. China Risk Management I. Logistics    
x.x.6. China Risk Management II. Quality    
 
It is hoped that this form of composition will be, in Yin’s terms (2014), “engaging” 
(p.205), i.e. clear in style and sufficiently interesting to stimulate continued reading. 
Yin’s “linear analytic” structure (p.188) is the most fitting of his six structure types, 
since these case studies present findings in an ordered, linear fashion. Yin states 
that the narrative element must be preceded by a methods and literature section and 
followed by a discussion and conclusion. The format of this thesis renders this format 
inapplicable: the reports/narratives of all the case studies are collated. Together they 
constitute the Findings chapters of this research. Methods, literature, and discussion 
surround these chapters. The inclusion of a separate methods, literature, and 
discussion section for each case and key informant report would entail repetition and 
redundancy. Hence, the fit of Yin’s “linear analytical” is partial: in principle, applied; in 
practice, adapted.  According to Stake (1995, p.33), a case study report is well 
structured if it focuses clearly on the areas of most relevance to the research 
questions, where necessary repeat areas that deserve emphasis, and is supported 
by tables that present isolated items of importance (p.79). This author’s attempt to 
apply the foregoing is reflected in the use of headings in reports and tables in the 
chapters that present aggregated findings. 
 
(In some key informant reports, informant brevity was such that the need for 
separation by headings was obviated. Key informant data was however aggregated, 




Miles and Huberman (1994) describe two main categories of data display: matrices 
and networks (discussed in the previous section). Matrices consist of tabular 
arrangements of data in cells. Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend both forms of 
data display as economic modes of representing complex textual data (they refer to 
transcriptions, narratives, and other textual data as “extended text”). Matrices and 
networks allow selected items and key findings to be extracted, emphasised, and 
visually presented for comprehensibility. Graphical methods benefit the researcher 
by forcing, where possible, the data into a logical and theoretically meaningful 
arrangement. Moreover, synthesising of individual models into composite meta-
models becomes possible, provided sufficient commonality between the cases is 
revealed – such a revelation being itself facilitated by the use of sociographs and 
business process models. These recommendations were applied. The case studies 
and key informant reports feature various models that reveal patterns and structures. 
Meta-models are also proposed in the Discussion section. 
 
3.5 Contributions of This Research 
This research has theoretical and practical implications: it could sensitise managers 
and inquisitive theorists to the theoretical and practical ramifications of its 
observations, and thereby fortify or disrupt dominant or nascent theories and 
practices of supply risk management in the context of China. 
 
The ultimate theoretical contributions of this research are condensed into five 
theoretical outputs and two practitioner outputs. (Theoretical Output #1 has three 
collateral outputs (explained in the Discussions chapters). For this reason, although 
the total number of theoretical outputs is five, the Table of Contents indicates the 
main two.) 
 






4. Case Study Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the two case studies – French Electrical 
Manufacturer (FEM) and Canadian Transportation (CT).  For each case, supply 
strategy, China strategy, and risk management are described. 
 
4.1 Case Study 1 (CS1): French Electrical Manufacturer (Global 
MNE) 
4.1.1 Company Overview 
FEM is a Paris-based European multinational specialising in electrical distribution 
and energy related hardware for residential and non-residential facilities. Figures 
from 2014 [S15] indicate that the Asia-Pacific region and Western Europe each 
represent 28% of FEM’s business, North America 25%, and the rest of the world 
19%. In terms of product sales, electrical distribution systems for residential and non-
residential buildings are FEM’s core lines (33%), industrial and mechanical products 
are second (27%), utilities and infrastructure follow closely (26%), and data centres 
and networks represent the remainder (14%) [S6, S7, S13]. FEM operates in 148 
countries and employs around 170,000 people. By some measures (i.e. annual 
revenue made by a publicly traded company specialising in energy-saving electrical 
equipment), FEM ranks world no.7. 
 
FEM is an industry-oriented business supplying to governments and other 
businesses. FEM is not a well-known consumer brand. Its competitors are 
companies such as Siemens and General Electric, but these are far more diversified 
in their product offerings. FEM’s preferred customers are large scale construction 
and infrastructure companies. Currently, FEM is investing most heavily in developing 
its Asia-Pacific and North America markets [S4, S10, S16]. 
 
4.1.2 Internationalisation  
Since 1980, FEM has been acquiring companies, with the number of companies 
acquired increasing on a year-on-year basis [S3]. From 2011 onwards, the majority 
of FEM’s acquisitions have been data handling and software companies, possibly 
signifying the direction in which the company is turning. Pre-2011 acquisitions were, 
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in the majority, electromechanical companies. However, in 2015, FEM’s speciality is 
still electrical distribution hardware (switchgears, power supplies, circuit breakers, 
programmable logic boards, sensors, and motor controllers). FEM owns 23 mostly 
European subsidiaries, all of which manufacture hardware or software for the 
electrical distribution industry. The Asia-Pacific markets that is most keen to service 
are those of Japan, South Korea, and China [S10, S12].  
 
4.1.3 Global Supply Strategy 
FEM operates a network of international supply storage and order consolidation 
“hubs”. These operate as regional warehouses/distribution centres. The North 
American markets, for example, are served by one hub in Mexico City and one in a 
suburb of Montreal. High volume and/or complex orders can bypass the hubs and go 
directly to the site of installation (in the case of infrastructure). FEM also runs 
assembly facilities (“FEM Factories”), where goods from separate suppliers converge 
and multiple-component items are assembled. Fully composed orders are then 
forwarded directly to the buyer, to the buyer’s specified location, or to a regional hub. 
 
Suppliers provide FEM and its subsidiaries with a range of products, primarily 
electromechanical (e.g., standard devices)  in nature. Where possible, suppliers 
source from within-nation tier 2 suppliers, since this practice reduces complexity 
(linguistic, transactional, logistical, tax and customs-related). FEM favours 
purchasing the majority of its products from third-parties, and leveraging its scale 
and credentials in purchasing negotiations. This strategy reduces overheads and the 
complexity of managing, staffing, and supplying hundreds of component makers 
around the world. In a small number of exceptional cases, FEM contributes to 
supplier upskilling and investing according to commercial, logistical, and strategic 
rationality. Despite FEM’s preference for arm’s-length, transactional supplier 
relationships, the firm will acquire some suppliers, especially suppliers of critical 
components or bottleneck products. This occurs most often when maintaining 
externality would incur penalizing costs. 
 
Product complexity and supplier competency generally correlate. Less sophisticated 
products are manufactured by suppliers who specialise in limited material products 
such as cable and fastenings. When possible, FEM prefers to use multi-capability 
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suppliers, who can manufacture a variety of products and, ideally, assemble, kit, and 
package. Since many of FEM’s products are low-tech, the supply base is, overall, 
competitive. As products increase in complexity, the number of suppliers capable of 
producing those products diminishes. This fully rational situation is exploitable. A 
large proportion of FEM’s products are near commodity status (fuses, switches, 
resistors, cables, and circuit breakers), which gives FEM the advantage of a buyer’s 
market for these categories of product. Since FEM incorporates high quantities of 
such products in its solutions, the orders it places with lower-tech suppliers are high-
volume. More sophisticated products come from fewer suppliers, and higher-tech 
suppliers enjoy the advantage of a supplier’s market. FEM operates a network of 
international suppliers (in the case of FEM, over 200 factories worldwide [S6]).  
 
FEM places responsibility for tier 2 supplier selection and performance with its tier 1 
suppliers. The global nature of FEM’s operations and overall corporate strategy is 
reflected in the organisation’s preference for establishing national and regional 
headquarters, which FEM calls “Centres of Excellence”.  
 
4.1.4 China Strategy 
FEM’s Chinese supply base is growing, and so too is FEM’s Chinese market [S2, S9, 
S11, S13]. Tremendous investment on the part of the Chinese government in 
buildings and other infrastructure has created numerous high returning contract 
opportunities for FEM [S15]. Currently, the growth of the Asia-Pacific markets and 
the promise of the rents obtainable therein, actual and potential, are factors 
influencing FEM’s supplier selection strategy [S5, S13, S16].  
 
Possibly illustrating FEM’s keen ambitions in the region, China alone has three 
“Centres of Excellence” – in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Wuhan [S12]. Despite 
steadily increasing labour costs, Chinese suppliers remain very price-competitive. 
Possibly more importantly, deep engagement with an established Chinese supply 
base gives FEM presence, visibility, opportunity, and industrial connectedness in a 
rapidly growing market. The firm’s policy of within-nation China sourcing also 
reduces the logistical costs and complexities of servicing that market. 
In contrast to its general stance on suppliers relations, FEM’s interest in 
Chinese supplier acquisition is growing, but no acquisitions have to date been 
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completed. The interviewee stated that 80% of FEM’s offerings consist of products 
made by third-party Chinese suppliers. The remaining 20% are the outputs of 
speciality non-Chinese suppliers that FEM has acquired in order to secure the 
availability of more complex, higher value products (and, presumably, to sell similar 
products to competitors at a suitable mark-up).  
 
Currently, there are few Chinese suppliers in FEM’s network that are making a 
component that is sufficiently critical to merit acquisition. The Chinese suppliers 
being most closely scoped for acquisition are those who have particularly good 
access to rare earth metals, which are critical to many of FEM’s core products. 
Generally, the Chinese supply base is less capable and less technologically 
sophisticated than that of Japan, for example, so represents limited value in terms of 
technological learning. Nevertheless, FEM has acquired a small number of joint-
ventures with Chinese state-owned makers of electrical equipment ([S9, S11, S12]. 
 
Since FEM provides residential and non-residential power distribution hardware, 
their typical Chinese customer is a state-owned construction company under 
contract to a local or central government. In China, where government involvement 
in construction is extensive, forging contacts with the Chinese government through 
subcontracting has proven prudent practice.  
 
FEM regards China and Asia Pacific generally as markets of growing opportunity 
and therefore of strategic significance, and increasingly important as a region of 
supply base location [S2, S7, S8, S10]. For these reasons, FEM is gradually 
increasing its investment in some of its key Chinese suppliers and, whenever 
possible, servicing its Chinese customers with China-sourced supply. General policy 
at FEM is to supply worldwide customers with product sourced worldwide according 
to profitability and risk minimization, creating crossflow. China is no exception: 
Chinese suppliers provide products for worldwide markets; Chinese customers can 
receive products sourced both within-nation and overseas. 
 
For FEM’s Chinese suppliers, contracting with FEM brings various advantages, not 
the least of which are high quantity orders and stability of partnership, coupled with 
the possibility of interacting and thereby furthering their relationships with other local 
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suppliers, and, possibly, independent entry into foreign markets on the back of 
association with FEM. In China, central and local government encourages FEM to 
engage Chinese suppliers.  
To date, FEM has practised within-nation China sourcing whenever possible, 
but this has created something of a dilemma. So far, it has been FEM strategy to use 
the low cost advantages of Chinese suppliers to produce high quantities of 
substitutable, low-tech components and parts, and to concentrate on Japan as a 
source of high-tech supply. To Chinese officialdom, such a position is construable as 
cynical: FEM is failing to invest in Chinese companies and thereby depriving Chinese 
industry of valuable capability. Moreover, FEM appears not to be embedding 
Chinese high-tech supply in its long-term global strategy, despite that strategy 
having Chinese demand at its core.  
 
The dilemma is thus: FEM must maintain its so far positive relationship with the 
Chinese government and continue to serve its expanding but mainly low- to medium-
tech China markets effectively and profitably while continuing to source high-tech 
products in Japan. Will pressure to switch to Chinese suppliers of high-tech create 
risk? 
 
FEM has regional and national administrative “Centers of Excellence”, which defer to 
global headquarters in matters of strategy [S12]. The FEM interviewee assumed that 
accepted suppliers begin contributing to the supply base immediately. FEM suppliers 
petition their nearest Centers of Excellence for contracts, reply to requests for 
proposals, or await discovery by FEM personnel seeking specific suppliers. 
 
The FEM SC model contains three basic elements linked by lines of communication 
and product flow. The left side of the following diagram shows the FEM supply base, 
from where products flow to FEM’s customers (on the right side of the diagram). 
Between the two ends is situated the FEM Centre of Excellence, which functions as 
a national or regional headquarters representing the global FEM entity locally. 
Communication between suppliers and customers, if necessary, is through the 
Centre of Excellence. Customers, including FEM-owned factories or assembly 
facilities, seldom have direct contact with suppliers. The Center of Excellence can 





4.1.5 China Risk Management I. Logistics 
FEM’s global capability and long-term China strategy is intensely supply chain 
dependent. FEM is operating a global supply chain that is highly China-dependent. 
FEM prefers to contract with Chinese suppliers who are close to FEM’s major China 
markets, and, ideally, located in or around coastal industrial clusters, since these are 
typically well served by logistics companies and close to ports. Such locations 
reduce risk related to domestic and international lead time, and suppliers’ visibility to 
FEM staff. For China-side risk reduction, FEM favours within-nation supply to 
Chinese customers, but the feasibility of domestic supply is contingent upon the 
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Figure 11 FEM Supplier-Buyer Flows 
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nature of the customer’s solution. For several categories of product, international 
crossflow is typical, and this is perceived as potentially higher risk than within-nation 
supply. 
 
The practice of within-nation supply also amplifies the advantages of the Centers of 
Excellence system: FEM global headquarters deputises its Centers of Excellence to 
manage the suppliers within its borders largely autonomously, but according to 
group-wide directives. This diffusion of control enables local issues to be resolved by 
local people, who manage their section of the global supply base in a locally 
appropriate, adaptive, and intelligent manner. Moreover, regional and national 
deputisation makes management of FEM’s corporate visage the duty of local actors 
who are, generally speaking, better positioned than  expatriate managers to 
represent the company to its various stakeholders, and to navigate the native 
business and regulatory terrain. Additionally, maintaining a permanent local 
presence enables direct interaction with managers at suppliers and frequent 
interaction with local officials. Deputisation relieves the global headquarters of the 
responsibility of coordinating hundreds of suppliers worldwide, allowing it to focus on 
corporate strategy. 
 
For FEM’s customers and partners, the FEM supply base is a risk reducer. In the 
event of SC interruption, continuity can be provided by other nodes (suppliers) in the 
network. The global crossflow that characterises FEM supply becomes a tool of 
resilience. Since all FEM suppliers are rated for universal product quality compliance, 
any FEM supplier can supply any FEM customer. The manufacture of standardised 
products by a global mesh of rated suppliers provides FEM system-wide resilience to 
quality risk. 
 
Bidirectional communication occurs between the Center of Excellence and the 
within-nation supply base. Addressing supply coordination and continuity risk is the 
responsibility of the Center of Excellence in the region or nation in which an affected 




4.1.6 China Risk Management II. Quality 
FEM enforces process and product quality across its supply base, principally through 
a combination of contractually stipulated terms and conditions. Auditing at FEM 
begins at the selection stage and continues throughout the partnership.  
 
The safety critical nature of many of FEM’s core products requires that suppliers 
build to exact specification. Quality testing is routine and performed on an in-house 
and external basis. For FEM, quality control constitutes the main source of 
complexity and cost in the management of its globally dispersed network of third-
party suppliers. This is especially acute in the production of safety or performance 
critical equipment. Failure in fuses and circuit breakers, for example, could result in 
loss of life, fire damage to property, and long-term reputation penalties.  
For this reason, FEM circulates quality control staff among its suppliers of the 
more critical components. In some factories, one or two  expatriate quality 
control/production experts are present on a near permanent basis. 
 
Until recently, FEM has preferred outright acquisitions over investment in suppliers 
(both Chinese and non-Chinese). Historically however, both activities have been rare. 
Because quality failure in Chinese supply was, until a few years ago, most effectively 
resolved by acquisition of the problematic supplier, investment in Chinese suppliers 
has been extremely modest and acquisition more common. This however is currently 
under review. FEM is considering trialling more investment in third-party Chinese 
suppliers as a method of reducing quality risk. This might be due to the rising cost of 
acquiring Chinese companies, or to FEM’s having knowledge or experience of the 
disadvantages of acquiring Chinese suppliers outweighing the advantages. (The 
interviewee was reluctant to state which was of these two suppositions was the case, 
but gave indications that the latter explanation was the closer of the two.) 
 
Ensuring third-party, independent Chinese suppliers have complied with quality 
standards has, in the past, been problematic. The situation has improved, and the 
interviewee could recall no instances of Chinese quality failure occurring in the last 
few years. The interviewee described FEM’s China supply base as “generally world-
class”. (This too is possibly explanatory of FEM’s waning interest in acquiring 
suppliers as a quality risk-reducing strategy.) 
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In addition to insisting on ISO standards, FEM has proprietary in-house quality 
specifications. For each product design, quality is formally articulated in the 
engineering specification. Onsite quality checking by a resident FEM representative 
on the suppliers’ premises is not unique to Chinese factories. The interviewee 
stressed that this method has been generally successful in maintaining quality in 
FEM products regardless of where in the world production occurs. 
 
FEM, because of its global reach, involvement with many of the world’s largest 
construction and infrastructure companies, and the high-volume of the orders it 
places, wields significant buyer power over its supply base. FEM benefits from its 
dominance. To meet the standards of a global powerhouse such as FEM, suppliers 
must demonstrate the capability to manufacture at specified quality levels, 
consistently and reliably, and in high quantities [S3, S7, S12, S13].   
 
When selecting a third-party supplier, FEM prefer a partner that has an in situ 
relationship with a local, reliable logistics carrier, has experience in manufacturing 
comparable products, is receptive to audits and evaluations, and can present 
verifiable documentation.  
 
FEM’s more complicated product offerings comprise standardised components in 
non-standard forms, i.e. they are often bespoke arrangements of standard parts. The 
FEM interviewee described his company as an “integrator”, that is, an aggregator or 
designer/assembler of variously sourced components. FEM’s designing and testing 
of customer-specified components constitute FEM’s “solutions”. Electrical regulations 
in the country in which the solution is installed constrain FEM’s design options, and 
limit the range of components FEM can use inside its customers’ systems. FEM’s 
designs must therefore take into account national electrical standards; the build of 
individual components must meet or exceed the minimum quality specifications laid 
down by the authorities in the location in which the product will be used.  
FEM’s international ubiquity gives the firm a unique selling point in this regard: 
FEM is expertly familiar with the relevant specifications, constraints, and conventions 
(formal and traditional) of most countries, and ensures that its suppliers manufacture 
components that are compatible with region- or nation-specific standards, or 
internationally compliant. Furthermore, FEM’s integrated systems are built for load 
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and resistance compatibility with FEM components, limiting the possibility of 
malfunction due to within-system failure. This has advantages for FEM sales and 
customer retention via service contracts. FEM systems normally remain guaranteed 
provided any failed components are replaced by FEM components (and by FEM 
approved, qualified personnel). For this condition to be honourable however, FEM 
has to ensure that a continuous supply of quality-assured components is maintained. 
 
FEM’s system of supply is a pattern of multinational sourcing, integration by FEM at 
a third-party or FEM factory, or direct shipping of product by the supplier to the 
client’s site. FEM provides very few, if any, collection and delivery services (hence 
the preference for suppliers who have their own logistics capability), preferring to 
outsource these on an as-and-when basis in most countries.  
 
Internal supply logistics are usually the responsibility of the supplier. In some cases, 
suppliers can consolidate loads so that logistical economies can be obtained and 
costs thereby lowered. In various Asian regions, suppliers located in clusters are 
preferred for this reason. Most industrial clusters in China, for example, are coastal 
and strongly supported by local and international carriers. 
 
FEM’s supply network is characterised by international cross-border crossflow [S4, 
S13]. For some categories of product, the extreme cost competitiveness of suppliers 
in low-cost regions such as South and Southeast Asia offsets the cost, time, and 
administrative complexities and risks that result from the geographical remoteness of 
those regions relative to the end customer.  
FEM’s international crossflow is made possible by enforcement of 
contractually obliging quality standards and internal supply chain coordination via 
regional “Centers of Excellence”. 
 
When depicted as a model (see Figure 11), the FEM supply network is 
straightforward. FEM operates a network of worldwide, rated suppliers that 
manufacture according to various standards (internal and external) and ship, usually 
directly, to FEM’s customers around the world. FEM engineers design a “solution” 
based on customer requirements and the electrical regulations in the nation of usage, 
orders are placed with FEM’s suppliers, the orders are fulfilled and components are 
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sent. FEM technicians perform the installation on site, sometimes in conjunction with 
electricians working for the construction contractor. Apart from drop shipping, FEM’s 
clients have no interaction with FEM’s suppliers. FEM’s clients interact only with the 
FEM Centre of Excellence in their country. Likewise, FEM suppliers interact only with 
their nearest FEM Centre of Excellence. FEM suppliers have no direct interaction 
with FEM global headquarters in Paris.  
 
The Centers of Excellence bear responsibility for identifying, evaluating, background 
checking, selecting, quality control monitoring, compliance auditing, and the general 
managing of all within-nation suppliers. Similarly, the Centers of Excellence have 
responsibility for the management of their relationships with their within-nation 
customers, including identifying business, bidding, problem-solving, contract 
handling, and solutions design. This deputised/in-country mediated model gives the 
Centers of Excellence a high degree of business autonomy within the areas under 
their respective control.  The Chinese Centers of Excellence enable FEM to provide 
localized solutions to Chinese customers via Chinese staff conversant with Chinese 





4.2 Case Study 2 (CS2): Canadian Transportation (Global MNE) 
4.2.1 Company Overview 
After Siemens Mobility and General Electric Transportation, Canadian Transportation 
(hereafter “CT”), the Montréal-based railway subdivision of a Canadian transport 
engineering conglomerate, is the world’s third largest locomotive and railway 
carriage builder [B7, B11, B47]. In terms of rail related product diversity, CT is 
possibly global number one [B7, B17]. Worldwide, CT has 80 production and 
engineering facilities in 28 countries and a supply network spanning 22 countries 
[B17, B47]. The company’s core lines are rail vehicles (locomotives and carriages), 
rail network control technologies, infrastructure electrification, and propulsion 
components.  
 
CT is a highly technical company that provides a highly bespoke product, usually to 
governments, secondarily to Train Operating Companies (TOCs). Although lacking 
public visibility (at least outside Canada), CT is a major entity in the realm of 
transport engineering. Coincidentally, CT’s largest competitors are the transport 
divisions of Siemens and General Electric. The manager at CT described his 
organisation as an “integrator”, and as a provider of railway and transport “solutions”. 
 
4.2.2 Internationalisation  
Prior to interview, the interviewee stated that approximately 30 to 40% of CT’s 
revenue comes from the North American markets. The Asia-Pacific region is 
somewhere between 25 and 30%, but expected to grow year-on-year [B10, B28]. 
Western Europe is the company’s third key market, but also where the company 
faces its strongest competition and restricted growth opportunities due to recent 
economic conditions in the European Union. The company is looking eastward for its 
principal growth drivers [B47]. It has entered into cooperative ventures with three 
major state-owned Chinese railway companies, which are, in terms of sheer 
numbers of rail vehicles built and mileage of track laid per annum, the world’s largest 
rail infrastructure and rail vehicle purchasing commercial entities [B7, B28, B39].  
The rail industry is unusual in that national authorities generally demand that rail 
vehicles are built inside the countries in which they are used, but are seldom 
concerned with where the components of rail vehicles are manufactured. This 
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preference requires CT to locate assembly facilities in the nations where its main 
products are used, and is often a tiebreaking capability when bidding to national 
governments for large-scale rail infrastructure and rail vehicle contracts. Provided CT 
can assemble rail vehicles within the borders of the nation in which those vehicles 
will be used, quality and the sources of CT’s supply remain a matter of CT’s internal 
supply chain arrangement. 
 
4.2.3 Global Supply Strategy 
CT operates a global network of Regional Offices that represent its main markets 
and sources of supply. CT’s supply base comprises wholly-owned, joint-ventures, 
and third-party entities in 22 nations [B8, B10, B47]. The majority of CT’s wholly-
owned factories (both in China and other countries) are assembly facilities [B7, B11]. 
The majority of CT’s suppliers (around 80%) however are third-party entities. CT also 
has a steadily expanding portfolio of globally diffuse strategic acquisitions [B17, B21].  
 
Prospective CT suppliers, in China and other countries, petition their nearest CT 
Regional Office for contracts [B44]. Alternatively, if a supplier is active in the rail 
industry, it is likely that CT will be aware of their activity, their customers, and the 
products it is capable of manufacturing. In such cases, CT may approach an already 
active supplier and request samples. In most cases however, samples are not 
required, since the supplier must already be meeting the quality standards stipulated 
by the national rail authorities if it is manufacturing rail products that are being sold 
for incorporation in domestically operating vehicles or infrastructure.  
 
Through its network of third-party suppliers, its various joint-ventures, and its 
portfolio of wholly-owned factories, CT manufactures and commissions a wide 
variety of components in China for both the Chinese rail industry and overseas rail 
markets [B15, B23, B43].  
 
4.2.4 China Strategy 
CT has an extensive footprint in China: joint-ventures with three state-owned 
Chinese rail equipment manufacturers, three wholly CT-owned enterprises, and four 
Regional Offices (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong) [B15]. In total, CT 
employs around 3000 people in its owned facilities and offices in China [B9, B15]. 
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The interviewee was unsure how many Chinese suppliers CT is using currently, but 
gave an estimate of 100. For a company that in 2014 posted annual revenues of 
U$ 20 billion [B11], CT’s investment in its Chinese joint-ventures has been modest: 
U$ 38 million for a 50% stake in Changchun Railway Vehicles; U$ 38 million into CT 
CPC Propulsion Systems (percentage of stake not given); U$ 72 million for a 50% 
stake in CT Sifang Power Transportation [B4, B39]. 
 
In autumn of 2015, CT was engaged in 14 projects in Mainland China: seven were 
rail vehicle manufacturing projects (subways and coach building), five were signalling 
projects, and the remaining two were automated people moving systems (airport 
monorails) [B11]. This breakdown indicates the company’s continued focus on its 
traditional core activities, which are locomotive and coach building primarily, and 
railway infrastructure equipment (manufacturing, installing, and maintaining) 
secondarily.  
 
CT has a modest interest in supplier acquisition, preferring to bring to bear scale-
related enticements such as high-volume orders, association prestige, and long-term 
arrangements when selecting suppliers and negotiating price. In the case of China, 
CT is able to leverage two key strengths: its connections with China’s government 
via its joint-ventures [B9, B23, B33], and its technological superiority over competing 
native Chinese rail industry manufacturers. These strengths provide CT with a strong 
bargaining position when contracting with Chinese suppliers. The interviewee stated 
that as long as China’s rail companies remain relative technological laggards, this 
advantageous situation will continue.  
 
Also according to my interviewee, CT in China possesses the enviable position of 
non-substitutability. CT is deeply, irremovably embedded in the Chinese 
government’s ambitious nationwide rail infrastructure projects [also supported by 
B24, B30, B36, B39]. CT is also highly attractive to Chinese engineering graduates: 
CT currently offers better pay and conditions than Chinese companies. CT’s 
competitors in the field of high-speed rail vehicles, particularly Kawasaki of Japan, 
are less willing than CT to engage with China since allegations of injurious industrial 
espionage on the part of Chinese partners surfaced in the mid-2000s. CT’s long 
presence in China [B16] and enthusiasm for investment and participation in major 
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joint-ventures with state owned companies [B10, B24, B35, B39] has gained the 
company significant credibility in the eyes of the central government. Effective 
interaction with governments is a crucial part of the rail industry, since the majority of 
projects are issued and paid for by governments, central and regional. 
 
CT has an enduring relationship with the Chinese government. It has a heavy, 
deliberate reliance on Chinese supply [B7, B9, B15]: the Chinese government seems 
to favour companies who source intensively in China. 
 
Sourcing predominantly from third-party Chinese suppliers provides CT with several 
long-term advantages: geographical proximity to a major market, industry 
prominence and visibility, presence in the world’s fastest-growing economy, and 
general approval (thus far) by the Chinese government, who read CT’s endorsement 
of Chinese supply as a gesture of loyalty, as recognition of Chinese industrial 
competence, and as demonstrative of a desire to continue helping Chinese industry 
reach and eventually surpass global standards.  
 
However, CT management believes that the Chinese rail industry will evolve from 
ally into competitor within 10 to 15 years. By that time, the groundwork for most of 
China’s major rail infrastructure projects will be laid, and China’s native rail vehicle 
building proficiency will be comparable with that of CT and every other major 
international rail technology company. For this reason, CT is hurriedly and 
concertedly attempting to wring out the returns from its China investments.  
 
In 2015, CT was relishing the following short-term benefits of operating a 
predominantly third-party Chinese supply base:  
 relatively low labour costs;  
 a highly competitive domestic buyer’s market that drives down prices of 
commodities and substitutable product;  
 low overheads as a result of non-ownership of plant and facility; avoidance of 
tier 2 supplier management costs and complexities (which in China can be 
formidable);  
 obviation of labour and property related issues;  
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 and a favourable power discrepancy that permits selectivity and disposability 
(assuming continuity of the buyer’s market).  
 
CT regard the Asia-Pacific region generally and China particularly as key growth 
markets and therefore of high strategic significance [B9, B11, B15, B47]. CT uses its 
supply base and joint-ventures as a beachhead for exploration and involvement in 
the Chinese market, particularly the growing aerospace opportunities [B25, B27, 
B28]. Currently, in terms of pure product sourcing, the Chinese supply base 
functions mainly as a source of acceptable-quality, relatively low cost components, 
which are bought and installed both locally and overseas at CT’s assembly facilities, 
where they are aggregated with other components and built into infrastructure or 
local-use rail vehicles. 
 
Crossflow characterises the CT international supply network. Products manufactured 
at a Chinese supplier can be sold or deployed in any country – provided their 
specifications comply with the requirements of the rail authorities in the country of 
use. Likewise, products manufactured by third-party CT suppliers outside China can 
be aggregated into Chinese vehicles and infrastructure at CT factories, joint-ventures, 
or third-party assemblers in China. 
 
Most of CT’s suppliers and joint-venture partners use world-class production 
technology improved or directly provided by CT. However, the production of 
extremely high technologies is limited to suppliers in a handful of countries, namely 
Japan, various Western European countries, the United States, and Canada. 
However, because the technological capability of Chinese suppliers is rising steadily, 
this situation is likely to change in the near future. 
CT offers Chinese suppliers technological and managerial improvements, 
entry into a global supply pool for rail products, high-volume orders, government 
connections, a long-term relationship, and the many other sundry advantages of 
association with a world leading rail technology partner.  
 
CT is building its long-term China strategy around the continuation and deepening of 
its Chinese supply base, despite management acknowledging that CT’s position in 
the Chinese market will decline as the capabilities of Chinese suppliers and vehicle 
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builders improve. Markets in neighbouring countries are expected to grow, and CT 
envisages their Chinese supply base – due to its high scale production capability and 
geographical proximity – to become increasingly elemental in SCs serving the rail 
needs of various emerging Asian markets [B7, B28, B47]. Chinese supply – provided 
the relatively low costs of labour continue – will contribute to CT’s competitiveness in 
the steadier markets of developed countries too. Also, the potentially vast growth 
that the Chinese market represents is such that CT envisions high returns from the 
capture of even a modest share of the Chinese rail technology market, and is for this 
reason continuing to invest and source in China. CT is addressing Chinese demand 
with Chinese supply, and performing China market-specific research and 
development in China [B, B15].  
 
In sum, Chinese supply is crucial to CT’s formula for meeting both local and global 
demand, in both the present and the future. 
 
It is unofficial CT policy that projects are supplied within-nation whenever possible 
and profitable. In the case of rail vehicle building, within-nation provision is usual 
according to industry convention and public expectation; in some cases, it is a formal 
contractual condition. However, because not all rail industry products can be sourced 
inside China (or any other country), a degree of transnational crossflow of products 
is unavoidable, commercially and practically rational, and an inevitable outcome of 
global supplier dispersion. In the case of substitutable products in high volumes, 
lower cost may trump proximity to market or within-nation status. If, for example, a 
Chinese supplier can provide a basic, non-critical item for use in a North American 
project at significantly lower per-unit cost than the North American supplier, the 
Chinese supplier will normally receive the order, provided the transaction costs do 
not erode the price economy and that the extended lead time does not impact the 
schedule unduly. When depicted as a diagram (following), CT’s global SC operations 
comprise three straightforward elements: a global supply base, Regional Offices 
handling regional sales and suppliers, and an end customer (typically a government  
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or a rail vehicle-building rival). Figure 12 (following) shows CT’s supplier-buyer 
crossflows.   
 
 
For CT’s customers and suppliers, the CT Regional Office is the one point of contact 
[B9, B14]. The most intensive bidirectional communication occurs between Regional 
Offices and their within-nation supply base. In common with the other MNEs 
presented in this research, CT places responsibility for supplier risk on its Regional 
Offices. Each Regional Office monitors its within-nation suppliers for quality and 
compliance [B18, B16]. CT’s global office assigns responsibility for customer 
relationship management, supplier management, public relations, and all other 
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region- or nation-specific functions to its Regional Offices. Communication between 
Regional Offices occurs when customer interests are transnational, SC failure has 
occurred, and when information about suppliers is required. CT’s Regional Offices 
defer to global headquarters in matters of strategy and policy. CT’s suppliers are 
international from outset, serving markets both domestically and overseas. Many 
locomotives and carriages, for example, comprise standard components that meet or 
surpass the quality standards of most national rail authorities. Control systems and 
high-speed rail technologies can be highly specific  to project [B30], so not exported 
from China, where most suppliers are manufacturing low to medium tech products.  
 Although some high-tech is manufactured by Chinese suppliers, the majority 
of cutting edge, highly innovative technologies remain manufactured by suppliers 
elsewhere. (The interviewee was evasive on the issue of why very few of CT’s 
higher-tech products are manufactured in China, despite the Chinese government’s 
simultaneous commissioning of several of the world’s largest high-speed rail projects 
[B22].)  
 
For CT, contracting with the larger Chinese suppliers and participating in joint-
venture partnerships decreases very specific forms of risk related to government and 
market. CT’s proximity to the Chinese government and allows the firm to harness 
native know-how regarding logistics, business network management, tier 2 supply 
management, and the various channels of resource acquisition. 
 
4.2.5 China Risk Management I. Logistics 
For CT’s customers, within-nation supply represents risk reduction in the form of lead 
time punctuality. Importantly, various legal, regulatory, communicatory, and logistical 
reassurances also result from dealing with local companies.  
Furthermore, CT’s global supply network functions as a powerful complement 
to local sourcing: in the event of local supplier failure or disruption to local SCs, CT’s 
network of suppliers overseas offer continuity through redundancy. This is likely 
facilitated by CT’s enforcement of minimum quality standards on all its suppliers of 
basic, interchangeable products. This global crossflow capability thus functions as a 




Within-nation supply is made possible through and harnesses the advantages of the 
autonomous Regional Office [B4, B7, B9, B12]. The in-country mediation/ 
deputisation of control allows local people to manage local companies according to 
local ways. When dealing in China with officials from both central and local 
governments, this practice assumes great importance. Regional and national 
deputisation makes management of CT’s corporate countenance the responsibility of 
local Chinese people who are more likely suited to managing the company’s 
relations with its Chinese stakeholders than, say, expatriate managers in China or 
non-Chinese managers in a distant overseas central headquarters. The advantages 
of delegating the management of the Chinese supply base to the China offices can 
be summed up in two words: proximity and sensitivity. 
 
CT operates SCs based on multinational sourcing and integration by CT factories 
and facilities local to project sites [B8, B45, B46]. Via suppliers, CT usually ship very 
large orders directly to project sites, since this saves both time and logistical cost. 
Logistical operations are outsourced to internationally active and industry-
experienced third-party transport companies (or carriers appointed by the Chinese 
government). Whenever possible, CT customers are provisioned by local SCs. 
Decisions to initiate and/or continue international crossflows (and bear the costs and 
complexities of managing those flows) are based on the profitability of the trade, the 
nature of the demand (volume and duration), and the availability of within-nation 
suppliers. 
 
4.2.6 China Risk Management II. Quality  
The interviewee had little to say about quality risk: CT’s universal enforcement of 
quality standards [B18, B44] means that in the cases of most products, most 
suppliers are able to supply most markets.  
 
Supplier identification, contracting, quality management, auditing, and conditional 
admission to the global CT supply pool are the primary tools of risk management 
used by the Regional Office. The Regional Office also bears responsibility for 
managing its within-nation customer base, so influences both supply- and demand-
side risk. All four multinationals presented in this research operate a regionally 
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deputised, in-country mediated system of both customer and supplier risk 
management.  
 
The CT SC model comprises three basic sections linked by lines of communication 
and product flow. Between supplier and customer sits the CT national or Regional 
Office, which represents CT to customers and manages CT’s suppliers within that 
nation or region. Communication between suppliers and customers, if necessary, is 
through the relevant Regional Office. Customers, including CT’s wholly-owned 
factories and assembly facilities, rarely have reason for communication with 
suppliers directly. CT’s Regional Offices can thus be considered double-sided 
interfaces, looking back to supply and forward to demand.  
 
CT’s customers can request design assistance from CT’s engineering experts. CT 
describes this service flexibility as a “design provision solution”. Once defined and 
approved, designs are transferred to suppliers for manufacturing. Initially, small 
production runs are commissioned so that the output can be tested for appropriate 
quality. Production is either continued or discontinued pending quality testing. This 
way, the customer receives product whose quality is assured. 
 
At key suppliers and wholly-owned plants, an ex-patriot expert will typically be 
working alongside a native Chinese manager. CT considers its native Chinese 
managers a vital asset, since most are bilingual and foreign educated, and all are 
qualified, rail-specialising engineers. Worldwide, if the number of suppliers producing 
a critical component exceeds the number of experts, CT rotates its experts so that 
each supplier of safety critical components is routinely visited. Routine quality 
checking is also performed at CT assembly facilities, where SCs converge. CT will 
also dispatch engineers and production managers on an ad hoc, firefighting basis in 
response to quality failures or production efficiency issues at suppliers. 
 
CT entrusts responsibility for tier 2 quality management to its tier 1 suppliers. In the 
case of China, this appears to be a sensible strategy, because CT management 
believe that few foreign organisations can navigate with comparable proficiency the 
conditions, regulations, and networks that characterise the Chinese business 
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environment generally and the highly government-influenced steel and rail industries 
especially. 
 
CT enforces strict process and product controls on its suppliers [B18, B44]. In 
addition to in-house standards and quality control, CT suppliers must also ensure 
their products meet the material and performance requirements of the particular rail 
authority in which the products will be used. Usually however, CT’s internal 
specifications satisfy or exceed these requirements.  
 
CT will actively seek suppliers capable of manufacturing specific products. However, 
the supply base for rail products is far smaller. CT typically knows which suppliers 
are supplying its rivals, and in the case of suppliers of highly sophisticated products, 
will attempt acquisitions and enter joint-ventures [B11, B36] to secure own supply 
and wrest away a competitor’s source. The industry of rail supply, because its 
products are strongly regulated, specialist, and subject to stringent quality controls, is 
smaller and more visible than less technical supply industries. This gives rail industry 
suppliers a degree of bargaining power with buyers that is not enjoyed by suppliers 
of less regulated or commodity status products. 
 
CT places China at the centre of many of its globe-spanning SCs. The interviewee 
acknowledged that CT’s long-term fortunes in China, i.e. CT’s China strategy, is 
intensely dependent on maintaining and, ideally, expanding the Chinese supply base 
in response to the Chinese and global market appetite for rail products. CT operates 
a global supply network that is heavily China-reliant. In China, probably due to the 
Chinese government’s enthusiasm for state-owned enterprises and the possibility of 
economically advantageous spillovers, supplying Chinese customers with China-
made products garners approval from the authorities.  
 
CT’s Regional Offices handle supply and logistical issues related to the within-nation 
suppliers for whom they have responsibility. The CT system of international supplier 
management is thus deputised and largely autonomous.  
 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the highly regulated nature of railway products, 
railway technology is, for the most part, low risk. It is generally understood, seldom 
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subject to revolutionary innovation surges, and, due to the general inertia of rail 
regulation, not vulnerable to rapid or disruptive revisions. Most innovation is related 
to drive/propulsion systems, electrical distribution, vehicular stability, energy-saving, 
and network management. Rail, ties, ballast, rail-laying machinery, cables, signalling, 
vehicle interiors and exteriors, bogeys, axles, and non-high-speed power systems 
are fairly stable technologies that rarely undergo major change (Bonnet, 2005). Thus, 
the majority of rail products are to some degree substitutable. In terms of product, 
differentiating capability typically comes in the form of software and high-speed rail 
vehicles. Fortunately for CT, China’s interest in the latter is great and CT’s capability 
in both is also strong [B22, B36, B42, B43]. 
 
All CT’s suppliers are ISO certified. CT’s supply base for substitutable items is far 
larger than its supply base for cutting edge, high-tech products. Competition between 
suppliers inside the CT supply base is therefore restricted to low to medium 
technology products. Compared to the other three large multinationals, CT’s supply 
requirements are more specialist in nature. This specificity gives a subset of CT 
suppliers distinct bargaining power. In its favour however, CT has its global presence, 
prestige, research and development capability, and, due to its strong business 
legacy, close relationships with the rail authorities of many of the world’s richest 
countries – advantages that for suppliers represent potentially high volume orders, 
technology transfers, investment, and mergers and acquisitions with stronger, 
globally active entities.  
 
In the following chapter, the findings of six industry key informant interviews (two 






5. Industry Key Informant Findings 
Findings from the six industry key informant interviews are presented in this chapter. 
Two key informants were MNE managers; four were UK SME managers. All six 
provided details on their companies’ supply strategy, China strategy, and risk 
management. 
 
5.1 Industry Key Informant 1 (IK1): Swedish Furniture Manufacturer 
(Global MNE) 
5.1.1 Company Overview  
Swedish Furniture Manufacturer (hereafter “SFM”) retails furniture and other 
domestic-use goods through 350 stores in 47 countries, stocking around 10,000 
standard products at each facility. Regional distribution centres serve the country of 
location and surrounding markets. Control decisions and strategy occur at the global 
headquarters in Stockholm and are relayed downward through the company’s 
various regional and national headquarters.  
National headquarters are tasked with the implementation of policies, 
practices, and directives issued from the global headquarters, specifically from “the 
family”, whose members constitute the majority of the board. The SFM corporate 
structure can therefore be described as centralised. Regional and national 
headquarters have autonomy only in supplier selection. Suggestions for strategic, 
market-specific manoeuvres, and proposals for suppliers of major categories of 
product are issued by a national or regional headquarters, but approval is the 
decision of the global headquarters.  
 
5.1.2 Internationalisation  
SFM’s management regard China as a major growth market, and have plans for at 
least 20 more stores in mainland China. Chinese suppliers have so far proven 
capable of servicing both domestic and foreign markets. Hence, the case for 
continuing Chinese supply is strong, and made stronger by the cost and complexity 
savings intrinsic to Chinese supply and SC within national borders. Corporate 
strategy is currently (2015-2022) focusing on increasing the number of retail facilities 
in China and India. 
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5.1.3 Global Supply Strategy 
SFM’s manufacturing is done by a network of approximately 1100 suppliers located 
in 52 countries. Quality in both product and processes across the supply base is 
regulated by a set of in-house standards, procedures, quality controls, and second 
tier supplier engagement conditions and protocols. This collection of regulations is 
formally articulated in a body of contractual standards known as the “S-Way”. Only 
suppliers that contractually commit to cohere with S-Way standards can become 
first-tier SFM suppliers. Most suppliers are third-party; about 20% are under the 
management or direct ownership of “S-KANO”, an SFM subsidiary that specialises in 
insurance, property, and financial products. All suppliers are regulated by “S-Way”.  
 
Since the majority of SFM products are modular (typical furniture products are 
constructed from materials that differ in configuration and dimensions, and in grade 
not substance), the level of necessary machining sophistication is modest, making 
the number of potential suppliers great. SFM, according to this interviewee, finds the 
supply base a “buyer’s market”, so is able to select from pools of candidate suppliers 
and secure low prices.  
Furniture, the core product line, is highly modular, to allow assembly by 
unskilled customers. For the manufacturer, modularity simplifies production. In terms 
of setup, the commonality of product components (screws, plugs, chipboard) means 
that manufacturing of different models requires only the reconfiguration of machinery.  
 
The company’s key products are rearrangements of common materials. This 
absence of uniqueness simplifies both procurement and production.  
 
5.1.4 China Strategy 
The interviewee claimed that although most products sold by SFM in China are 
China-made, a minority come from overseas. This crossflow is necessitated by the 
relative costs and differentiating capabilities of suppliers. All things being equal, SFM 
favours suppliers who are closest to the most active markets. The dispersed nature 
of the supply base applies competitive pressure on all suppliers, and elevates the 




SFM’s China strategy is critically dependent on SC configuration decisions. Currently, 
close-to-market suppliers operating in locations that are logistically favourable are 
preferred. Suppliers operating close to regional distribution centres present lower 
logistical costs and lower complexity than distant suppliers. When capabilities are 
equal, the nearer supplier is favoured. SFM’s business model is highly supplier 
intensive; thus, locating the supply network as close as possible to the market is 
rational and logical. Figure 13 (following) shows SFM’s buyer-supplier crossflows. 
 
 
5.1.5 China Risk Management I. Logistics  
Top management regard risk in China logistics (domestic and foreign-bound) 
systems as no more significant than in any other market. The concept of China risk 
management is in adapted little from the standard model, which is one of national 
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Figure 13 SFM Buyer-Supplier Flows 
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and regional distribution centres intelligently forwarding inventory to retail branches 
or overseas distribution centres in response to sales. Like elsewhere, Chinese 
suppliers will, in some cases, ship certain categories of product directly to the retail-
warehouse branch, bypassing the distribution centres. Established product lines, and 
furniture in particular, are predominantly replenished from a distribution centre. In the 
event of a customer order not being fulfilled from branch inventory directly due to 
stock out at the nearest local branch, supplier drop shipping can occur, or delivery 
may be from a third-party logistics provider contracted by the local branch.  
 
Because China is the single largest country of supply within SFM’s global supply 
network, logistics management is a major activity at the China headquarters. Main 
activities include logistics company vetting, communications, and flow monitoring. 
Outside China, selection of third-party logistics providers is typically the responsibility 
of local branch management, but in China (and other major emerging markets where 
demand is high but supply can be erratic and not of uniform standards), a particular 
set of preapproved logistics companies is recommended by the national head office. 
The level of central involvement in the case of SFM’s logistics in China is thus far 
greater than in other countries or regions. Due to the level of logistics-related work 
being higher than in other national headquarters, and to the strategic importance of 
China in the SFM supply network, the China national office has far higher levels of 
resources and expertise dedicated to logistics activities. 
 
he method appears to have been successful: since commencement in 2010, purely 
logistical failures, such as unpunctuality and incomplete orders have been rare 
occurrences. The preferred Chinese logistics partners are technologically modern, 
so provide SFM’s China headquarters with visibility of transit progress and vehicle 
dispatch.  
 
5.1.6 China Risk Management II. Quality 
The enforcement of S-Way raises supplier capabilities and competencies, and 
qualifies a supplier’s products as appropriate for retail across the entire international 
SFM consumer base. Within-China supplier selection is the responsibility of the 
China national headquarters, and performed in accordance with SFM’s globally 
standardised protocols of vetting and due diligence. Once a supplier is rated worthy, 
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is formally contracted to supply according to S-Way conditions, and has 
demonstrated competence as a within-nation supplier for the duration of a specified 
evaluation period, that supplier receives an international rating and begins fulfilling 
international orders. Each national headquarters takes responsibility for the quality of 
the suppliers inside its respective national borders.  
 
The approach to quality risk management in Chinese supply is functionally identical 
to the global supply management approach.  
However, as with logistics quality, central involvement in the China supply 
quality is higher than in other countries. Main activities include supplier background 
vetting, certification vetting and enforcement, communications, auditing, kaizen, and 
quality and compliance monitoring. At the China headquarters, more resources and 
personnel are dedicated to management of supplier quality than at any other national 
or regional SFM headquarters. This is because Chinese supply is critical to the 
global SFM competitiveness formula, and because the Chinese domestic market is 
envisaged as a major growth driver that will increase in importance in the coming 
decades.   
 
5.2 Industry Key Informant 2 (IK2): American Food Conglomerate 
(Global MNE) 
5.2.1 Company Overview 
American Food Conglomerate (hereafter “AFC”) is the world’s thirteenth largest food 
processing company. Its core products are food and beverage ingredients. 
Specialities include pharmaceuticals, livestock management, food related industrial 
products, financial services, logistics and transport, energy technologies, agricultural 
technologies, animal feed, bio-industrial chemicals, farming services, and human 
personal care products. AFC operates in 68 countries and employs around 155,000 
people. AFC’s ownership remains firmly in the hands of family members.  
 
5.2.2 Internationalisation 
AFC began concerted internationalisation in the early 1980s, with the 
commencement of large-scale operations in Western Europe. Currently, its main 
markets are North America, Western Europe, and East Asia, with the last receiving 
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the greatest strategic attention. The global dispersion of its suppliers has been 
expanding in rough proportion to the global ubiquity of its markets and customers. 
East Asia is a location of strategically vital, growth-driving concentrated markets, and 
the location of key supplies and suppliers. The company’s internationalisation – of 
both markets and supplies – reflects global changes in macroeconomic wealth and 
the expanding range of goods and services demanded by diverse markets.   
 
The AFC supply network is characterised by international cross-border crossflows. 
Although within-nation suppliers are generally preferred, not all commodities and 
products can be sourced in-country. AFC enforces universal quality standards to 
ensure that any supplier’s produce or product is acceptable to any of AFC’s 
customers – whether they be internal supply chain participants of external customers. 
These factors create a network of intersecting flows and high redundancy.  
 
5.2.3 Global Supply Strategy 
AFC’s supply base is spread across 68 countries. AFC suppliers are typically 
independently-owned farms, livestock processors, slaughterers, crop growers, and 
other food processors and packagers. AFC owns very few resource providers 
outright, but has instead an extensive portfolio of internationally dispersed food and 
beverage ingredient processing plants.  
 
Throughout the supply base, both product and process quality is ensured by the 
contractual stipulation of terms and conditions. AFC grants its suppliers autonomy in 
tier 2 decisions. However, because AFC’s core products are food- and beverage-
related, hygiene and sterility are essential to quality so are heavily regulated to 
satisfy minimum national and international legal and industrial standards. AFC 
places responsibility for supplier selection with the relevant national headquarters. 
The vastness of AFC’s operations necessitates this deputisation.  
 
AFC has very limited interest in supplier acquisition, preferring to leverage its high-
volume purchase requirements in the market in order to secure the cost reductions 
that typically accompany extreme high-volume orders. AFC policy favours group-
wide bulk purchases for maximisation of scale economies. This limits the autonomy 
of regional AFC offices to exploit economies offered by local suppliers. Group-wide, 
151 
 
en bloc buying followed by bulk breaking and distribution is the superior economic 
strategy. According to the interviewee, this approach gives AFC a dominant position 
in several vital markets and favoured status with multiple major suppliers. 
Purchasers in regional headquarters or offices must apply to global headquarters for 
permission to procure with local purchasers.  
 
5.2.4 China Strategy 
AFC regards China as a market of growing importance and as a supply base of 
extreme potential, so is steadily enlarging its presence in the country. The AFC 
ambition is to select Chinese suppliers in order to reduce the logistical and regulatory 
complexities of moving high bulk food and beverage ingredients across borders. 
Currently, AFC’s Chinese customers receive AFC product from both within and 
outside China. This is the general global case. Only North American customers have 
the majority of their ingredients sourced relatively locally.  
 
For Chinese suppliers, contracting with AFC has advantages: order stability and 
quantity, technological upgrading, and the possibility of entering lucrative networks of 
local suppliers. In China, government (central and local) encourages multinationals 
to trade with Chinese suppliers as much as possible.  
 
In its lines of machinery and other industrial-use equipment, AFC can provide 
customisable solutions from its network of factories, many of which are located in 
China (the interviewee was uncertain of the percentage of production that Chinese 
manufacturing represents, but indicated that China is the source of several important 





5.2.5 China Risk Management I. Logistics  
AFC’s China strategy is highly SC-dependent, and AFC’s global SC capability is 
highly China-dependent.  
 
AFC’s procurement decisions favours within-China supply whenever possible. Close 
proximity  between supplier and customer reduces lead times and logistical risks. 
Suppliers located in or near clusters, particularly Chinese coastal clusters, are more 
attractive to AFC than cheaper inland suppliers. Moreover, the local presence of 
AFC staff enables direct interaction with managers at suppliers.  
 
AFC have little to no involvement in the logistical operations of their China suppliers. 
As a precondition of contracting, suppliers are required to demonstrate autonomous 
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capability in logistics. AFC China prefers suppliers who have contracts with known-
good logistics providers.  
 
5.2.6 China Risk Management II. Quality 
So far, AFC has practised local sourcing within China, but has made significant 
technological contributions to several Chinese suppliers, especially suppliers of 
machinery. Ensuring that Chinese suppliers routinely adhere to AFC’s own and 
international quality standards has, in earlier years, been a costly and challenging 
undertaking. AFC’s purchasers today report few incidents of quality failure that are 
directly attributable to technology or proficiency lag in Chinese suppliers.  
New suppliers petition their nearest AFC headquarters for contracts, respond 
to requests for proposals through formal bidding processes, or be discovered by 
procurement personnel from their national AFC headquarters. New Chinese 
suppliers are accepted into the international supply pool once the China national 
headquarters has completed a formal evaluation and proofing process and found the 
supplier capable and competent.  
 
AFC dispatches production engineers and quality control staff to inspect premises, 
licences, certification, and samples of product. Dun and Bradstreet may also be 
subcontracted by AFC to perform background checks and other forms of due 
diligence on prospective suppliers. New suppliers begin by supplying within-China 
buyers or AFC-owned facilities. After a specified period elapses without significant 
quality decline or negative incidents, the supplier earns entrance into the 
international pool and can commence contributing to AFC’s global supply network. 
 
AFC deputises its China headquarters to manage Chinese supplier risk – logistics- 
and quality-related – within national borders autonomously, but in accordance with 
group-wide directives. This spreading of control allows local people to resolve local 
issues, and to manage the supply base in a locally responsive, sensitive, and 
intelligent manner. Moreover, it places responsibility for AFC’s local presence in the 
hands of local actors who are better equipped to navigate the local business and 




Communication in the AFC model is most intensive between national headquarters 
and national supply base (see Figure 14). Complaints about quality or logistical 
failures are managed by the AFC headquarters in the country where the produce or 
product originated. This way, the advantages of proximity and local knowledge can 
be brought to bear on the issue and the risk of repetition or ripple effects thereby 
better contained. 
 
5.3 Industry Key Informant 3 (IK3): Direct2Customer (UK SME) 
5.3.1 Company Overview 
Direct2Customer (hereafter “D2C”) supplies clothing to British retailers, brands and 
football clubs. D2C specialises in knitwear but can supply most forms of garment.  
 
The essential business model (in marketing terms, the unique selling point) of D2C 
can be deconstructed thus:  
 secure relationship with a network of proven capable manufacturers;  
 long-term, stable relationship with one of the world’s largest clothing 
manufacturers;  
 service and price competitiveness;  
 simplified/assisted design submission process;  
 simplified/assisted logistical processes;  
 expertise in fashion design and retail;  
 engagement with both Chinese clothing manufacturer networks and British 
fashion retail networks;  
 bilingual/bicultural capability and near-permanent presence in China 
(reassures customers that troubleshooting will be capably performed); and  
 head office in Cheadle, Greater Manchester, so accessible and verifiable to 
UK firms.  
 
5.3.2 China Strategy 
D2C do not manufacture. Most of the designs required by their bigger customers are 
manufactured by Jinping Zhejiang Garments Company Limited (Pinghu, Zhejiang, 
China) – a single, very large factory supplying big retailers and brands worldwide 
(such as Japan’s Uniqlo label/retailer). 
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For its smaller customers (lower English league football clubs), D2C provides whole 
package solutions. Such solutions include design proposals. Customers accept or 
reject the proposed designs, or suggest modifications. Customers then specify the 
quantity they require and a calendrical window for receipt of the order.  
 
D2C has distinct scale preferences. Retailers place large orders that maximise scale 
economies by utilising the strength of Jinping, which is D2C’s main and preferred 
supplier. Jinping is a very high volume-oriented manufacturer. Low volume orders 
thus reduce the possibility of Jinping maximising its economies of scale and 
therefore lowers D2C’s profits on the transaction. Table 13 summarises the relative 
requirements of D2C’s main customers. 
 
Table 13 D2C Typical Customer Requirements by Category 
 
Figure 15 describes D2C’sessential business processes in terms of the flows 





Order size (volumes) Design assistance Logistics assistance 
Football clubs Very low Very high Very high 
Brands Low to medium Low Low to medium 
























When mapped in rudimentary sociographic terms (Figure 16), D2C appears to be a 
meeting point of its two managers’ networks: MG’s network of UK buyers and CP’s 
network of Chinese suppliers. Through D2C, MG has access to CP’s network, and 
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D2C exhibits a degree of functional symmetry: both networks represent reflective 
suites of expertise and resources that either manager can access via his counterpart. 
MG and CP operate as front- and back-end managers, respectively. MG interfaces 
with UK; CP, who is ethnically Chinese, Mainland China-born, and who graduated 
from a British university in a design-related discipline, manages the China-side, 
back-end supply network.  
 
Both MG and CP communicate with Jinping, but since CP is the more regular visitor 
and the more linguistically capable, CP’s ties with Jinping are stronger than MG’s. 
CP’s family and friend networks provide D2C with supply options outside Jinping. 
These third-party factories are nimble. They can supply MG’s smaller customers and 
produce low quantity runs more cost effectively than Jinping. They also reduce risk 
by providing extra capacity and redundancy. 
 
CP is D2C’s key China person. His connectedness and capabilities constitute D2C’s 
core China risk-reducing assets.  
 
5.3.3 China Risk Management I. Logistics  
When the client signs an order, D2C forward the order to one of their suppliers in 
China. D2C also organises delivery, which is typically from supplier directly to the 
customer’s premises via an international third-party logistics provider. On occasion, 
D2C have contacted logistics companies to ascertain progress of shipped items. In 
the event of Chinese language necessity, CP (the ethnically Chinese and Chinese-
speaking partner) has contacted the China offices of the third-party logistics provider. 
 
Brands and larger retailers usually operate their own accounts with major 
international logistics firms. In such cases, D2C only place orders with their Chinese 
suppliers and provide the customers with a date for collection at the factory gate in 
China. The customer’s own logistics provider then performs the collection and 
delivery. D2C have experienced very few instances of unpunctuality and delivery 




5.3.4 China Risk Management II. Quality 
The supplier-buyer flows reveal that D2C functions as a buyer-to-supplier-facilitating 
intermediary performing three roles: back-end supply management and support 
(quality control, cost monitoring, schedule control, etc.); intermediary facilitation 
(communication with buyers and suppliers); and front-end enablement (opportunity 
creation, customer relationship management, and total solutions provision).  
 
The quality in large orders is assured by partner credentials. Jinping is a world-class 
supplier of many international brands and retailers. Jinping quality is as high as can 
be obtained anywhere for mass market garments. For smaller orders, D2C (via CP, 
the Chinese partner) achieves quality control by manufacturing at factories that are 
directly owned by CP’s family, friends, and hometown peer network. Both CP and his 
manufacturers have a reputational and financial stake in quality achievement. CP is 
in constant communication with both manufacturing bases. Both CP and MG visit 
and communicate with Jinping several times annually; CP is in contact with his family 
and peer manufacturing network daily.    
 
D2C have had very few cases of quality failure, and use their customers’ testimonies 
on this matter when pitching to supply new customers. They argue that their prices 
are higher than China-sourcing suppliers of comparable product because they use 
known-good, proven capable and reliable partners and refuse to buy on price. 
According to D2C, China sourcing can be extremely low cost if buying is on price, 
but the quality of product thus sourced is likely to be inconsistent at best. D2C seek 




5.4 Industry Key Informant 4 (IK4): OEM (UK SME) 
5.4.1 Company Overview  
OEM Engineering Limited (also trading as “OEM Electrical Components Limited” and 
“OEM Appliances Limited”, but hereafter “OEM”) supplies high-end hobs and ovens 
to luxury UK brands and catalogue companies, medical refrigerators to the NHS, and 
unbranded white goods to UK retailers. OEM provides a one-stop, integrated design, 
manufacturing, and logistics solution. Manufacturers perform to international 
standards, as articulated in the relevant EU and ISO standards and/or manufacture 
to the customer’s bespoke specifications.  
 
The OEM essential business model (in marketing terms, its unique selling points) 
can be deconstructed thus:  
 direct ownership of a proven capable factory;  
 strong portfolio of well-known household and luxury brands;  
 strong quality control;  
 turnkey product development solutions: product is designed to order, 
manufactured, and delivered;  
 simplified logistics;  
 product design expertise;  
 production and shipping monitoring;  
 direct business connections inside China;  
 deep experience with Chinese business, European retail, appliance 
engineering, design, and marketing;  
 bilingual/bicultural staff with frequent presence in China (reassures customers 
that troubleshooting will be capably performed);  
 proven consistency with delivering quality prestige goods to well-known high 
street retailers;  
 based in Old Trafford greater Manchester, so accessible and verifiable to UK 
firms. 
 
The exclusive nature of OEM’s main product (prestige, high-price hobs and ovens) 
means scale is neither a priority nor a determiner of profits – low quantity is profitably 
offset by high per-unit pricing.  
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5.4.2 China Strategy 
OEM’s goods are designed in-house at OEM’s UK office in Trafford Park, 
Manchester. Manufacturing occurs at OEM’s Qingdao factory, where 35 people work 
full-time. OEM receives designs and requests for manufacturing from UK-based 
brands. Designs for brands and NHS clients are created in Manchester and sent by 
e-mail to OEM’s Qingdao factory. If necessary, Chinese instructions are appended 
by Manchester-based Chinese staff. All staff are engineers with relevant product 
experience, are direct employees of OEM, and often participate in the design 
process. Tier 2 supply is handled locally in China by the factory’s operations 
manager. 
 
In block concept terms (Figure 17), the OEM model is an uncomplicated tripartite 
arrangement. Its central position is occupied by BJ, the manager, owner, and 




BJ functions as both the front- and back-end manager, although at the back-end, he 
is assisted by numerous China-based individuals that he describes as “friends who 
are also manufacturing and product design experts”. At the front end, he interfaces 
Legend 
 Flow of orders (unidirectional)  
 Flow of goods (unidirectional) 
 Flow of product design and other information (bidirectional) 
 
 
Line thickness indicates approximate volume (thicker line=higher volume) 
 
Total design/manufacturing/logistics solution (if required) 
   Location: UK 











Figure 17 OEM Supplier-Buyer Flows 
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with his major customers, who are UK brands that he has known since his days with 
Haier in the 1990s. For the bulk of his business, BJ seems confidently reliant upon 
his network of contacts with people in the UK’s domestic appliance and retail 
industry. A minority of BJ’s orders come from independent British entrepreneurs. 
Few independents place repeat orders or high-value orders. Figure 18 (following) 







Tie thickness (thicker line=stronger tie) 
 
Tie length (shorter line=higher frequency of direct communication) 
   Location: UK 
   Location: China 
   Key China People; friends/experts (Chinese, China-based) 
 BJ  Key UK Person: BJ (manager, British, UK-based) 
 
At the back-end, BJ manages the Chinese factory that he owns outright. The factory 
is a unit in a large industrial manufacturing facility that is shared by several 
companies, foreign and Chinese. Direct ownership of the factory necessitates 
constant contact and the development and maintenance of strong ties with the 
managers there. BJ states that the relationships he has with his managers have 
grown steadily to the point of strong trust. Nevertheless, BJ’s presence in China is 
frequent and productive. BJ’s supply activities are facilitated by a group of ethnically 
Chinese, predominantly China-based contacts. This group of valuable individuals are 
BJ’s key China people (his “trusted friends, Chinese colleagues and business 








Figure 18 OEM Engineering Sociograph 
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They are his quality control and general management deputies, attending critical 
stages of product development, and performing major transactions. These friends 
provide linguistic and cultural assistance, and act as liaisons with tier 2 suppliers and 
local officialdom. They also monitor local business developments, economic 
conditions, material prices, and any other events or trends likely to impact on the 
continuity of OEM’s supply, transportation, or labour. 
 
In terms of essential business processes/supplier-buyer flows, OEM is a buyer-to-
supplier-facilitating intermediary performing three roles: back-end supply support 
(quality control, and cost monitoring); intermediary-facilitation (communicating with 
buyers and suppliers); and front-end sales enabling (opportunity identification, 
customer relationship management, and total solutions provision if necessary). 
Chinese suppliers communicate directly with OEM through BJ’s representatives in 
China or Manchester.  
 
5.4.3 China Risk Management I. Logistics 
OEM has no storage or distribution facilities. Orders are shipped directly from factory 
to customers’ premises. Factory floor-to-customer door direct delivery is usually 
provided by OEM via a third-party logistics provider, but occasionally by the 
customer’s own logistics partner. OEM uses internationally capable shippers and has 
of Autumn 2015 suffered only one late delivery. 
 
Logistics companies communicate with OEM representatives either in China or with 
the Manchester office, through which all payments for logistics operations are made. 
Manchester-based ethnically Chinese staff handle communications with the China 
offices of third-party logistics providers, although the necessity for such 
communications is infrequent. Unpunctuality and delivery failure are extremely rare 
occurrences. OEM management consider logistical risk to be trivial to the point of 
insignificance.  
 
5.4.4 China Risk Management II. Quality 
OEM’s China representatives assist the factory with issues related to quality and/or 
tier 2 supply, and forward any relevant information on such matters to the OEM office 
in Manchester. All China-side issues likely to impact negatively on orders are 
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handled by OEM first in Manchester and then in China. OEM endeavours to mitigate 
risk through constant communication with both customers and the factory. OEM’s 
presence in China consists of BJ (who is present for several months each year), and 
(when BJ is not present) a mixture of representatives with whom BJ has both formal 
and informal working relationships. 
 
OEM management considers risk of quality failure in their China manufacturing to be 
these days extremely low, but in the past frequent and severe. The principle reasons 
given for the most extreme instances of failure were lack of comprehension of 
instructions by Chinese staff, and, in the worst cases, innovative but 
counterproductive misguided resourcefulness on the part of Chinese staff: well-
intentioned attempts to simplify processes and reduce material usage by deviating 
from the engineering specification resulted in quality failures. BJ personally oversees 
production of goods that he regards as potentially problematic, or deputizes a China-
side colleague to perform quality control. BJ correlates the degree of his China 
presence with the incidence of quality failure strongly. Higher levels of personal 
presence reduce quality-related risk.  
 
5.5 Industry Key Informant 5 (IK5): R-UK (UK SME) 
5.5.1 Company Overview 
Forfar-based R-UK is a supplier of engineered components to agribusiness and gas 
industry clients worldwide. The R-UK essential business model (in marketing terms, 
its unique selling points) can be described thus:  
 a portfolio of proven good, reliable suppliers;  
 strong historical legacy;  
 dominant position in the supply market of both the gas and agriculture 
businesses;  
 in-house expertise (a flexibility that is likely of higher value to smaller 
companies);  
 long track record of high quality products at competitive prices;  
 reliable EU-wide logistics via its UK facilities;  
 strong business connections in China;  
 extensive portfolio of international customers;  
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 solid comprehension of customers’ technical needs and the cost pressures in 
their industries;  
 bilingual/bicultural staff with frequent presence in China (reassures customers 
that queries with Chinese suppliers can be quickly and efficiently resolved, 
which is persuasive to customers considering ordering critical/unusual 
components or placing high-volume orders);  
 possibility of additional quality control at a UK facility;  
 based in the United Kingdom, close to the operational centres of many of its 
customers in the gas industry.  
 
5.5.2 China Strategy 
The R-UK system comprises three basic functions: back-end operations, i.e. supplier 
and supply management (quality control, logistics, and cost monitoring); intermediary 
operations (buyer and supplier communications and issue resolution); and front-end 
operations (sales, customer relationship management, and the provision of 
additional design services if necessary). 
 
Communication with Chinese suppliers occurs predominantly via a small number of 
bilingual, ethnically Chinese staff based in both Forfar and, increasingly, in China 
(thanks to voice over Internet applications). Non-Chinese speaking staff at R-UK 
have the option of communicating directly with the handful of third-party Chinese 
suppliers that have their own bilingual staff, although the necessity for this mode of 
communication rises only infrequently. Chinese suppliers handle tier 2 supply 
independently of R-UK. The joint-venture factory also trades with its tier 2 suppliers 
autonomously. 
 
As is evident from the following diagrams, the R-UK business model can be seen as 
comprised of three interlinking sections: a central point of conversion that contains 
the UK headquarters, a back-end supply base, and a collection of customers at the 






In 2009, R-UK formed a joint-venture with its main Chinese supplier, WeiGao (name 
changed). The joint-venture effectively fused the operations, and, consequently, the 
fortunes of the partners. Neither organisation can withdraw easily, so mutualism is 
fundamental to the arrangement. We can assume that both parties derive an 
acceptable degree of advantage from the partnership. Figure 20 (following) shows R-
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Figure 19 R-UK (Pre-2009) Supplier-Buyer Flows 




The joint-venture means that R-UK has permanent representation in China. This 
arrangement frees the UK office from responsibility for the management of a major 
supplier operating in a distant country. China-side problems are resolved quickly and 
economically by China-present R-UK employees. 
 
If portrayed sociographically, the R-UK supply model reveals a pivotal, portal-like key 
China person.  Ms Ria (name changed) is that person. The same individual was the 
owner of the formerly state-owned engineering component maker WeiGao, which 
since 2009 has been the Chinese partner in R-UK’s joint-venture.  
 
Interestingly, R-UK’s interaction with its third-party suppliers has also been steadily 
increasing since 2009. To better manage its third-party Chinese suppliers, R-UK has 
employed a permanently China-based, ethnically Chinese, bilingual production 
operations manager/engineer and accountant (more key China people). This pair 
operates independently of Ms Ria, whose role is now focused on management of the 
joint-venture.  
 
Liaising with the China presence is the duty of Forfar-based AJW, who 
communicates on behalf of both the board and R-UK’s customers. AJW relies on his 
third-party supplier management duo and Ms Ria for control and coordination of 
China-side supply activity. Since AJW is UK-based, China-side supply activity is 
effectively deputised to this trio.  
 
The involvement of these three individuals in China sales was not clearly articulated. 
However, the interviewee reported that prior to 2009, Ms Ria actively identified 
Chinese buyers for R-UK products and initiated sales. This observation suggests 
that Ms Ria is a deeply embedded, possibly irreducible element of R-UK’s China 
strategy, both in terms of supply and sales. Figure 21 (following) shows the 
Legend 
 Flow of orders (unidirectional)  
 Flow of goods (unidirectional) 
 Flow of product design and other information (bidirectional) 
 
 
Line thickness indicates approximate volume (thicker line=higher volume) 
   Location: UK 
   Location: China 
    Location: China; Ownership: UK/China 
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relatedness of R-UK’s pre-2009 network actors. Figure 22 (also following) shows the 
































5.5.3 China Risk Management I. Logistics 
The interviewee initially recalled no instances of unpunctuality or delivery failure. 
When pressed, he said an incident of late delivery occurred many years ago, but 
logistical risk is very rarely a UK-side concern. The joint-venture company uses a 
local third-party logistics company. The partnership has existed since the early days 
of WeiGao, so predates the joint-venture by about a decade. The enduring nature of 
this relationship suggests both parties find the arrangement advantageous. It is 
rational to speculate (since no precise information regarding this matter was offered) 
that the infrequency of China-side logistics-related problems is at least in part due to 
effective selection, loyalty pressures, and the management of that aspect of the 
business by Ms Ria, R-UK’s long-term, China-based representative and joint-venture 
manager. Ms Ria is a person of considerable influence in the local economy 
(evidenced by her acquisition of a large-scale, formerly state-owned plant).  
 
5.5.4 China Risk Management II. Quality 
Ms Ria and (post-2009) the operations manager and accountant pairing act as R-
UK’s presence in China, reducing risk by monitoring quality, answering queries from 
both sides, and smoothening communications.  
Operating a network of third-party Chinese suppliers provides R-UK with risk-
reducing redundancy. In the event of quality failure at the joint-venture or a third-
party supplier, an alternative supplier can be activated on a temporary basis – 
provided it can meet the technical and capacity requirements of the order. Supplier 
identification, vetting, activation, and all necessary communications and transaction 





Tie thickness (thicker line=stronger tie) 
 
Tie length (shorter line=higher frequency of direct communication) 
   Location: UK 
   Location: China 
   Location: ROTW (customers across the rest of the world) 
    Location: China; Ownership: UK/China 
 Ms Ria  Key China Person: Ms Ria (entrepreneur, Chinese, China-based) 
 Others  Post-2009 key China people (operations manager and accountant) 
 AJW  Key UK Person: AJW (Director, British, UK-Based) 
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R-UK also operates several wholly-owned manufacturing facilities inside the United 
Kingdom: a factory, a fabrication site, and a galvanising plant. These UK facilities are 
the typical destination of the vast majority of R-UK’s globally sourced products. 
Finalizing modifications of products and the incorporation of subcomponents into 
larger components occur at these facilities. When products are fully assembled, they 
are moved forward to R-UK’s customers in the UK and overseas. In the case of 
Chinese customers, products comprising subcomponents made in China are 
shipped back to China after being assembled in the United Kingdom. Products 
requiring no modification or assembly into other products whatsoever are few in 
number. Such products are shipped directly from Chinese supplier customer, 
wherever that customer may be. However, this is the minority case so is not 
representative of the overall R-UK’s general flow. The UK facilities appear to act as 
something of a risk-reducing postponement/decoupling point; goods are received in 
volume, incorporation and/or modification according to customer requirement is 
performed (variety), quality control follows, and despatch of finished product to the 
customer is the final activity. The inclusion of the UK stage reduces the probability of 
faulty product reaching the customer, and provides the advantage of agility via stock. 
This decoupled system also reduces R-UK’s exposure to China-side logistical risk, 
since only a small proportion of products are sent directly from China suppliers to 
customers.   
 
R-UK’s suppliers are all ISO-certified. When ordering irregular products from a 
supplier, R-UK stipulate quality in their design specifications, as is standard practice 
in most engineering instances. Manufacturers produce to international standards, as 
articulated in the relevant EU and ISO documentation. Production can also be, albeit 
infrequently, to the bespoke specifications of the customer, with quality tested by R-





5.6 Industry Key Informant 6 (IK6): P-S (UK SME) 
5.6.1 Company Overview 
P-S Refractories Limited (hereafter “P-S”) is a Halifax-based manufacturer of 
refractories and other engineered products for glass manufacturing and bottle 
making clients worldwide.  
 
P-S has been active for 214 years, has a strong reputation for quality products at 
reasonable prices, provides design services for companies requiring custom-made 
products, P-S sells furnace and refractory solutions to global glassmakers (the UK 
represents 10% of its sales). Design is the responsibility of the Technical Services 
Division of P-S. Design services are usually of more value to smaller glassmakers 
who lack in-house design expertise.  
 
In marketing terms, P-S’s unique selling points are two-fold: 
 strong legacy and single industry specialism, and 
 UK headquarters and facilities (P-S is accessible to UK and European 
glassmakers. The UK factory assembles subcomponents, performs finalising 
modifications, and aggregates minerals into materials. Near-to-market 
location of final stage product preparation and customisation gives the 
company immediacy and proximity to many of its major customers.  
 
5.6.2 China Strategy 
P-S source both standard and bespoke products from a predominantly Chinese 
supply base. P-S source entirely from third-party suppliers. In 2015, P-S was using 
eight Chinese suppliers.  
P-S began using Chinese suppliers in 2010. Management were initially 
motivated by cost savings of around 70%. Previously, P-S used mostly British 
suppliers, but the price competitiveness and equivalent quality of Chinese suppliers 
drove P-S to switch, and to soon after begin building long-term strategy around 
Chinese supply. Most of the products and materials received at the UK factory are 
the outputs of Chinese suppliers. P-S performs finalising modifications and 
aggregation of subcomponents at their UK facility. Completed products are shipped 
onward to the buyer or location of installation. P-S’s Chinese suppliers are ISO 
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compliant and certified. P-S entrusts tier 2 supply management entirely to its 
Chinese suppliers.  
 
The P-S supplier-to-buyer flow (shown in the following diagram) resembles the 
models that describe the preceding three UK SME cases. The central position is 
occupied by P-S and its UK headquarters, where the key China person, Ms J, the 
interviewee, and the board members interact. Figure 23 (following) shows the 
supplier-buyer crossflows of P-S. 
 
Legend 
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Figure 23 P-S Supplier-Buyer Flows 
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P-S has several key China people who are bilingual and literate in the relevant 
technologies and requirements of their customers. P-S’s use of Chinese suppliers 
represents low prices; efficient management of a Chinese supply base reduces the 
commonly perceived risk of low quality accompanying low prices. The presence of 
China-proficient personnel reassures P-S’s customers that in the event of quality or 
logistical failures, a solution can be quickly and efficiently obtained. Thus, P-S 
markets its Chinese supply base as a low-risk and cost-reducing capability to its 
customers. 
 
Although P-S still sources from suppliers outside China, many of its core product 
lines contain minerals and materials sourced from Chinese suppliers. Increasingly, 
engineered components are also being sourced from Chinese suppliers. Thus, the 
proportion of the P-S China supply base is steadily growing. This trend is the result 
of the company’s successes with its existing suppliers, the infrequency of logistical 
problems, and the general satisfaction of P-S’s customers with the price and quality 
offered by P-S’s China-sourced products and materials.  
 
The P-S China presence is modest and transient, consisting of one individual, Ms J, 
who communicates mostly by voice over Internet, and visits China only when 
accompanying the interviewee or another high-level manager. Fortunately for P-S 
however, most of their Chinese suppliers employ at least one bilingual person. 
(Interestingly, the P-S interviewee stated that he is endeavouring to develop direct 
relations with a handful of his Chinese suppliers. To this end, he is currently learning 
to speak Chinese to better communicate with Chinese suppliers, to become less 
dependent on Ms J for communication with them. In Figure 24, this is indicated by 
the finer lines that extend from “GN and Board” to four suppliers directly, 
circumventing Ms J.) As the sociography shows, Ms J is the principal point of contact 
for P-S’s eight suppliers. Ms J is also the channel through which P-S communicates 
with those suppliers. Thus, Ms J’s role is that of a bidirectional bilingual intermediary. 
Ms J is directly employed and usually physically present at P-S in the UK. The 
interviewee implied that Ms J’s services make her an indispensable element of the 
P-S supply strategy. The importance of the relationship between Ms J and the board 
appears exemplified in the high-level trust that the board has in Ms J and the 
prominence of Ms J’s activities in the company’s China-side sourcing operations. Ms 
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J is directly employed by P-S so likely has a higher personal stake in P-S than in any 
Chinese supplier. 
 
P-S’s key China person is thus an internal asset under the control of the board. 
Figure 24 (following) shows the interrelatedness of the P-S network actors. 
 
 
      Legend 
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Tie length (shorter line=higher frequency of direct communication) 
 Possible ties (inferable) 
   Location: UK  
   Location: China 
   Location: ROTW (customers across the rest of the world) 
 Ms J  Key China Person: Ms J (P-S employee, Chinese, UK-/China-based) 
 GN  Key UK Person: GN (Commercial Director, British, UK-Based) 
 
 
5.6.3 China Risk Management I. Logistics  
P-S’s system contains three elements: back-end operations (supplier management 
and logistics); intermediary activities (customer and supplier query management); 
and front-end operations (sales, design consultation, and customer relationship 
Figure 24 P-S Sociograph 















management). Simplicity in logistical operations reduces P-S’s distribution risks. All 
their Chinese suppliers ship directly and only to P-S facilities in the UK. Only very 
rarely do Chinese suppliers ship to P-S’s customers. Shipping is typically high in 
quantity and rarely urgent. Following inspection and, if necessary, final stage 
customisation at the UK facility, products are despatched to customers worldwide 
from the UK. Thus, Chinese suppliers ship inventory that is typically unmodified. 
Accumulating inventory near to the point of modification and central despatch keeps 
inventory buffer in the system, which translates to competitive lead times for the 
customer. The withholding of finalization (postponement) reduces waste and 
decreases the vulnerability of the system to China-side logistics failures. Thus, the  
P-S system features a risk-reducing decoupling point. 
 
5.6.4 China Risk Management II. Quality 
The generic nature of supplier product reduces risk related to technical, 
manufacturing quality. Product consolidation, aggregation, and quality control at P-S 
occur at their UK facility. P-S reduces the risk of quality failures and simplifies 
logistics processes by having all its SCs converge at a single point.  
 
In the next chapter, the findings from the two case studies and all six industry key 






6. Summary of Case Study and Industry Key Informant 
Findings 
In this chapter, the findings of the two MNE case studies and six industry key 
informant interviews are aggregated for comparison. Main risks and their modes of 
mitigation are identified. 
 
6.1 Risks Reported 
The following risks were presented in both case studies and all six industry key 
informant reports (order approximately reflecting recurrence): specific quality failures, 
general quality management, bureaucratic obstructions, intellectual property related 
issues, corruption, and logistical problems. Table 14 reports the risks identified and 
their locations of mitigation. 
 
Table 14 Supply Risks Identified and Location of Mitigation 
 
Legend 
 Location of Mitigation 
Global MNEs (Cases KM1-4) UK SMEs (Cases KU1-4) 
中 China HQ or regional office 
China – through  China-based staff or frequently China-visiting UK-
based Chinese staff 
UK/中  UK – through UK-side manager with China-side assistance 
 Corporate global head office; strategic supplier strategy   
△  Not actively prevented or resolved (tolerated) 
 
6.2 Risks and Modes of Mitigation Reported by Global MNEs 
In the case of global MNEs, identifying specific individuals and dyadic relationships 
was impractical. For this reason, sociographs of the type created to represent the 
human network dimension of the UK SMEs could not be created. Tables 15 and 16 
Supply Risk 
Global MNEs (CS1, CS2, IK1, IK2) UK SMEs (IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6) 
FEM CT SFM AFC D2C OEM R-UK P-S 
Quality failure 中 中 中 中 中 UK/中 中 中 
General quality 
management 
中 中 中 中 中 UK/中 中 中 
Corruption   中 中     
Intellectual 
Property loss       △  
Logistical failure      UK/中   
Bureaucracy       中  
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(following) present the China supply risks and mitigation methods used by global 
MNEs and UK SMEs respectively (case study MNEs are yellow). 
 





Frequency Severity Mode of Mitigation Action by 
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FEM “Quality Policy”, “FEM Supplier 
Quality Management” guide (SSQM), 
“Supplier Guidebook” (practices and 
standards document); legally binding, 
formal contracts, ISO compliance 
(process-specific and general, i.e. ISO 
26000:2010), equipment 
manufacturer’s licences (where 
applicable), in-house enforcement, 
resident quality inspectors, quality 
















Supplier selection criteria,  background 
checks and other due diligence, 
supplier inspections, in-house 
assembly of critical products, quality 







Manufacturing of very high tech/highly 















CT “Supplier Code of Conduct”; legally 
binding, formal contracts, rail 
manufacturer’s licences (where 
applicable), in-house quality standard 
enforcement, resident quality 
















Supplier selection criteria, background 
checks and other due diligence, ISO 
9001, ISO 14001, ISO 16001, supplier 
inspections,  in-house assembly of 
critical products , quality control by CT 
experts (“Division and Site Teams”), 
“Preferred Supplier Panel”, 








Manufacturing of very high tech/highly 









“S-Way” (in-house quality standard: 
contractual quality and performance  
agreements) 
National HQ General 
quality 
management 
Corruption High  
Potentially 
high 
Zero tolerance policy 
Mandated by 
Global HQ; 















of food chain)  
Internal KPIs, ISO compliance, 
industry and regulatory standard 
certification (where applicable), formal 
in-house quality and performance 
agreements 
National HQ 
Switching of sources (redundancy), 
when possible 
Corruption High  
Potentially 
high 
Zero tolerance policy 
Mandated by 
Global HQ; 




6.3 Risks and Modes of Mitigation Reported by UK SMEs 
 
Table 16 China Supply Risks and Modes of Mitigation: UK SMEs (IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6) 
 
Table 17 (following) presents the key relationships that reduce China supply risk, 






Frequency Severity Mode of Mitigation Action by 
D2C 
(IK3) 
Quality failure Low Low 
Direct communication with Jinping 
(main factory)/third-party supplier; 
direct, long-term contracting with 
single major manufacturer; 













death, fire)  
Direct communication with factory, 
personal visit to customer’s site (if 
UK-side), personal visit by 
Chinese expert friends  (if China-
side), personal “problem solving” 
by BJ when China-side expert 
friends face financial or 
technological difficulty, trust  
Usually China-based 
Chinese expert friends 
under direction of BJ; 
occasionally BJ in 
person, if incident 
coincides with his 






high if delay 
is extreme 
Direct communication with third-
party logistics company and port 
BJ with China-side 
assistance by expert 





ISO 9001 & 14000, expert friends 
in China, trust, direct 






instance in 15 
years) 
Very low 
Iterative dialogue with supplier, 
insistence that design 
specification is followed, 
systematic cause identification  
China-side personnel: 
Ms Ria (when issue is 
JV-related), 
Operations Manager 
and accountant (when 







Direct communication with R-Hua 
(main factory and JV)/third-party 
supplier, insistence on ISO 
compliance (partial solution only), 
DNV certification (industry 








very high  
Use of trusted, well-connected, 









Not resolvable. Managers accept 
that any product sold in China will 
be copied at lower quality and sold 
at lower price. Not a concern 
unless the copies are sold in the 






(“one or two”)  
Low  
Direct communication with 
supplier, insistence on ISO 
compliance, inspections;  
P-S requests mend or remake – 
so far, all suppliers have obliged 
and borne all costs  
Ms J (visits China 
when P-S is  
considering partnering 






Inspections of supplier site and 
product, relationship-/trust-building 
(unprompted mention of “guanxi”), 
ISO (no. unspecified)  
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Table 17 Key Relationships in China Supply Management by UK SMEs 
Company 
Key UK Person Key China Person 









contacts in UK 
fashion retail, 



















































































































































































to joining P-S 
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In the next chapter, the findings of the eight non-industry key informant interviews 
and an online exchange between supply chain professionals on the subject of China 






7. Other Key Informant Findings  
This chapter reports the findings from interviews with non-industry key informants: 
two academics, three consultants, one Chinese MNE manager, and two managers of 
UK SMEs that both sell and source in China. The findings of an online discussion of 
Chinese supply risk by supply chain professionals are also presented. 
 
7.1 Academic/Practitioner Key Informant (AK1): Stuart Emmett 
(Author and Trainer) 
7.1.1 Reducing Risk by Relationships 
Stuart Emmett reported that practitioner correspondence concerning his book The 
Relationship-Driven Supply Chain (2006) has been greater than that for all his other 
books combined. The book’s premise is that competitive advantage-generating 
efficiency in SCs is acquired by the achievement of two fundamental relationships:  
1. A company’s internal relationships: the alignment of objectives, activities, and 
priorities across a company’s divisions and hierarchies; 
2. A company’s external relationships – especially with suppliers: a company that 
can operate effectively with its suppliers, through provision of market 
intelligence, technology, visibility, and rewards for strong performance, earns its 
suppliers’ loyalty, which likely reduces instances of quality failure and other 
risks. 
Relationships are fundamental to SC performance and supplier management 
generally, regardless of culture, or industry. Business is social activity; SCs 
necessitate relationships between businesses, and therefore necessitate 
relationships between people. In a well-managed SC, relationships exist between 
managers, workers, divisions, and upstream and downstream entities. Effective 
supply requires all actors to perform mutually for collective advantage.  
 
7.1.2 Arm’s-Length Versus Mutualist Relationships 
Traditionally, UK management has had a transactional, arm’s-length approach to 
supplier and SC management. However, with the success and resultant influence of 
the supply strategies of Japanese companies such as Toyota, the mutualist, 
relationship-driven SC has become an ideal that British companies are striving to 
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realise. Traditionally entrenched, arm’s-length supply base operating companies are 
aware of the advantages that integrated, common focus-oriented SCs can deliver. 
Adversarial relationships are thus increasingly rare. SC concepts emerged in the 
literature in the 1980s but began to manifest in practice in the 1990s. Nissan’s 
presence in England’s northeast has profoundly influenced the supply management 
practices of major British car parts suppliers. UK supermarkets nowadays prefer 
specialist suppliers, and favour suppliers who can honour long-term contracts, which 
typically benefit both parties. British companies had adversarial, opportunistic 
relationships with their suppliers, and saw effective supply management as the 
obtainment of the lowest prices.  
 
Increasingly common these days is the premise that demand pulls supply 
intelligently. In order to reap the advantages of effective supply, buyers must provide 
demand-related information to suppliers, so that suppliers also benefit from the 
efficiencies of improved forecasting and other techniques.  
 
Overwhelmingly, buyers are attempting to reduce the quantity of inventory in SCs, 
principally to achieve just-in-time efficiencies and thereby minimise expenditure on 
inventory and the collateral costs of handling. This efficiency-over-quantity model 
necessitates a higher level of SC management proficiency: more frequent 
communication, greater market intelligence, improved understanding of transport, 
and a generally higher degree of buyer-supplier interaction. In short, efficiency and 
mutualism necessitate closer relationships between SC parties.  
 
In previous decades, infrequent high-volume purchases were the preference of 
buyers in various industries. In such scenarios, buyer-supplier interaction was 
transactional, arm’s-length, and non-communicative. Today’s SC managers are 
sensitive to both supply and demand factors, including the constraints and 
preferences of their suppliers, so no longer function in hermetic silos. The supply 
management strategies of the best SC managers incorporate disciplinary and 
industrial factors that their predecessors considered outside their core interests. In 
British industry, concepts such as “partnership sourcing” have emerged, reflecting 




7.2 Academic Key Informant (AK2): Martin Christopher (Professor 
of Logistics and SCM, Cranfield School of Management)  
Prof Christopher emphasises decoupling as the principal method of internal risk 
reduction in SCs. To Prof Christopher, most SC risk is reducible by adoption of some 
variant of this system, with little adaptation for cultural or relational values necessary. 
However, the better the relationship that exists between buyer and supplier, the 
greater the supplier’s commitment to achieving quality and lowering the probability of 
negatively impactful occurrences.   
 
7.2.1 Risk in China Supply  
Formality in the Chinese macroeconomic and political environment (institutional and 
legal power) can be a source of risk. Highly formal environments (i.e. environments 
in which the minutiae of relationships are detailed in contracts and enforced/ 
enforceable) can be a disadvantage for multinationals, since formality can reduce 
flexibility and restrict options.  
Chinese companies are often criticised for non-adherence to contracts. The 
Chinese establishment is also alleged by many writers to be weak in supporting 
formal control mechanisms such as fines and legal penalties. However, such formal 
weaknesses can provide advantages. The weakness of contracts permits ad hoc 
temporary relationships that can be dissolved or continued based purely on market 
conditions. For foreign companies in China, hiring on an ad hoc basis to address 
sudden demand spikes, for example, might be arduous due to bureaucratic 
complexity. For Chinese third-party suppliers accustomed to the native business 
landscape and navigating its idiosyncrasies, such an obstacle will rarely impede 
order completion. This has implications for China-sourcing multinationals: outright 
ownership of Chinese factories entails complexity/risk and commitment of a severity 
that can be challenging to justify, whereas the ocean of available, disposable, and 
functionally flexible third-party suppliers provides a degree of cost-competitive 
production that is incomparable.  
 
In developed countries, where formality is usually high, efficiency and quality tend to 
be stronger, so contractual methods of risk reduction, although standard practice, 
are less necessary. (In less developed countries generally, contracts are better 
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regarded as a legal/bureaucratic requirement more than as a tool of risk 
management.) In less developed countries, formality is usually lower and efficiency 
and quality tend to be weaker, so informal (non-contractual) methods of risk 
reduction are standard practice and often effective. In the case of China, informal 
methods of risk reduction are usually interpersonal in nature, i.e. guanxi-based. If the 
guanxi between the managers of a transport company and a manufacturer are good, 
punctuality and security in logistics are practically assured. Similarly, the longer a 
working relationship endures, the stronger the guanxi-tie grows, and the probability 
of serious failures diminishes proportionally.  
 
In China and other less developed countries, formal agreements are rarely as 
effective at addressing SC risk as technology transfers, investment, and other 
relationship-building solutions. In less developed countries, institutional power is 
weak – formal agreements are less effective than trust-based agreements, and 
seldom legally potent. Contracts and other signed agreements typically fail to return 
the compensatory outcomes they produce in the developed world, so the need for 
proactive, informal supply risk management is greater when sourcing in less 
developed countries. In practice, this often means motivating and educating the 
people who operate at the critical interface points of the chain.   
 
 “Quality fade” – the gradual loss of a manufactured product’s quality over time – has 
been observed in many of the recent high-profile examples of substandard products 
from Chinese suppliers. Quality fade occurs when buyers impose undue cost 
pressures on suppliers. Buyers “cut corners” (i.e. compromise on the quality or 
quantity of materials) to satisfy the buyer’s cost requirements. Buying on price is, 
according to Prof Christopher, a bad practice that is increasingly rare among world-
class companies. 
 
In the context of China specifically, supply-related risk is best resolved by having as 
many in-China agents “on the ground” as possible. It is difficult, if not impossible, for 
a distant foreign company operating at arm’s-length with a Chinese supplier to 
receive the standard of service and risk reduction available to either a local Chinese 




7.2.2 Relationships: One of The Four Rs 
In his book, Logistics and Supply Chain Management (first published in 1992 and 
now in its fifth edition), Prof Martin proposes the Four Rs as a set of principles 
governing SCM: responsiveness, reliability, resilience, and relationships.  
 
Responsiveness refers to the SC’s ability to respond to market requirements, so is 
similar to agility (in the book, the two terms are in places used seemingly 
interchangeably). The demand-driven (pull) SC is better suited to serving fast-
moving, rapidly changing markets than is the forecast-driven (push) SC. However, 
demand-driven SCs incur higher supply side risk (due to higher production agility 
requirements); whereas forecast-driven SCs incur higher demand-side risks (due to 
far lower responsiveness).  
 
Reliability is achieved through process variability reduction, and reduces the 
possibility of quality failure. Resilience in SCs refers to the ability to recover 
continuity when impacted upon by unexpected, disruptive shocks. Prof Christopher 
recommends against over-lean systems, and favours holding inventory to lessen the 
effects of productivity sags and other interruptions.  
 
Perhaps of most interest to this research is the fourth R: relationships. Prof Martin 
mentioned partnership sourcing, and describes it as a widespread practice that 
incorporates combined quality improvement initiatives, innovation transfer, 
systematic cost reduction activities, and visibility systems that facilitate the 
scheduling and synchronisation of manufacturing and delivery. Relationships have 
been growing in significance as a result of the trend toward minimising the number of 
suppliers. If supply minimisation is taken to the extreme, i.e. single sourcing, the 
relationship between buyer and sole supplier becomes critically performance 
determinative. The minimalist dyad offers economies, but also represents risk: the 
buyer has no immediately available supply alternative and faces high switching costs 
if the relationship deteriorates.  
On the other hand, a successful relationship with a single source or a very 
narrow supply base can be a strategic advantage, because competitors may find 
achievement of the same problematic. Seen in this light, strategic supply 
management can be used as an entry barrier. The greater the degree of dependency 
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between supplier and buyer, the less the supplier is capable of performing effectively 
with another buyer, particularly if that buyer demonstrates lower commitment or 
interest in transferring technology or making other gestures of mutualism.  
 
The ideal SC scenario has both buyer and supplier receiving ideal outcomes. For 
this, mutuality and trust are paramount. The achievement of the preceding three Rs 
is facilitated by the foundational construction of relationships and mutualism between 
interacting parties. Similarly, all tools of SC management, including visibility 
technologies and efficiency techniques such as just-in-time, are exploited more 
effectively when the buyer-supplier relationship is underpinned by a long-term, 
mutualist ethos of partnership. The deliberate cultivation of interdependency has the 
secondary benefit of complicating the ambitions of competitors. Nowadays, the 
prevailing nature of the supplier-buyer relationship is more collaborative than 
competitive. 
 
7.2.3 Reducing SC Risk by Decoupling 
Decoupling is achieved by holding inventory at some point in the SC, ideally as close 
to the end customer as possible. Decoupling requires a SC that is non-lean. In a 
decoupled SC, inventory exists in generic, non-customised form until the market’s 
requirements are known, whereupon customisation commences. This is possible in 
SCs in which the inventory is not the final product. Two examples were offered by 
Prof Christopher:  
1. The Zara mass customisation/postponement model: garments in undyed, 
unfinished (greige) form are stored close to market, and then, when market 
preferences have been identified, customised before dispatching to retail.  
2. Delarue, the British ATM maker: Chinese factories assemble the material bulk, 
but sensitive, high-tech components and the crucial software are installed in 
the United Kingdom and other countries of end usage. This form of 
decoupling is done to reduce both manufacturing complexity and the threat of 
intellectual property loss.  Managers at Delarue believe the threat of IP loss is 
a considerable disadvantage of China sourcing. 
 
Large companies struggle to manage their hundreds of suppliers, so effective 
relationship-based supply management, although desirable, is, for many 
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multinationals, not attainable. Formally documented procedures can substitute, to a 
degree, for sub-optimal relationships. Thoroughly codified quality requirements and 
order specifications allow suppliers to operate effectively without frequent interaction 
with their buyers.  
Rare is the company that knows how its suppliers are handling their tier 2 
suppliers. Immediate relationships (i.e. buyer-to-tier 1 supplier) maybe manageable, 
provided the number of tier 1 suppliers is modest. Large multinationals may however 
have to commit an entire office to regional supply management. In such cases, this 
strategy, when applied on a basis of formal agreements and quality standards 
reduces most internal risks. 
 
7.3 Consultant Key Informant (CK1): Anderson Consulting (“China 
Solution Provider”, Stoke-On-Trent) 
7.3.1 Risk in China Supply 
For SMEs, most China supply risk is resource related. Small companies lack the 
financial power required to permanently station an employee in China to resolve 
problems and manage risk proactively. For SMEs, a trustworthy Chinese partner 
constitutes the best possible option. A small company is unlikely to place orders 
large enough to give them priority status in the supplier’s portfolio of clients. Buyers 
might also have to market themselves to suppliers to secure their loyalty by, for 
example, transferring know-how, promising access to diverse markets, or making 
direct investments. SMEs unable to make such gestures require a Chinese supplier 
who recognises – but does not exploit – the precariousness of the buyer’s situation. 
Ideally, the Chinese supplier will be mutualist in outlook, long-term oriented, quality- 
and delivery-focused, and conscious of their criticality to the buyer.  
 
For larger companies, most China supply risk is related to control, which in this 
context refers to an advantageous power dynamic, i.e. a state in which the buyer 
exercises power over its suppliers. Larger companies, because they place high-
volume orders, are typically more technologically advanced than their suppliers, and 
have multiple suppliers at their disposal, have greater control and influence over their 
supply base than smaller, less advanced companies who are precariously 




Big companies are exposed to risks that smaller companies rarely encounter, 
namely corruption and the complexity of regulations and law. These problems are 
particularly acute for companies operating wholly-owned foreign enterprises. 
Outsourcing is generally lower risk than direct ownership. Property laws are difficult 
and costly to navigate.  
 
For larger companies operating factories (wholly owned or third-party) in China, the 
ideal manager is a Western-educated or foreign-born Chinese who is trustworthy, 
bilingual, bicultural, prioritises his/her company’s objectives over ethnic loyalties, and 
is willing to harness his/her company’s favourably imbalanced power dynamic in his 
relationships with workers and third-party suppliers. 
 
7.3.2 Managing China Risk 
Locally situated, locally connected, multiple industry-experienced China solutions 
companies/consultants have links with local officials, expatriate communities, and 
native business networks. They also have UK offices, which increases their 
accessibility for UK clients. The consultant’s China office can physically dispatch 
people to a supplier’s premises, a port, or a customs office, and/or probe the local 
business environment for information and assistance. In these ways, China solutions 
companies provide numerous risk mitigation services/problem resolution capabilities 
to their clients. 
 
Import-specialising companies constitute a risk-reducing solution that for short-term, 
low price-focussed SMEs is often acceptable. For a fee, the importer arranges China 
sourcing and UK delivery. The margins are much lower than are possible through 
direct sourcing, but the importer bears all risks (quality-related and logistical), and 
bears the cost of delegating pre-delivery checking to a third-party quality assurance 
company. Ali Baba and other e-procurement platforms offer alternative arms-length 
supply possibilities, but the risk of quality and delivery failure is high. For companies 
seeking long-term, strategic solutions, the advantages of e-procurement are few.  
 
Most very low cost Chinese suppliers operate opportunistically, rarely believing they 
will receive a second order. Such suppliers inflict reputational damage on the 
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broader community of Chinese suppliers. For foreign companies seeking Chinese 
suppliers, separating opportunists from legitimate, quality focused, long-term 
relationship-seeking Chinese suppliers is challenging. Lacking knowledge of local 
suppliers and access to the networks of local business people, foreign managers are 
poorly positioned to make effective selection decisions.  
 
7.3.2.1 Relationships 
UK companies using Chinese supply are often excessively focussed on immediate 
results. Long-term oriented partnerships with Chinese suppliers yield the best returns 
for both parties. The formation and maintenance of a good relationship between the 
UK buyer and Chinese supplier is key to sustained supplier performance.  
 
A good relationship is one in which the buyer imposes no undue price reductions on 
the supplier, makes loyalty gestures (such as investments), and spends time socially 
with management in order to create interpersonal proximity and foster mutualism. 
When such a relationship is established (formation is rarely rapid), several specific 
risks are likely to recede: quality inconsistency, delivery failure, and price hikes. 
Three to four years’ investment in a Chinese supplier is required for dependability 
and profitability to be achieved.  
 
A bad supplier-buyer relationship is arm’s-length, low price-oriented, underinvested, 
short-term, and impersonal. Bad supplier-buyer relationships typically yield low 
quality products, delays, non-deliveries, and unforeseen extra charges.  
 
Gift-giving and socialising for the appeasement and ingratiating of local officials are 
also daily features of Chinese business practice with which foreigners must come to 
terms. Impromptu fines for breaches of unknowable regulations and requests for 
payments to cover previously undisclosed bureaucratic procedures are 
commonplace. Resistance can result in the forced discontinuation of operations. 





7.3.2.2 The Advantages of The Consultant – The Professional Intermediary 
UK SMEs considering China sourcing typically neglect to conduct rigorous research 
into potential suppliers or buyers before investing or commencing trade. Whenever 
possible and affordable, the services of professional due diligence companies should 
be bought. Better yet, a China-specialising consultancy or China solutions company 
should be retained. Such companies match the needs of UK clients with the 
capabilities of Chinese suppliers. Companies acting independently face higher risks; 
insufficient research and capability expose them to opportunism and fraudulent 
business practices. 
 
UK SMEs are myopically attentive to achieving low-cost, so omit the following crucial 
considerations from their decision process:   
 
 the services of third-party intermediaries and matchmaking/China solutions 
companies are costly; 
 language issues are not easily or cheaply resolved; 
 employing skilled workers and managers is costly and complicated; 
 identifying suitable facilities and completing the procedures necessary for 
renting property is costly and complicated; 
 maintaining offices and representatives in China is costly and complicated; 
 travel and accommodation in China is expensive and consumes management 
time, which could impact on UK operations (the severity of quality and delivery 
risk appears to correlate keenly with the buyer’s degree of physical presence 
in China and in-person interaction with managers at Chinese suppliers, so 
frequent travel is necessary);  
 dealings with local governments can involve official and unofficial payments; 
 the cooperation of local transport companies (particularly in provincial regions) 
can be difficult and costly to obtain; 
 loss of intellectual property is a near-certainty, the strategic impact of which 
must be carefully weighed against cost savings; 
 the unspecifiable financial and psychological costs of the trial-and-error nature 
of doing business in China; 
 transport lead times tend to be longer than envisaged; 
191 
 
 import duties are profit-erosive (upfront payments of VAT on goods sourced in 
China are unavoidable); and   
 the cost of pre-delivery checking services is sometimes unacceptably high. 
 
7.4 Consultant Key Informant (CK2): Cargo East Asia (“China Trade 
and Cargo Specialists”, London/Hong Kong/Worldwide) 
7.4.1 Risk in China Supply 
For foreign companies embarking on China sourcing, the Chinese business 
environment is replete with formidable challenges. Very few books that describe 
business in China give a sufficiently frank picture of the hazards. China sourcing 
decisions are often based on exaggerated estimates of material and labour cost 
savings. Until recently, the motivation of many UK managers attempting to source in 
China has been simply make-cheap-to-sell-high.  
 
Risks and problems in China supply are more efficiently resolved when there are 
fewer layers of control. Foreign companies attempting to operate in China via an 
agent or a third-party China-specialising, one-stop solution company will benefit from 
choosing a partner whose management structure has few layers. This way, 
communications travel upward and downward through as few filters as possible, 
enabling risks and issues to be speedily addressed. 
 
Most books that discuss “quality fade” fail to identify cost pressure by buyers as its 
cause. This has popularized the belief that “Made in China” means low quality. 
Chinese manufacturers, suppliers, and brands are acutely aware of their poor quality 
reputation. In many cases, the result of this awareness has been positive: Chinese 
manufacturers are making conscientious efforts to increase the quality of their goods 
so that the reputational slur becomes retrograde. 
 
The greatest risk to foreign companies considering China sourcing is unrealistic 
expectation. China costs are far higher than they were 20 years ago. Chinese 
managers expect approximately the same pay as managers in Europe and North 
America. China’s popularity as a location of sourcing continues despite the rising 
costs. This is probably attributable to the allure of the vast Chinese market. For many 
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companies, it seems logistically and economically rational to locate manufacturing as 
close as possible to the envisaged market. However, such temptation is well 
understood by many an opportunist Chinese supplier. Thus, the nature of risk has 
evolved from technical, logistical, and product quality issues (which seem largely 
resolved as a result of technology transfer, national pride, and buyers insisting on 
ISO and other quality standards) to corruption, intellectual property theft, inter alia.  
 
For foreign companies sourcing in China, customs and local transport companies 
represent two potentially serious dimensions of complexity and risk. All the 
consultants who contributed to this research stressed the peculiarly fickle, 
changeable, and officious nature of Chinese customs procedures and officers, citing 
Chinese customs as probably the most significant risk factor affecting foreign 
companies both sourcing in China and shipping overseas and shipping into China. 
Matchmaking companies retain staff who specialise in customs regulations and 
documentation. Perhaps most importantly, the matchmaker’s customs staff are often 
coastally located so able to visit ports and customs offices, and physically collect 
goods or arrange onward transportation inside China.  
          
Another risk faced by foreign companies is excessive control by Chinese partners, 
which is a particular risk for companies involved in joint ventures. A case in point is 
Carrefour, who, to maintain their modest presence in China, have accepted a 
weakened position and a loss of autonomy that outside of China would be untenable. 
 
For foreign companies sourcing non IP-sensitive products in China, consistency in 
quality is achievable through use of China-based third-party quality assurance 
companies. In 2015, quality-related risk does not characterise China-originating SCs 
or manufacturing. Non-ISO certified products from Chinese suppliers can be vetted 
by third-party quality assurance companies.  
 
7.4.2 Managing China Risk 
Foreign companies, including many UK SMEs, that lack in-house connectedness 
with China or relevantly experienced managers, can be introduced to a Chinese 
supplier via a matchmaking third-party/consultant. Such companies include Li and 
Fung and Cargo East Asia (the interviewee who supplied this information worked for 
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Cargo East Asia). These are large, highly capable, highly connected, multiple 
industry-experienced brokers, matchmakers, and China solution providers, operating 
out of offices in most of the world’s major cities. In their matchmaking capacity, such 
companies connect foreign buyers to Chinese third-party quality assurance 
companies. When requested, the quality assurance company dispatches personnel 
from its office inside China to check either a supplier’s premises or its products – 
both if necessary. Product checks occur at the supplier’s premises, in warehouses or 
distribution centres, or dockside. Alternatively, suppliers can be required to dispatch 
a sample batch to the quality assurance company’s offices (typically in southern 
China or Hong Kong) before shipping the entire order.  
This method, although costly, provides foreign companies with in-China 
representation and a strong, responsive quality assurance capability. The quality 
assurance company also handles language and technical issues.  
 
7.4.2.1 Relationships 
Nowadays, for companies interested in low-price, short-term sourcing, guanxi is a 
redundant concern. Long-term supplier-buyer relationships are also unnecessary – 
unless the foreign partner is planning to enter the Chinese market and/or is placing 
China at the centre of their supply strategy. Arm’s length, ad hoc China sourcing by 
appropriately assisted, i.e. consultant-facilitated, foreign companies is a low risk, low 
complexity, usually profitable practice.  
Chinese suppliers are now familiar with short-term arrangements and usually 
accommodating (although this varies by industry and product). The Chinese supply 
market for low-tech products especially favours the buyer. According to some of our 
interviewee’s clients (and two UK SME interviewees), China sourcing is as safe as 
sourcing in most developed countries: interpersonal relationships have no bearing on 
quality or logistical risk; selling in China is however far more risky. Goods 
manufactured in China, for example, are usually subject to various taxes and tariffs 
before they can be legally sold inside China. Even to very large multinationals, this 
realisation is often a very unwelcome surprise – a surprise that spoils many an 
envisaged strategy of increasing margins by selling China-made products at 
international prices inside China. Extremely China savvy operators (of which there 
are very few), such as Japan’s Uniqlo (who have a “Made-in-China-Stays-in-China 
policy), overcome this profit-sapping constraint by partnering only with Chinese 
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vendors who possess licences for domestic retail. Such vendors will typically 
leverage their status by charging higher rates than non-licensed vendors. 
 
7.4.2.2 The Advantages of The Consultant – The Professional Intermediary 
For foreign companies sourcing in China, strategic involvement of third parties 
reduces the majority of risks associated with China supply: the matchmaker/ 
consultant/intermediary pre-screens suppliers for reliability and, if necessary, 
compliance with international quality standards; the quality assurance company 
checks samples prior to shipping. 
 
7.5 Consultant Key Informant (CK3): Cargo East Asia, China-Britain 
Business Council, and Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce (Joint 
Seminar) 
7.5.1 Risk in China Supply 
Before entering the Chinese market, foreign companies require a clear 
understanding of their objectives. If they lack in-house expertise, they should engage 
a China-specialising logistics provider. The ideal solution would be to hire a company 
who could handle all of the entrant’s China affairs, including both supply and demand 
side, i.e. both marketing and SC. In China, SCM and marketing are best performed 
by local Chinese people familiar with the complexities and conventions of the 
entrant’s industry or market. Order fulfilment in China is often unexpectedly 
complicated, and involves a range of risks rarely considered before entry into China.
 The cost of warehousing, the bureaucratic ramifications of hiring and firing, 
the selection of personnel, the appointment of managers, the location of warehouses, 
the choice of logistics provider, and the necessary level of logistics investment are all 
considerations that if not given due contemplation become sources of risk.  
China features regional variations that are seldom thoroughly considered. Generally 
speaking, the costliest (but lowest risk) locations are the largest coastal conurbations. 
 
In terms of pure logistics, Chinese companies lag behind foreign companies in 
warehouse technology, perishable goods transportation, warehouse operatives’ 
basic skills, and, perhaps most significantly, customs knowhow. Consequently, 
documentation and permits can be arduous to manage. Refused goods are a costly 
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loss. The solution to customs issues is representation by a customs-specialising third 
party. Customs specialists can liaise on behalf of the exporter with Chinese customs 
officials, pay the relevant charges, arrange onward transport, and ensure goods are 
received at the intended destination.  
 
7.5.2 Managing China Risk 
Fortunately, most problems facing foreign companies in China are non-cultural in 
nature, so are faced, albeit to a lesser degree, by domestic Chinese companies also. 
China solution companies attempt to craft the foreign entrant’s China strategy to fit 
with a China supply strategy.  
7.5.2.1 The Importance of 3PLs 
Large foreign companies operating in China usually contract with Chinese third-party 
logistics providers. However, Chinese 3PLs rarely have the same technological tools 
that are standard to 3PLs based in Europe or the USA. Consequently, time-sensitive 
logistics is failure prone. Cold chain logistics is especially haphazard. By the 
standards of most multinationals, the visibility capabilities of Chinese 3PLs – and the 
level of visibility inside domestic Chinese SCs generally – are deficient. Locating lost 
loads and recovering the costs of spoilt goods from Chinese 3PLs can be difficult. 
Multinational 3PL companies offer a simple, if costly, solution. Companies 
such as DHL can – although for prices significantly higher than those of Chinese 
carriers – provide internal China logistics with the same level of service and visibility 
that is standard in most developed countries. 
 
7.5.2.2 The Advantages of The One-Stop China Solutions Company 
The competition that foreign companies face from in situ Chinese companies is often 
far greater than estimated. To compete in China against Chinese companies that are 
intrinsically better equipped to navigate the domestic business landscape, foreign 
companies have to delegate the major portion of their Chinese strategy to China-
specialising third parties. 
Larger China-specialising fulfilment companies provide a one-stop solution. 
Facilities, managers, personnel, ordering systems, and even a corporate website in 
Chinese can be provided. Such services enable foreign companies to operate in 
Chinese markets with risk levels similar to those faced by domestic competitors. 
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7.6 Firm Comparator Key Informant (FK1): SCMG (Xuzhou, China) 
7.6.1 Risk for the Chinese Multinational 
Unprompted, the interviewee identified three areas of risk: internal (organisational), 
external (macroeconomic), and imitator-related.  
 
7.6.1.1 Internal Risk 
Because SCMG is 100% Chinese state-owned, its main internal risk is party 
interference in corporate strategy, the complexity of business-government interaction, 
and inertial management. SCMG managers perceive the influence of the 
government negatively. Rules and regulations are abundant and difficult to navigate. 
The government can overrule management on any issue, is resistant to foreign 
inward investment, and is cautious about foreign outward investment, controlling how 
much SCMG can invest in foreign companies or offer for an acquisition. Overseas 
investment is politically sensitive and decisions depend heavily on the current foreign 
policy of China’s central government. This influences when and where SCMG can 
invest. State involvement reduces the autonomy of SCMG to pursue profit 
opportunities according to profit factors. 
State involvement deters global candidates from joining the management. 
Hence, the risk to human capital stock (acquisition and retention of world-class 
personnel) is severe. Foreign companies pay more and are perceived as better 
rewarders of innovation than Chinese companies. Layers of bureaucratic approval 
limit the company’s ability to respond quickly to external conditions, incurring agility 
and responsiveness-to-market risk. The “committee” that runs SCMG includes at 
least one permanent member representing the Chinese Communist Party. This 
member has no official power, but wields significant, undefined influence over 
strategic decisions. All other members (which the interviewee referred to as 
“secretaries”) come from engineering backgrounds. The Party member is a source of 
risk. Corporate management must consider the interests of this individual and the 
organisation s/he represents. The risk of strategic opportunity loss is ever present, 
since the party invariably moves slower than the market, understands less than 




7.6.1.2 External Risk 
International exchange rates pose the biggest single external risk for SCMG. The 
cost of parts and shipping from overseas suppliers can fluctuate unfavourably; a 
strengthening yuan would diminish the price competitiveness of SCMG’s exports.  
The cost effectiveness thus far delivered by concentrating production inside China is 
likely to be radically undermined if the value of the yuan is released from government 
control.  
 
7.6.1.3 Imitator Risk 
There is some risk, albeit of low impact, of Chinese competitors copying SCMG’s 
machines. Imitation of very basic equipment already occurs, but is at low scale. 
Chinese imitators cannot provide SCMG’s levels of service quality, cannot export 
profitably, cannot support their machines internationally or even in remote areas 
inside China, and lack the capability to innovate.  
 
7.6.2 Risk Management by the Chinese Multinational 
Logistics and quality were not mentioned as risks. Implied by this omission is the 
assumption that efficiency in these two aspects of business performance is adequate 
by the standards of SCMG’s Chinese and main foreign customers, or rarely 
sufficiently problematic to be a recognisable concern. From details that emerged 
concerning the firm’s favoured markets and production strategy, it appears that risk – 
including quality and logistical risk – is mitigated structurally. (Only after prompting 
did the interviewee address the issue of risk related to quality and logistics 
specifically.) 
 
The SCMG business model appears to be structured around risk aversion. SCMG 
concentrates its strategy on developing and less developed countries in which there 
are extensive infrastructure development projects. Thus, most business is between 
SCMG and governments (making it effectively a B2G-oriented business system). In 
China, SCMG’s sales are predominantly to regional level governments. Similarly, 
governments seeking low price construction machinery and/or courting China state-
backed investment constitute SCMG’s focal foreign markets. Moreover, SCMG 
enters its key LDC markets as part of a greater political whole, i.e. as a 
representative industrial arm of the Chinese state.  
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This B2G preference reduces the need for head-to-head, contract-for-contract 
competition against rival manufacturers, and minimizes the risks present in the cut-
and-thrust of competitive free markets and private party contracting.  
 
All assembly of machines and production of most components is done at SCMG’s 
plant at Xuzhou, Jiangsu. Most sales are to Chinese regional governments. Thus, 
SCMG’s main facilities are well located to serve its main markets, which are 
domestic. In addition to reducing logistical risk and costs, local concentration of 
production inside China increases the international competitiveness of SCMG 
products: government subsidies lessen cash flow-related constraints and improve 
access to low-cost investment capital. State-owned Chinese companies overseas 
could also, it is rational to assume, be recipients of this advantage. However, 
government involvement in SCMG is highly territorial. SCMG’s operations are likely 
significant to the economy of Jiangsu province, hence the provincial government will 
be deeply invested in SCMG and keen to keep the company local. Labour and 
property costs are far lower than in North America and Europe, where SCMG’s 
competitors perform much of their production. This also amplifies SCMG’s 
competitiveness. However, some countries apply heavy import taxes and other 
domestic industry-protective tariffs on China-made machines.  
This is the case in Brazil, which is a major growth market for SCMG. The 
situation has prompted SCMG to invest in the production of a major assembly plant 
in Brazil. When fully operational, the Brazilian plant will be SCMG’s only assembly 
facility outside China. Its output will serve customers based or requiring machinery in 
South and Central America. The principle reason for the Brazilian plant is 
circumvention of margin-lowering import taxes and protectionist tariffs that would 
limit SCMG’s performance in a key growth region. Secondarily, manufacturing in 
Brazil reduces the logistical challenges of serving Latin America from China. 
 
The centralization of production in China simplifies most logistical and manufacturing 
operations. SC issues are similarly addressed: SCMG’s acquires suppliers of non-
substitutable products. Following acquisition, previously distant Chinese suppliers 
are, whenever possible, relocated to SCMG’s plant. It is practice (but not policy) to 
geographically centralize as much of the supply base as possible. This reduces lead 
times and other logistical risks. Centralization reduces the complexity and cost of 
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dealing with external companies. When selecting external suppliers – both in China 
and overseas – SCMG uses a competitive bidding process.  
 
Developing countries offer many attractions for SCMG: urgent, large orders for major 
infrastructure projects (many of which involve Chinese state-owned construction 
companies); familiar modes of state-business interaction; a preference for relational 
rather than transactional interaction; and the support of the Chinese government 
when trading with countries where there is extensive Chinese business and/or 
governmental involvement.  
Governments in developing countries expect high levels of involvement in 
major business deals. Hence, the relationship between SCMG and the Brazilian 
government has so far been positive. The situation in India is similar.  
SCMG’s sales in Africa are also growing, but SCMG has no plans to begin 
production in Africa. The interviewee cited political instability as the main risk limiting 
African trade and deterring direct investment. Instead of direct investment, SCMG 
intends to concentrate its efforts on sales and developing relationships with the local 
governments of African countries, especially those countries with whom the Chinese 
government already has favourable relations.  
 
7.6.2.1 Risk Management I. Logistics 
Logistics and SC related risks are considered insignificant. SCMG’s acquisition 
practices extend to Chinese domestic companies. International shipping is 
outsourced to state-owned Chinese shipping companies, who collect product from 
SCMG’s yards and place on ships at port. Customer-side delivery operations are 
handled either by the customer or (more usually) by a foreign company that has 
contracted with the Chinese shipper. Efficiency in logistics is provided essentially 
through SCMG’s interaction with China Ocean Shipping Company, the Chinese 
state-owned shipping company (COSCO, established 1961). The majority of 
Chinese state-owned manufacturers are strongly encouraged to contract with 
COSCO, with few exceptions granted. 
 
7.6.2.2 Risk Management II. Quality  
For SCMG, the low quality reputation of “Made in China” is not a source of risk. 
SCMG’s main target markets are developing world countries, where buying 
200 
 
decisions tend to be heavily price-influenced. SCMG claim the quality of their 
machinery is as high as JCB or Liebherr, but their prices are much lower. The 
package of world-class-quality-at-low-price makes SCMG attractive to customers in 
developing countries. 
 
7.6.2.3 Risk Management III. Foreign Partners 
The interviewee reported the influence of its foreign partners to be a source of risk. 
The company operates two full-scale joint-ventures with foreign partners. By Chinese 
law, foreign partners can hold a maximum share of 40% in joint-ventures with 
Chinese state-owned enterprises. This means that SCMG exercises more power in 
these arrangements than their foreign partners. This asymmetry is the mechanism 
through which SCMG reduces its foreign partner risk.   
 
SCMG headquarters has a foreign support section dedicated to lessening foreign 
customer-/fulfilment-related risk and resolving delays and incidents. Within this 
department are three sections, each handling customers in the Middle East and 
Africa, Europe, and North America. Language experts work alongside technical and 
sales people: all are located in the main office in Xuzhou, China. SCMG runs sales 
offices in Dubai, Brazil, the USA, Canada, and Germany, where there is also a small 
plant. In all locations, the majority of staff are ethnically Chinese.  
 
7.6.2.4 Risk Management IV. Technology Lag 
For SCMG, acquisition of suppliers of vital components, particularly European 
suppliers of non-replicable components, reduces most forms of technological risk. 
Whenever possible and rational, SCMG acquires overseas and domestic suppliers of 






7.7 Firm Comparator Key Informant (FK2): 360C (UK SME, Crewe) 
7.7.1 Risk in China Supply 
Sourcing cash processing equipment from Chinese suppliers has been a generally 
negative experience for this UK SME. Typical incidents are non-delivery, late 
delivery, substandard product, incorrect quantities, poor packaging, customs issues, 
missing and incorrect invoices, duplicate payment requests, and insistence on 
upfront payments before shipping. Industry associates confirm that these are routine 
hazards of China sourcing. Chinese companies frequently request advance payment 
in full prior to shipping.  
 
7.7.2 Managing China Risk  
The managers of 360C routinely negotiate with their Chinese suppliers for a lower 
risk payment schedule: 40% payment when the order is placed; 40% payment when 
the order is delivered; and a final 20% payment when the product meets quality 
requirements and is deemed suitable for resale.  
 
The imposition of these conditions has so far produced a dramatic improvement in 
both quality and punctuality of supply. Through industry contacts, 360C has learnt 
that similar agreements constitute conventional practice between Chinese 
companies. 
 
The interviewee reported that the industry’s larger buyers are highly quality focussed 
and reputation-oriented (“quality” in the cash processing equipment industry refers to 
mechanical reliability, counting accuracy, usability, and the capability to accept mix 
bundles of notes). Because he has experienced substandard manufacturing in many 
China-made devices and has heard negative reports from influential industry 
associates, he never arranges drop shipping directly to his customers from Chinese 
suppliers/manufacturers.  
 
7.7.3 Relationship Skepticism 
In 2015, 360C was trialling products for three Chinese manufacturers. The 
interviewee stated that all three manufacturers wish to partner with 360C because all 
three are reluctant or limited in their capability to attempt production beyond imitation. 
202 
 
In the partnership envisaged by all three companies, 360C provides high level 
technical expertise concerning currency adaptation, EU- and UK-specific product 
designs, and EU/UK market entry intelligence. In return, the Chinese partner 
provides 360C with a dependable supply of low price, appropriate quality, central 
bank-certified cash processing devices that 360C can sell as they see fit. 
 
The interviewee’s main reason for resisting these offers is the partners’ apparent 
absence of demonstrated operational capabilities beyond exhibiting, modest 
marketing, and imitation-based, high-volume, low cost manufacturing. None of the 
three appear capable of problem solving or developing designs that reflect 
customers’ evolving needs. Nor are they willing to assist 360C in exploring the 
Chinese market. These deficiencies create an asymmetry that the interviewee 
believes would become a source of risk. The immediate resolution of any quality or 
delivery failure would be the responsibility of 360C, who would bear all the seller’s 
risks. The Chinese partner, on the other hand, would acquire strategically valuable 
technical and market knowledge without having to make major investments in 360C, 
without major disruption to their existing strategy and operations, and without bearing 
significant risk. 
 
7.8 Firm Comparator Key Informant (FK3): UKCeram Products (UK 
SME, Stoke-on-Trent) 
UKCeram Products, a Stoke-on-Trent-based SME makes, designs, sells, and resells 
manufacturing-use products for the ceramic industry to customers in the UK and 
around the world.  
UKCeram both sources and sells in China. UKCeram’s managers regard their 
current China-sourcing process as risk-free in terms of both quality and delivery. This 
contrasts harshly with China-sourced product in the 1990s and 2000s, which often 
failed to appear, and whose quality the interviewee, JH, described as “rubbish”. 
Generally, the quality of product from Chinese suppliers who sell to multiple western 
buyers is superior to product from Chinese suppliers who sell mostly to domestic 
companies. This is due to Chinese suppliers’ quality capability being closely geared 




To UKCeram, the advantages of engaging Chinese suppliers were seductive. 
Besides low price, Chinese suppliers are close to major sources of minerals and raw 
materials, the Chinese political environment is stable; the government maintains tight 
control over the value of the yuan, which contributes significantly to the price 
competitiveness of China-sourced product; there are vast pools of available human 
resources; for many commodities, supply often exceeds demand, which creates 
buyer-advantaging imbalances; the culture is disciplined and supportive of work; 
workplace conflict is unusual; Chinese workers are industrious. 
 
7.8.1 Risk in China Supply 
In previous years, UKCeram outsourced the manufacturing of key products to 
Chinese suppliers. On the whole, the experiment was unsuccessful. European 
suppliers, although more expensive, were less problematic: product from European 
suppliers has higher consistency of quality and less distance to travel; European 
suppliers are less likely to attempt to manufacture and sell unauthorised products 
under the buyer’s brand name; and the geographical proximity of European suppliers 
to UKCeram’s UK base allows frequent in-person visits by UKCeram buyers. 
 
UKCeram’s enthusiasm for expanding its China supply operations declined not only 
as a result of the factors mentioned above, but also due to (1.) recurrent problems 
encountered in its China market venturing, and (2.) negative incidents with Chinese 
companies. The interviewee provided an example of two significant incidents: 
1. UKCeram’s China distributor sent a China-made copy of a UKCeram product 
to the UK office. The copy appeared to derive from a sample that UKCeram 
had exhibited on its stand at a recent trade fair. UKCeram management 
believes Chinese companies are conscientiously endeavouring to undermine 
UKCeram in the Chinese market by making low quality replicas of UKCeram’s 
best-selling products. Fortunately for UKCeram, their best-selling China 
market product is a glaze finishing-sponge that is applied to ware post-firing. 
To produce the sponge, the copier requires both the exact chemical formula 
and in-depth knowledge of the process. Obtaining either by trial and error is – 
UKCeram hopes – impossible. 
2. The interviewee reported an attempt to acquire details of a highly valuable 
production process by visitors from a Chinese ceramics supplier (ostensibly 
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interested in finding a UK buyer). Managers of several other ceramics-related 
companies in the locale received the same group of Chinese visitors and 
observed similar behaviour. From this interviewee, the researcher learned that 
many managers at UK companies apply a standard practice of physically 
locking off all sensitive areas of plant when Chinese visitors are present.      
 
7.8.2 Managing China Risk 
In UKCeram’s experience, ISO certification and other forms of credentials are 
unreliable as measures of a supplier’s product or service quality. Uncertified, 
unaccredited European suppliers are often better performers than credentialed 
European suppliers. In the case of Chinese suppliers, selection of high performing 
suppliers is more risk-fraught. Very broadly speaking, credentialed Chinese suppliers 
are usually better performers than non-credentialed Chinese suppliers. For fulfilment 
of infrequent, low volume, or technically uncomplicated orders, selection on 
credentials often suffices. However, for effective selection of long-term, high 
volume/high capability, strategically important Chinese suppliers, deep due diligence 
in the form of background checks, independent verification of quality and reputation, 
and, ideally, introduction from a mutually trusted party, provide greater reassurance 
than credentials.    
 
7.8.2.1 Relationships 
UKCeram’s managers believe that patience, presence, and relationships of trust 
underpin their success in China sales and sourcing. The interviewee makes three or 
four visits per year to China, primarily for the purpose of visiting his distributor and 
customers, and to exhibit at the trade show. He claims that the first three years of 
exhibiting gained the company very little in terms of immediate revenue, but have 
positioned them very well for the long-term.  
Like the Chinese, European suppliers appear to perform better if 
communication and visits are frequent. However, the performance of European 
suppliers is much less sensitive to relational or interpersonal conditions, making 
European suppliers simpler and generally less costly to manage. Developing 
relationships with Chinese suppliers entailed higher levels of cultural and 
transactional complexity, and was more resource-intensive. When the cost of 
intellectual property loss and the many sundry costs of China sourcing and 
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relationship maintenance were factored, the economic argument for China sourcing 
weakened. 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, echoing the literature, JH claims that investing time 
and energy in building trust creates relationships that reduce China-side risk for the 
foreign buyer and act as conduits of opportunity and resources.  
 
7.8.2.2 The Advantages of the China Distributor 
UKCeram recognise their China distributor as crucial to their China-side trade.  
Connecting with customers, showcasing products, closing sale, and managing 
Chinese customers from their office in Crewe (in which there is not a single Chinese 
speaker) would be impossible tasks. A physically present, China-based, Chinese-
speaking, ethnically Chinese representative is an indispensable element of 
UKCeram’s China strategy. UKCeram knows from experience that business by e-
mail or any other medium returns very little revenue, but does consume time and 
patience. Their initial China venturing began with online efforts to both buy and sell in 
the late 1990s. The sales results were paltry; the standard of the products bought 
(the few that arrived) was unusably low.  
 
7.9 Various Practitioner Key Informants (LKs): (LinkedIn Discussion 
Forum, Worldwide) 
This section summarises a LinkedIn forum discussion topic. All 26 respondents were 
China-experienced supply chain and sourcing professionals. 
 
The researcher began the discussion thread (2015) with the following questions:  
So much is written about the difficulties of doing business in China, but 
what, if anything, are the risks and difficulties today?  
 What challenges and risks does China present for logistics and 
procurement professionals?  




7.9.1 Risk in China Supply 
Approximately one third of the responses contributed to the discussion thread 
expressed the opinion that China sourcing is in no way significantly more risky than 
sourcing in any other country. 
 
A particularly enthusiastic contributor (who, unprompted, identified herself as an 
Arab) claimed the following: 
 The documentation requirements of Chinese customs are the most common 
cause of problems.  
 The third-party inspection services provided by Chinese companies are 
unreliable.   
 Too many Chinese suppliers agree to anything before funds are transferred; 
when payment is made, very little of the original agreement is present in the 
final product. 
 The costs of China sourcing are now high, but many of the people working in 
SCM and logistics are unqualified or poorly skilled compared to SC workers in 
developed countries. 
 
The preceding list typifies the comments made by most of the respondents who did 
not have Chinese names. According to the respondents with Chinese names, the 
typical supply risks faced by foreign companies sourcing in China are as follows: 
 communication problems (which cause delays and poor quality), 
 unexpected charges in addition to payments to suppliers,  
 import/export documentation,  
 transfer of payments to suppliers, 
 product quality assurance, 
 packaging,  
 transport, 
 identification of reliable suppliers, and 
 differing conditions within China. 
 
Every respondent made the following two claims, albeit in differing ways:  
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1. For most foreign companies, selection of a suitable (i.e. honest, capable, and 
punctual) supplier is the most difficult aspect of Chinese sourcing and 
probably the most important.  
2. All China sourcing risks can be reduced with the assistance of a reliable 
Chinese partner. Most risks and problems are best addressed by a Chinese 
representative in China who is connected to all the relevant parties. However, 
current preference among foreign companies is for direct dealing with Chinese 
suppliers, which increases all forms of risk. For most companies, the optimum 
solution (short of having a permanent office in a major Chinese city) is to 
contract with a professional China solutions provider such as Li and Fung. 
 
7.9.2 Managing China Risk  
The respondents were unanimous in their recommendation of China-side 
representation as the ideal solution to China supply risk and of 3PLs as a close-
running second: 
 Local staff monitor suppliers and pursue claims against inefficient suppliers in 
China. Foreign companies who cannot afford to base staff permanently in 
China must communicate regularly with their Chinese partners. 
Communication by e-mail is preferred by foreign companies, but is far less 
effective than phone calls.  
 Use of global 3PL companies removes most of the risk from export-oriented 
Chinese SCs. The need for 3PLs decreases if the foreign company has a 
permanent China or Hong Kong office.  
 
7.9.3 Causes of China Risk 
The respondents’ input on the issue of the causes of China risk were enlightening – 
and offered without elicitation on the part of the researcher (implying  these issues 
have prompted considerable reflection in the professional community). They can be 
broadly categorised thus. 
 
7.9.3.1 Causes of Risk I. Perceptual 
According to a Chinese respondent, risk is rooted in cultural differences and ways of 
thinking. Too many companies sourcing in China assume that quality failure is the 
supplier’s responsibility, when product design or communication failure (which can 
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rarely be reliably attributed to a single party) is often the real cause. For most foreign 
companies, the best low cost solution to Chinese supply is identification of a 
dependable partner that is seeking a long-term relationship and has the ability to 
communicate and improve. Several respondents were in agreement that the more 
time a foreign buyer can spend with a Chinese supplier, the lower the risks of trading 
with that supplier. 
 
7.9.3.2 Causes of Risk II. Buying on Price 
Despite well-publicised cautions, many foreigners continue to buy on price after 
meeting exhibitors at the Canton Fair and other trade shows. Buyers do not check 
packaging or import restrictions before placing orders. Many fail to clearly explain 
their exact requirements to the Chinese supplier. These issues create quality and 
delivery problems but rarely result from incompetence, delinquency, or cynical 
opportunism by the Chinese supplier.  
 
Many companies assume, often erroneously, that China sourcing will always be 
cheaper than sourcing in developed countries. Companies neglect to calculate the 
total cost of bringing China-made product to final market. Companies that commit 
this error are prone to blaming Chinese suppliers for withholding information or 
feigning ignorance about additional costs. Thus, one of the biggest causes of risk is 
attitudinal, i.e. excessive expectation and impatience.  
 
7.9.3.3 Causes of Risk III. China’s Regional Variance 
Regional variation – in business practices and levels of economic, social, and 
infrastructural development – within China is often overlooked. Foreign business 
people assume homogeneity of cultural and infrastructural conditions, often to their 
cost. For many categories of product, the Chinese supply base is huge, but in parts 
of China, logistics infrastructure is weak and local transport companies are inefficient. 
This situation creates a bottleneck: suppliers are plentiful but logistically constrained. 
Transport, from second tier suppliers and to ports and cities, is often poor. 
 
7.9.3.4 Causes of Risk IV. Personnel  
Employee churn is a significant factor. Capable SC managers are high-value 
individuals, so change companies frequently. Foreign companies dependent on a 
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particular manager for control of their SCs are exposed to various risks. The same is 
the case for managers of important suppliers: their sudden absence can create 
severe problems.  
 
7.9.3.5 Causes of Risk V. Ignorance of Chinese Systems 
Foreign business people often seem ignorant about China’s economy, government, 
and business customs. Understanding the government and the regulations that 
influence business is vital. Two examples are the CIQ and export licenses. The 
Chinese government’s inspection and quarantine (CIQ) rules and requirements are 
often ignored, even by very large companies sourcing in China. Companies try to 
save costs by bypassing the CIQ test and not providing officially approved 
translations of required documents. Foreign companies often (usually unknowingly) 
contract with companies that do not have export licences. The Chinese government 
has implemented policy to restrict export licences to companies whose quality 
standards are high. This policy is intended to weaken the perception that Chinese 
manufacturing means low quality. Unlicensed companies export fraudulently through 
licensed front companies or false labelling. Goods purchased from unlicensed 






7.10 Summary of Other Key informant Findings 
7.10.1 Risks Reported  
Table 18 summarises the supply risks identified by the non-industry key informant 
expert respondents and indicates the location of the risk-mitigating activities or 
person.  
 




 Location of Mitigation 
中 
China – through China head office, regional office, China-based staff, or frequently China-visiting UK-
based Chinese staff 
UK/中 UK – through UK-side manager with China-side assistance 
 Corporate global head office (strategic supplier strategy)  
 Regional customer service centres (ME/Africa, Europe, etc.) and national offices  
△ Not actively prevented or resolved (tolerated) 
 
7.10.2 Causes of Risks and Modes of Mitigation 
Non-industry key informants gave informative insights into the root causes of supply 
risk and the methods by which those causes could be mitigated against. Table 19 
(next) describes the causes of supply risk reported by each Key informant source 
and the corresponding mode of mitigation that they recommended. Industry key 
informants were asked only to report what China supply risks they had encountered, 
not to offer their thoughts on the causes of those risks. Nevertheless, several key 
informants did speculate on the causes of the various risks they reported but none 
articulated those causes thoroughly.   
Supply Risk 
Academics Consultants Comparator Firms LinkedIn 
AK1 AK2 CK1 CK2 CK3 FK1 FK2 FK3 LKs 
Quality failure   中 中 中  UK/中 UK/中 UK/中 
General quality 
management   中 中 中  UK/中 UK/中 中 
Corruption   △ △ △    △ 
Intellectual Property loss  △ △ △ △   UK/中 △ 
Logistical failure   中 中 中  UK/中  中 
Supplier opportunism   中 中 中    中 
Customs issues   中 中 中    中 
Overseas customer 
support      

 
   
“Quality fade”    UK/中    UK/中 中 
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When considering the content of tables 19 and 20, it is helpful to consider the 
varying nature of the key informant sources: 
 Key informants FK1, FK2, FK3, and LKs are business professionals actively 
operating supply into and out of China. Thus, the risk causes they identify are 
likely based on an understanding of events they have experienced first-hand. 
Similarly, the modes of mitigation they mention were likely applied in actuality. 
 Two informants (AK1 and AK2) are theoreticians (albeit with decades of 
exposure to research and practitioners). The risks they report are likely 
derived from literature; the public, professional, and scholastic media; and the 
anecdotes and problems conveyed by practitioner students and trainees. 
Consequently, the modes of mitigation modes they recommend are likely best 
considered theoretical/conceptual and ideal more than specific and actual. 
 The remaining three non-industry key informant sources (CK1, CK2, and 
CK3) are consultants, so have extensive and direct knowledge of the typical 
China supply-related risks that face a great number of companies operating in 
various industries. The modes of mitigation they recommend are likely more 
industry-general than those of directly, singularly engaged practitioners, and 
more actual than the methods recommended by the theoreticians. 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, all three groups provided causes and modes of 
mitigation that featured sufficient aspects of commonality to reveal convergence on 
many points.    
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Table 19 Other Key informant Sources: Supply Risk Causes and Modes of Mitigation 
 
Supply Risk Cause 









       




        
Supply-demand imbalance          
Low supply chain resilience  
 
 
       
Cultural factors/perception  
 
 
中 中 中 △    
中 
China unfamiliarity   中 中 中    中 
Contacts/personnel factors   中 中 中   中 中 
Language barrier   中 中 中    中 
Unforeseen or underestimated  costs          
Property law   △ △ △     
Labour law   △ △ △     
Exchange rate fluctuation      △    
Involvement of officials      △    
Lack of agile response      △    
Technology lag          
High cost of capturing EU/ US market 
share       △    
Non-specific logistics & supply chain 







3PL  中 
中 
3PL 
Imitation-oriented (non- innovative)      ? ? △  






 Mode of Mitigation 
 Mutualism/integration and collaboration/relationship and trust building 
中 China-side intermediary (paid consultant/solutions provider/customs clearance broker etc.) 
3PL Third-party logistics company 
 Supply chain reconfiguration/organisational restructuring  
 Design of products for increased supply chain resilience 
 1. Research and learning; 2. Application of research to supplier selection decisions and/or interaction  
△ Not actively prevented or resolved (tolerated) 
 Not practiced/recommended 
Grey Of less significance to supply risk and relationships than causes in black 
? Interviewee unsure how this risk cause could be addressed 
 Acquisition of technologically superior supplier 
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Table 20 (following) provides detailed descriptions of the risks and their 
corresponding modes of resolution.  
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revision of corporate 








































































































manager/ liaison  
at solutions 
provider 
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buying; outsource to 
















tolerance (for global 
MNEs – depends on 
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General China  
logistics  







































acceptance  Top 
management, 
party members 
on the board 







to high  
Strategic supplier 
acquisition 







developing countries  
Logistics & 
supply chain 
Very low Very low 
Clustering; selection 
of nearest suppliers; 
relocation of distant 
suppliers;  central 
China location of 
plant 

















Moderate   Low  
Regional offices; 
dedicated overseas 













































capitalise on other 





Delivery failure Low  Low  
Hold stock in UK; 
implement some 
variant of the Israeli 
method 
Quality failure Moderate High  
Test in UK before 
sending to customer; 
implement some 
variant of the Israeli 
method; use video to 




Moderate  Moderate  
Use Simplified 
English; learn 
Chinese; use video 




*Trust failure Moderate  High  
In-person visits; 
frequent contact with 
managers at partner 
companies; steady 
orders of gradually 
increasing volume; 
long-term planning  











Quality failure Low High  
volume trial orders, 
increase volume if 








*Trust failure Moderate  High  
In-person visits; 
frequent contact with 
buyers; steady 
orders of gradually 
increasing volume; 
long-term planning  
*SME managers 








































Very high  Moderate 
Transfer of 
payments 
Low  Low  
Quality 
assurance 
Moderate  High  
Pre-shipping checks; 




Packaging High Moderate  
Pre-contract checks; 




























Moderate  High  
Background checks; 













In the following chapter, the main themes of the literature (as revealed in the 
Literature chapter) are compared with the findings of the case studies, key informant 






8. Discussion I. The Findings’ Fit with the Literature 
In this chapter, the findings of the case studies and key informant interviews are 
related back to dominant themes in the literature. Areas of convergence and 
divergence between the findings and the literature are revealed. 
 
8.1. Background and Concepts 
Table 21 (below) summarises the findings of this research in terms of its degree of 
compliance with the background and fundamental concepts of SC and SCM as 
articulated in the literature reviewed. 
 
Table 21 Compliance of Findings with the Background and Concepts Literature 
 
  
1. Traditional narrative review.  














































































































































CS1    - - -   












IK1    - - -   
IK2    - - -   
UK SMES 
IK3    - - -   
IK4    - - -   
IK5     -    
IK6     -    
Academics 
AK1     -    
AK2     - -   
Consultants 
CK1 - - - - - - -  
CK2 - - - - - - -  
CK3 - - - - - - -  
Comparators 
FK1   - - - - -  
FK2    - - - -  
FK3    - - - -  
LKs - - - - - - -  
Legend 
 Degree of Compliance with Consensus of Literature 
 Very strong  
 Strong  
 Weak (concept was implied or mentioned but considered weak) 
- Nothing relatable mentioned 
 Conflicts with consensus 
 Opposite of consensus 
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Relatively late in the 
evolution of the term supply 
chain, Lambert et al (1998) 
defined SCs as “aligned 
companies”. Introduced in 
Discussion II, the “MNE 
diamond” depicts supplier-
buyer alignment as 
evidenced by the data that 
emerged from the key 
informants in this research 
and was particularly strong 
in the MNE cases and.  
 
Christopher (1992, p.10) describes SCs as “networks of organisations linked by 
different value producing activities”. The SCs described in this research are 
intrinsically multiple-organisation entities, but the internalizing vertical integration 
practices adopted by four MNEs had effectively reduced various forms of risk. 
 
Christopher and Peck (2004) describe SCs as dynamic networks of interrelated firms. 
The MNEs studied in this research operate China supply networks of partners – 
most are integrated, some are arm’s-length, but critical partners are typically 
incorporated/vertically integrated by acquisitions. Unfavourable MNE-supplier 
relationships (only a few were reported) are those typically involving supply partners 
that are selected by the Chinese government, not by the MNE or by supplier self-
petition. SMEs also achieve risk-reducing integrated China supply, but through 
informal mechanisms: as predicted by the literature, relationships between individual 
managers permits access to their China-side suppliers’ resource networks, which 
have a valuable risk-reducing function. 
 
Regarding the development of the SC concept, the following authors’ definitions 
correspond most closely with the supply arrangements observed in this research: 
Stevens (1989) – SCs are multiple entity, multiple function, incorporative systems; 
Aitken (1998) – SCs are networks whose members work together mutually and 
Figure 25 Background and Concepts in the Literature 
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cooperatively; Morehouse (1998) – SCs are extended enterprises linked by 
relationships; Handfield and Nichols (1999) – relationships enable management of 
SCs, which are firms integrated for competitive advantage; Peck (2010) – SCs link 
organisations together by tangible and intangible enablers such as relationships. 
Post-2001 research (e.g. Ritchie and Brindley, 2007) shows a strengthening 
interest in exploration of the relational aspects of SCs, especially in the creation and 
management of organisation-linking relationships, and the ability of integrated, 
relationship-bound entities to share risk and liability. The findings of this research 
suggest the exploration is justified: interpersonal relationships – in the case of SMEs 
– impact strongly on supply-related risk; organisational relationships – in the case of 
MNEs – are found to impact strongly on supply-related risk. 
 
Of the various concepts that are analogous with supply chain management (SCM), 
the following are associable with the supply arrangements revealed by the case 
studies and key informant experts presented in this research: Burt (1984) – 
integrated purchasing strategy; Ellram (1991) – vertical integration; Lamming (1993) 
– the mutualist buyer-supplier relationship. Integration and relationships are 
recurrent themes in this research’s findings. 
 
Houlihan (1984, 1985, 1987) uses the term supply chain management to denote 
internal integration. This concept was described as essential “internal alignment” by 
one industry key informant, and the principle was referred to variously by several 
consultant key informants. Later, this is developed more theoretically, based on 
these findings (see “Alignment 1”, “Alignment 2”, and the “MNE diamond”). A key 
academic informant (Emmett) re-stated one of the essential premises of his book 
The Relationship-Driven Supply Chain with the useful phrase “winning the home 
games first”. By this, he refers to internal integration – the eradication of functional 
silos – as the first phase of supplier integration. 
 
As with the definitions of SC, integration and relationships receive emphatic position 
in most of the influential definitions of SCM. The following authors’ definitions 
correspond most closely with the supply principles and practices reported by the 
case study respondents and key informants:  
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 Forrester (1958) – integration comes through relationships between 
companies; Oliver and Webber (1982) – SCs must be strongly integrated and 
managed as a single, whole entity;  
 Houlihan (1988) – integration between SC operating companies is superior to 
interfacing (which describes the pre-SCM, arm’s-length approach to buyer-
supplier interaction);  
 Ellram (1993) – SCM is a form of vertical integration, an ethos of integration, 
cooperation, and coordinated work; 
 Berry et al (1995) – SCM builds trust through exchange of information to 
create meaningful, long-term relationships between cooperating firms;  
 Lambert et al (1998) – SCM is the integration of key business processes and 
the management of relationships between SC members;  
 Simchi-Levi et al (2000) – SCM is a set of approaches use to integrate the 
functions and companies involved in the SC;  
 CSCMP (2010) – SCM involves coordination and collaboration between 
suppliers, intermediaries, and third-party companies.  
 
This final definition is highly pertinent: many key informant experts recommended 
intermediaries and third-party involvement as vital to reducing China supply risk. The 
UK SMEs were unanimous in their practice of culture- and geography-spanning “key 
China persons” (my coinage), who effectively operate as in-house intermediaries, 
smoothing communications, shuttling between UK buyer and China suppliers, 
providing a cultural/linguistic interface, and asserting regular physical China-side 
presence.  
 
In sum, relationships and integration are common elements of the theories of SCM 
and recurrent concerns of the practitioners, theorists, and consultants interviewed in 
this research. 
 
On the issue of risk and resilience in SCM, Cooper et al (1997) claim that the 
elongation of SCs has created risks beyond those present in the preceding era of 
“logistics”. Waters (2007) defines supply risk as mostly related to fulfilment issues. 
All the SME cases and two consultant key informants reported fulfilment risk as their 
main, but steadily lessening, cause of dissatisfaction with China supply. MNE 
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respondents reported minor instances of fulfilment failure, but were not overly 
concerned with risk of this sort. MNE respondents reported that macro-economic and 
political factors were the main sources of risk; fulfilment risk, although present, is a 
comparatively minor concern.  
MNEs reduce the risk of fulfilment failure mostly by formal methods, i.e. by 
imposing strong performance and contractual conditions on suppliers. The global 
MNEs practice in-country mediation via their f China-side facilities and offices, joint-
ventures, and partnerships with domestic and international logistics companies.  
SMEs reduce fulfilment risk mostly by informal methods, i.e. the exercise of 
relational influence: when a strong supplier-buyer relationship has developed, SMEs 
generally experience fewer instances of the fulfilment failure that can occur when the 
relationship is immature or mutualism is low. However, both MNEs and SMEs make 
concerted efforts to create trust relationships with the managers of their Chinese 
suppliers. Both sets of respondents reported the tendency of risk to diminish in rough 
proportion to the degree of mutualism and collaboration in the supplier-buyer 
relationship. 
 
Manuj and Mentzer (2008) claimed that internationally operating firms manage 
complex SCs, whose performance depends on multiple variables including cultural 
and interpersonal factors. In the logistics and SCM literature however, concentration 
has to date been upon the operational and structural influences of SC performance. 
The SME cases explored in this research provide support for the importance of 
relationships to achieving integration, collaboration and, as result of these two, risk 
reduction. 
Harland et al (2003) describe several advantages of global SCs: low-cost 
outsourcing, economies of location, and advantageous currency differentials. All four 
SME cases (and two industry key informants) reported similar enticements.  
On the evolution of the concept of risk in relation to supply specifically, several 
authors’ definitions of risk correspond closely with the accounts provided by this 
research’s respondents. Emmett (2005, p. 278): “risk is the product of internal factors 
such as “weak links and choke points, and external factors such as material 
availability and other macro-economic considerations.” “Weak links and choke points” 
were reported by UK SMEs and consultants. They include Chinese transport 
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companies, customs, and geographical conditions. No such weak links were 
reported by MNE respondents. 
“Material availability and other macro-economic considerations” (particularly 
the latter) describe the main concerns of MNEs operating supply in China. Material 
availability is addressed by partnering with large, state-involved, cluster-located 
suppliers with strong tier 2 control. Macro-economic conditions are best addressed 
by close relationships with the Chinese government and the global dispersion of 
supply, which provides redundancy in the event of regional or national calamity.  
Tiffin and Kissling (2007) claim that supply risk increases in accordance with the 
number of handoffs along the chain. The preference of three of the UK SMEs for a 
very narrow China supply base (narrowed by joint-venture or partnership with a 
single, very high-capability supplier) provides support for this claim.  
 
March and Shapira (1987) mentioned the social norms that influence managers’ 
perception of risk. This is one of very few studies that propose that future theories of 
supply risk incorporate consideration of the psychosocial factors that influence 
managers. In cross-cultural situations, such theorising would necessarily include 
some account of perceptual differences between Chinese and non-Chinese 
managers. This research considers risk primarily from the perspective of the non-
Chinese manager (the foreign buyer, for example). To obtain some key informant 
expert perspective on the Chinese perception of risk, a Chinese manager at a 
Chinese MNE (SCMG) was consulted. In common with the other MNE respondents, 
the Chinese manager reported macro-economic conditions as major sources of risk 
(along with the involvement of Communist Party members in strategic governance, 
which was the only unique difference). To all MNE respondents, the traditional 
concerns of SCM and logistics (quality and efficiency of fulfilment) were trivial. To 
SME respondents, they were present but minor risks.  
 
Manners-Bell et al (2014) asserts that manufacturing in emerging markets is always 
more risky than manufacturing in developed countries. Contradicting this, 
respondents from three SMEs reported that China sourcing is no less risky than 
sourcing from European companies. Two MNE respondents claimed that China 
sourcing is slightly better than sourcing in most emerging economies, but its 
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attractiveness can be undermined by the threat of IP loss and corruption, against 
which Chinese law is usually ineffectual.  
 
Jüttner et al (2003) claim collaboration is key to reducing SC vulnerability. Feedback 
from the SME respondents suggests strong, collaborative supplier-buyer 
relationships do indeed reduce SC vulnerability. Most articles about SC resilience/ 
vulnerability focus on the development of risk-reducing capabilities, i.e. capability 
elevation and distribution efficiency.  
However, this study shows that high level, formal integration/collaboration is 
an ideal that geographically disparate, small scale companies can seldom achieve. 
Strong relationships are however achievable. For SMEs, this is achieved most easily 
through regular visits, frequent communication, and as much in-person interaction as 
possible. For MNEs, deep, formal, organisation-level collaboration is not only 
possible and practical, it is strategically useful. Collaborating with Chinese suppliers 
brings the MNE closer to its Chinese customers and competitors, and collaboration 
with state-owned enterprises reinforces the MNE’s relationship with the Chinese 
government. MNEs also have the luxury of deputising their China-side supplier 
relationship and management activities to a permanent China office staffed by ethnic 
Chinese. 
 
Regarding the tools of SC risk management (agile, lean, postponement, etc.), the 
SME, MNE, and other key informant respondents had little to report. In most cases, 
buyers had contracted with suppliers based on product satisfaction, and considered 
efficiency processes to be the internal concern of the supplier, and not a condition of 
trade. Several SME sources claimed that the processes of their Chinese suppliers 
are “world-class”. Similarly, as a general rule, the larger MNEs only consider 
contracting with Chinese suppliers that meet global and/or ISO standards.  
 
Buyers may recognise the value of lean supply, but time-based inventory systems 
are impractical when product is being shipped internationally (the D2C key 
informant’s system is a case in point – shipping is direct from factory gate to 
customer doorstep on the simple basis of ASAP). The much-lauded Toyota 
approach to buyer-supplier collaboration (Ohno, 1988) offers great promise, but its 
implementation in systems whose actors are physically and culturally distant seems 
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a precarious prospect not evidenced by the data presented here. Indeed, Hall (2004) 
argues that Japanese cultural homogeneity and domestic proximity permits the very 
high level of collaboration and integration enjoyed by Toyota and suppliers. The 
findings of this research seem to corroborate the proximity claim, but the 
homogeneity claim is difficult to test. Similarly, Burt and Doyle (1994) claim that 
Japanese companies reduce costs through working relationships, but cultural factors 
influence such partnerships. Thus, it appears that a small number of theorists 
acknowledge that cultural factors are likely influencers of approaches to supply risk 
management. In terms of the findings of this research however, relatively little risk 
was attributed to culture – unless “culture” can be conceptually extended to cover the 
macroeconomic idiosyncrasies of the Chinese business and political landscape. The 
literature is quiet on this possibility and particularly quiet on the issue of whether 
culture is separable from national norms and regulations as they pertain to business.  
 
Tools such as lean, agile, leagile, and postponement demand tight interaction/high 
visibility between SC entities, but the literature seems to avoid informing the 
readership on the nature of the requisite relationships. The reluctance of foreign 
buyers to explicitly specify supplier capabilities with regard to lean and agile etc. is 
perhaps explicable: the practitioners interviewed seemed to realise that 
communication complexities and physical distance diminish the benefits of Toyota-
like operational methods of supply risk reduction. Moreover, if quality, delivery, and 
price are satisfactory, then risk may be considered already adequately addressed, 
obviating recourse to operational revisions. 
 
Leanness may also create SC vulnerability (Christopher, 2011a, b; Lee et al, 1997). 
Inventory-light systems lack buffer. In terms of Chinese supply, this would be China-
side make-to-stock production and UK-side storage. The two larger UK SMEs (R-UK 
and P-S) accumulate their China sourced product in their UK facilities. When they 
receive orders, product is adapted to customer specification (if necessary), and then 
shipped. These systems are inventory-intensive, so cannot be considered lean, but 
provide agility and harness the strengths of postponement. SC disruption risk can 
often be reduced by the concentration of buffer inventory close to market. The 
smaller SMEs avoid this option, arranging drop shipping to the customer’s door. 
These SME respondents claimed that China-side logistical disruptions are very rare 
227 
 
events, and that their China-sourced product is built to customer-specification in 
China and usually high volume in nature. All the SMEs use the services of third-party 
logistics providers to ensure on-time delivery.  
 
Agile, an oft-touted, rarely explicitly exemplified concept, may be impractical to 
implement in the Chinese supply scenario, at least for companies whose markets are 
geographically remote from their China sources. According to Christopher (2003), 
SC agility is the ability of organisations to respond speedily to demand changes. A 
problem arises if an existing supplier does not possess the required level of agility. 
According to the SME key informants, relationship formation and integration are 
time-intensive, continuous endeavours. Building relationships with Chinese suppliers 
is a gradual process. Acquiring and disposing of suppliers according to demand 
change may be economically desirable, but is likely unworkable. Risk reduction 
seems to correlate with relationship quality. Relationship quality increases with 
collaboration between companies and in-person interaction between managers, 
neither of which are hasty processes. Agile is however considered by some theorists 
(e.g. Christopher) as a philosophy. This might explain the absence in the literature of 
recommendations concerning implementable methods of agility.  
 
In the case of our SMEs, agility is achieved by market intelligence. The two smaller 
SMEs (D2C and OEM) have strong customer-facing connectivity. Production orders 
are issued to China in response to near-as-known market demand. The sociographs 
of these two companies reveal that their China-side supply capabilities are reflective 
of and proportional to their UK-side market capabilities. 
 
Practices resembling Quick Response, Efficient Customer Response were not 
reported by any MNE or SME respondents. Postponement and mass customisation 
were however evident in the systems of the two larger UK SMEs (who ship generic, 
china-sourced inventory to their UK facilities for modification according to customer 
requirement, most of their customers being in the UK or Europe). FEM (an MNE) 
also “integrate” their China-sourced product at the site of installation and provide 
modification at facilities as close as possible to site.) 
Elements of Early Supplier Involvement are inferable in the cases of AFC, 
FEM, and CT. All three have deep involvement in joint-ventures with state-owned 
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companies. Many of the larger joint-ventures were initiated to capture the insights 
and contacts possessed by the Chinese partner. When devising solutions, these 
MNEs draw on supplier capability and connectedness, since these are likely 
influencers of design options and China market-fit. 
 
The first literature stream (Background and Concepts) revealed that relationships 
underpin all the major tools of SC risk management, i.e. lean, agile, QR/ECR, 
postponement, ESI, etc. However, the role of the relationship itself as a method of 
risk management in culturally specific contexts has received scant attention. In the 
context of China, relationships of all types, including business, are encoded in the 
Chinese term guanxi. A review of the literature by Wilkinson (2011) revealed that 
among other things, guanxi enables access to resources, addresses weaknesses in 
formal institutions, is trust-based, influences business prospects, and evolves from 
emotional to instrumental tie.  
 
According to Limlingan (1986), the traditional Chinese firm is guanxi-biased, 
suggesting that Chinese business practice is highly relational, and that 
guanxi could therefore be an obstacle for non-Chinese companies  attempting to 
integrate with Chinese companies. However, the latter supposition is challenged by 
the evidence of this research: only one respondent (an SME director) mentioned 
guanxi unprompted; no MNE respondents mentioned guanxi directly, although some 
hinted at less-than-desirable interactions with government people. The general 
absence of guanxi in the accounts of the respondents suggests its importance is 
overstated in the literature. The issue of guanxi – the conceptually broad Chinese 







8.2. China and Supply  
Table 22 (below) summarises the findings of this research in terms of its degree of 
compliance with the literature on China and supply management.  
 
Table 22 Compliance of Findings with the China and Supply Management Literature 
 
Legend 
 Degree of Compliance with Consensus of Literature 
 Very strong  
 Strong  
 Weak (concept was implied or mentioned but considered weak) 
- Nothing relatable mentioned 
 Conflicts with consensus 
 Opposite of consensus 
 
In Chinese supply management, relationship quality exerts significant influence on 
strategic purchasing, outsourcing, and supplier capability – the three most critical 
aspects of SCM, making relational proficiency a valuable asset for effective Chinese 
supply management.  
 
2. Systematic literature search #1.  





































































































































































CS1            












IK1            
IK2            
UK SMES 
IK3            
IK4            
IK5            
IK6            
Academics 
AK1 -           





          
CK2        -    
CK3        -    
Comparators 
FK1 -   - -      - 
FK2    - -      - 
FK3    - -       





There is ambiguity in the literature 
on whether “relationship” and 
“guanxi” describe the interaction of 
organisations, of individuals 
representing organisations, or both.  
 
For instance, Lee and Humphreys 
(2007) equate guanxi with Chinese 
relationships in the interpersonal 
sense (in Chinese, the term 
“guanxi” normally describes only human-to-human relationships). The MNE 
informants did not use the word “guanxi”. MNE informants used “relationships” to 
describe organisational partnerships. SME informants used “relationships” – and 
occasionally “guanxi” – to refer to ties between identifiable, company-representing 
individuals. Thus, in the SME sense, “relationships” and “guanxi” were used 
interchangeably to refer both to organisational and interpersonal connections. It is 
possible that the infrequency of the word “guanxi” (by all informants) was due to the 
informants’ ignorance of the term (unlikely considering their many years of China 
supply) or their equation of guanxi with relationships. 
 
In the case of the MNE informants, the non-culturally specific recommendations of 
the SCM literature regarding the advantages of close buyer-supplier relationships 
are supported. For the MNEs examined, there appears to be no aspects of Chinese 
supply that are unique or uniquely sensitive to guanxi. That is, interpersonal factors 
such as relationships seem only as important to managing risk in supply as they are 
elsewhere: guanxi imposes no exceptionality and requires no adjustment of the 
advantage-through-collaboration concept that is core to the SCM paradigm.  
 
Supporting this notion, Wiley et al (2006) and Björkmann and Kock (1995) argued 
that relational business is not unique to China. The input of all four MNE informants 
in this study supports this claim. All four MNEs source multi-nationally and report the 
existence of similarities across emerging economies.  
Figure 26 “chin*” AND “suppl*” in the Literature 
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The global MNE case studies and MNE key informants support the claims of 
Sternquist and Wang (2010): state-influenced firms are less susceptible to influence 
by guanxi. No MNE informants mentioned guanxi explicitly, despite all four MNEs 
having considerable collaboration with state-owned companies. 
 
For the SMEs however, interpersonal factors, i.e. human-to-human relationships, 
appear to be a crucial concern. All the SME narratives featured accounts of trust-
building activities that preceded risk-reducing efficiencies and transaction confidence. 
The SME findings comply with the general consensus of the literature on guanxi and 
business. 
Researchers (Styles and Ambler, 2003, and Cheng et al, 2012 inter alios) 
allege that Chinese society is highly relational and that relational approaches 
characterise Chinese business patterns. The SME findings of this research are 
generally in agreement, but find that supplier loyalty and performance is linked to 
relational methods and to sales and other tangible gestures of commitment. 
 
All the SME and several non-industry key informants in this research professed the 
importance of having positive relationships, not guanxi per se, with their Chinese 
suppliers. Names were stated, and respective roles and communication practices 
were described. As mentioned earlier, only one key informant (an SME manager) 
explicitly identified a relationship as “guanxi”.  
The findings from the SME key informants support the findings of Barnes et al 
(2011), who found that relationships (which they term “guanxi”) are an important 
influence of performance in Chinese supply, contributing to cooperation, coordination 
and generally improved supplier performance. 
 
The SME key informants confirmed the claim by Ren et al (2009 and 2010) that 
guanxi-like relationships develop trust, which is superior to contracts and other 
formal methods as a means of control and reassurance. The findings of Su et al 
(2009) offer further confirmation: macro-economic and cultural factors, such as 
interpersonal influence, have a strong effect on organisational culture. Therefore, 
companies (especially smaller companies, if this research is indicative) wishing to 
partner with Chinese suppliers must recognise that trust-building is a powerful 
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determinant of performance and risk, and risk-reducing guanxi will likely eventually 
develop out of trust-building interaction. 
 
Li and Sheng (2011) caution that guanxi/interpersonal relationships alone – whether 
with government officials, business people, or competitors – are insufficient as a 
guarantee of business performance. This research concurs: in all four SME and two 
MNE key informant cases, a combination of informal methods (guanxi/interpersonal 
relationships) and formal methods (contracts, KPIs, etc.) were used to reduce quality 
risk.  
 
The SME findings of this research confirm the cross-cultural study by Mavondo and 
Rodrigo (2001), who found interpersonal relationships to be vital to forming and 
enhancing organisational relationships. 
 
The business-by-guanxi recommendation is generally supported by this research, 
but with significant caveats:  
 Guanxi is less important for very large (global) MNEs with strong ties to 
government and sourcing highly regulated product in a buyer’s market;  
 “guanxi” practice may be simply an alternative term for the effective 
management of supplier-buyer relationships in China; and 
 the SCM principle of collaboration and relationships need not be significantly 
adapted to incorporate China-specific cultural factors, merely rationally 
applied (according to factors such as company size and ambition). 
 
This research also reinforces the findings of a supply-relevant study by Cai et al 
(2010). Trust and information flow between Chinese suppliers and buyers is 
influenced by a trinity of factors: guanxi, government control, and legal protection.  
The evidence of this research suggests that for SMEs, interpersonal relationships 
(“guanxi” by these authors’ terms) are the most effective of the three. For MNEs 
however, government control and legal protection are stronger. But SMEs (via their 
intermediating “key China person”) and MNEs (via their Chinese-staffed China 




According to Jansson et al (2007), Chinese business networks are patient and long-
term oriented. To gain acceptance into a Chinese business network, Western 
partners are expected to invest deeply in their Chinese partners. The case study of 
the largest SME provides some support for this assertion: R-UK formed a joint-
venture with their most important Chinese partner, and thereby gained access to the 
deeper network of the China-side manager. R-UK and the individual who organised 
the joint-venture had been engaged in China sourcing and selling for around a 
decade prior to the formation of the joint-venture. 
A strategy of long-term relationship development characterises the 
approaches of both the SMEs and MNEs examined this research. The prudence of 
this method is reinforced by Duanmu and Fai (2007), who demonstrated that the 
nature of knowledge transferred between foreign companies and their Chinese 
suppliers improves as their relationship and collaboration deepens. The CT and FEM 
cases support this: both companies have been investing in and upskilling Chinese 
suppliers since the 1990s. 
 
To Tate et al (2009), buyer-supplier relationships are evolving from tactical to 
strategic. The SMEs and MNEs in this study have incorporated Chinese supply into 
their long-term strategies. Li et al (2006b) found that strategic China sourcing – if 
characterised by high levels of risk-reducing integration – generates competitive 
advantage and improved organisational performance. All eight industry studies show 
a generally positive picture of Chinese supply. The SMEs all reported significant cost 
savings as a result of concentrating supply in China. 
 
Overall, this study indicates a high degree of congruence between the relationship-
favouring Chinese business environment and the mutualist, collaborative, integration 
concepts that underpin SCM principles. Handfield and Nichols (2004), by contrast, 
found that foreign companies operating SCs in China struggle to develop the 
necessary risk-reducing business relationships with Chinese suppliers. It seems that 
much has improved in China between 2004 and the present. Several key informants 
alleged that 10 years ago, quality risk and delivery risk was far greater problems than 




Kotabe et al (2008) note that outsourcing to lower-cost producers associates strongly 
with two particular risks: quality and delay. The SME informants reported these same 
two risks as the most prevalent affecting China supply. The general cost benefits of 
China outsourcing/manufacturing, however, compensate for these risks. All 
respondents were generally positive about their China supply experiences, and 
reported that risk related to both quality and delivery is declining rapidly. 
 
Both SMEs and MNEs prefer to contract with suppliers who are located in or around 
clusters. Schiele (2006) recommends that core suppliers should be located near 
buyers, and that suppliers and buyers should be bound by a trust relationship in 
which there is significant interaction. The SME informants endorse this 
recommendation strongly. Jiang (2002) showed that foreign companies are 
strengthening their China supply reliability by use of international third-party logistics 
firms, use of local carriers inside China, and favouring suppliers who are enmeshed 
in clusters. These three methods are strongly recommended by a consultant key 
informant, and are also well established practice for four of the SMEs examined in 
this research. 
 
“Quality” in SC relationships is a composite of trust, adaptation, cooperation, and 
communication (Su et al, 2008). All eight industry informants made statements that 
support the importance of quality and the necessity of building trust, adapting to 
cultural and macro-economic unfamiliarity, corporative working, and regular 
communication, ideally in-person interaction.  
 
Like our SME respondents, Salmi (2006) reported that quality and general success 
in China sourcing is dependent on a long-term, relational approach. Such an 
approach enables the Chinese partner to address product quality risk. Relationship 
quality also improves gradually with time, and the effectiveness of foreign managers 
in their dealings with Chinese suppliers seems contingent on language, cultural 
literacy, social skills and appreciation of the Chinese culture. All the SME 
respondents reported an enthusiasm for visiting China and understanding Chinese 
business practices. Two SME managers are even learning Chinese. All stated that 




This research does not find that “quality fade” risk (Midler, 2009; Berman and Swani, 
2010) is characteristic of Chinese supply. No MNE or SME respondent recalled 
instances of quality fade. One consultant key informant stated that quality fade is the 
inevitable outcome of foreign buyers imposing unreasonable cost pressures on 
Chinese suppliers, resulting in reckless “cost-cutting” practices. 
 
Towers and Song (2010) revealed that the main challenges facing UK companies 
sourcing in China relate to delivery, negotiation, language barriers and Chinese 
business style and practices. All four were reported by consultant and SME key 
informants. Delivery failure is generally resolved by use of international 3PLs; the 
remaining three are addressed by China presence, learning, and the use of an 
experienced third-party intermediary or China solutions provider (such as Li and 
Fung), or by the involvement of a “key China person”, which is the preferred method 
in the four SME cases investigated. 
 
According to Wilson (2007) and Child (2009), for MNEs operating in China, joint-
ventures are now far less popular than wholly-owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs). 
Three of the four MNE cases indicate that joint-ventures retain value for MNEs that 
have long-term China market ambitions and are attempting to increase their 
proximity to the Chinese government, which is a highly influential institution. One 
SME case (Ritchie UK) is also benefiting from its 2010 entry into a joint-venture (R-
Hua) with a company that was formerly R-UK’s main supplier. 
 
Liu and Wang (1999), Pressey and Qiu (2007), and Vedel and Ellegaard (2013) 
stressed the advantages of using well-connected third-party intermediaries 
(consultants and/or China solutions providers). Not surprisingly perhaps, the 
consultant key informants praised the risk- reducing and cost-saving capabilities of 
effective intermediaries. Consultants and China solution providers can provide 
matchmaking services, whereby the foreign buyer is introduced to a duly checked, 
fully verified Chinese supplier. This reduces selection risk, which was reported by the 
LinkedIn respondents as a major determinant of effective China supply.  
 
Intermediaries perform a range of valuable, problem-solving, transaction-smoothing 
activities that remove much of the risk present in China supply. These can range 
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from tangible activities such as customs clearance and the processing of 
bureaucratic documentation, to intangible but vital activities such as face-saving, 
negotiation training, and interpreting/translating. The sum of these activities can 
significantly offset the liabilities of foreignness that are acutely disadvantageous to 
China novices. None of the MNE or SME practitioners reported use of third-party 
intermediaries, although one MNE respondent said that very occasionally his 
company does use consultants, but usually in human resource-related matters. 
 
8.3. Guanxi   
Table 23 (below) summarises the findings of this research in terms of its degree of 
compliance with the literature on guanxi.  
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IK1 -      
IK2 -      
UK SMES 
IK3 -      
IK4 -      
IK5 -      
IK6 -      
Academics 
AK1 - - - -  - 
AK2 - - - -  - 
Consultants 
CK1       
CK2       
CK3       
Comparators 
FK1 -  - -   
FK2 -     - 
FK3 -     - 




 Degree of Compliance with Consensus of Literature 
 Very strong  
 Strong  
 Weak (concept was implied or mentioned but considered weak) 
- Nothing relatable mentioned 
 Conflicts with consensus 
 Opposite of consensus 
 
Wang et al (2005): Confucianism 
continues to influence Chinese 
organisational practice despite the 
decline of traditional values among 
young Chinese. This observation 
raises the question of whether age 
and generational factors are 
affecting management style. The 
success of the relational approach 
of UK SME managers to Chinese 
supply management may be 
attributable to the age of the 
Chinese managers (a supposition also proffered by a UK SME interviewee). If the 
assertion of Wang et al is correct, the necessity for relational/guanxi methods of 
management will decline with time. Evidence from MNE informants suggests that 
where power dynamic and technological asymmetries favour the foreign partner, 
relational/guanxi factors are a minor concern. 
 
According to Guthrie et al (1998) and Mackinnon (2008), guanxi is in decline. To Xin 
and Pearce (1996), guanxi allows companies to overcome the weaknesses of formal 
institutions. Its utility appears to be waning as a consequence of China’s 
strengthening formal institutions (law and contracts) and the adoption by younger 
Chinese of Western-style management, which is less reliant on relationships and the 
use of networks to access resources. None of the informants cited guanxi as a major 
influencer of risk (SC-related or otherwise). Guanxi was however described by all the 
SME informants as important and arising from long-term interaction. These SME 
informants had already established China-side guanxi prior to the commencement of 
their China supply or joint ventures. 
Figure 27 "guanxi" in the Literature 
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Dunning and Kim (2007) believe that Confucianism explains the Chinese preference 
for guanxi. However, the existence of guanxi near equivalents in several East Asian 
countries (Alston, 1989), guanxi-like systems in Russia and the Arabic speaking 
world (Michailova and Worm, 2003), and the near ubiquity of powerful informal 
networks in emerging countries (Puffer et al, 2010; Smith et al, 2012) implies that the 
phenomenon is neither unique to China nor likely solely attributable to Confucian 
traditions. In this research, only one interviewee referred directly, without prompting, 
to guanxi, and two MNE respondents made no direct or indirect references to guanxi, 
suggesting that to managers and consultants, guanxi is currently of low significance. 
The findings of this research are generally in agreement with the theorists who claim 
that guanxi is a diminishing force in Chinese business practice.  
However, insistence on formal methods, especially inter-organisational rules, 
can increase risk (Ramasamy et al (2006). According to Wang (2005), China is a low 
trust society. The key component of guanxi is trust, hence where guanxi exists so too 
does trust. Therefore, the application of formal rules will, in some circumstances, 
suggest to the Chinese partner that the relationship lacks trust. One MNE key 
informant stated that he (not his Chinese counterparts) postponed discussion of 
contracts or conditions until a solid trust relationship had evolved. Similarly, two SME 
respondents reported that granting flexibility and autonomy to their China distributors 
produced positive performance. It seems both MNE and SME informants endorse 
the combined use of informal (i.e. trust-based, guanxi-like) methods and formal (legal 
and contract-based) methods. 
 
The MNEs’ use of national China headquarters and variously located regional offices 
has many advantages, not the least of which is their ability to engage local people in 
local business. Jiang et al (2011) showed that Chinese business people are more 
likely to trust people of the same ethnicity. Lovett et al (1999) reported that in 
domestic situations, native protocols of conduct are intrinsically superior to foreign 
protocols. The SME managers’ practice of informal methods is therefore predictably 
advantageous when dealing with Chinese suppliers in China. The usage of informal, 
trust-based methods strongly supports the proposition that guanxi (or at least guanxi-
like relational methods) can be adopted and applied by foreign managers, as is 
argued by Hutchings and Weir (2006). One consultant key informant, however, 
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stated that non-Chinese could not acquire guanxi, since guanxi is inherited or is the 
product of shared history. The researchers and writers that recommend foreigners 
adopt the practice of guanxi must concur with the findings of this research, i.e. 
foreigners are capable of practising guanxi. Without this premise, the business-by-
guanxi recommendation loses validity. The sheer number of foreign companies 
involved in relationships with Chinese companies is also supportive. Fock and Woo 
(1998), however, recommend foreign managers adapt only moderately to the 
Chinese business environment, engaging in guanxi only when necessary. The MNE 
case study respondents appear to practice this recommendation. The MNEs have 
strongly formulated anticorruption, anti-gift giving policies that govern their interaction 
with all external organisations and influential individuals. 
 
On the issue of ethnic similarity, the MNEs studied in this research seem well 
equipped. All four are headquartered in foreign states, but their China representation 
is predominantly through bilingual, internationally educated managers who are 
Chinese in ethnicity.  
A similar, albeit lower scale, pattern is discernible in the practices of SMEs: all 
four UK SMEs (and one MNE informant) are represented by and communicate with 
their suppliers through ethnically Chinese “key China people” (my phrase). This 
method enables non-Chinese organisations to effectively avoid cultural and linguistic 
obstacles that would be challenging otherwise. The use of national offices by MNEs 
and key China people by SMEs seems to create the “cross-cultural guanxi networks” 
recommended by Jia and Wang (2013), and minimizes the possibility of cultural 
differences increasing supply risk, which is claimed by Jia and Rutherford (2010).  
 
The guanxi-enhancing capabilities of intermediaries are claimed (by Liand Wright, 
2000) to be highly beneficial to Western companies operating in China. Third 
parties/intermediaries, such as consultants and China solutions providers, can, for a 
fee, lend their trustworthy status and credibility to inexperienced companies seeking 
Chinese partners. In this research, only the consultant informants advocated the 
necessity of contracting with third-party intermediaries. However, it seems rational 
that companies seeking low prices alone, i.e. not engaging with Chinese suppliers 
for strategic, long-term reasons, will lack key China people and the motivation to 
invest in resource-intensive trust-building activities. Thus, for the achievement of 
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reducing risk in arm’s-length, transactional trade with suppliers, hired third-parties 
may be suitable. 
 
The importance of establishing guanxi with officials was mentioned by two MNE 
respondents. Tung and Worm (2001) claim that European companies’ failure to 
develop government guanxi has contributed to their weak performance in China. The 
scale of SMEs is such that guanxi with officials is likely unnecessary. Through joint-
ventures, MNEs, on the other hand, are already connected with government. No 
informants indicated that guanxi with government officials were actively pursued. 
This omission is construable as further evidence that the importance of guanxi is in 
decline. 
 
8.4. Supply and Risk 
 
Table 24 Compliance of Findings with the Supply and Risk Literature 
 
4. Systematic literature search #3.  
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Academics 
AK1  -         
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Comparators 
FK1 - -  -   - -  - 
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 Degree of Compliance with Consensus of Literature 
 Very strong  
 Strong  
 Weak (concept was implied or mentioned but considered weak) 
- Nothing relatable mentioned 
 Conflicts with consensus 
 Opposite of consensus 
 
Table 24 (above) summarises the findings of this research in terms of its degree of 
compliance with the supply and risk literature stream.  
 
Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) 
stress the instrumental 
significance of a distributor in 
effective inventory management. 
The distributor acts as an 
intermediary, interfacing between 
the supplier and regional 
customers, placing orders 
according to demand and handling 
inventory.  
 
Similar distributor activities feature 
in the UKCeram and pre-2009 R-UK key informant cases. In addition to distributing 
product and finding and finalising China side sales, both SMEs’ China distributors 
also identify and liaise with suppliers and handle supply-side related risk. Thus, both 
China-side distributors have a dual function: they minimise fulfilment risk by local 
storage and distribution; and they function as the SME’s key China person, 
representing the SME’s interests to its China-side stakeholders, building and 
maintaining customer and tier 2 relationships, providing consistent China-side in-
person presence, and resolving supply related issues as they occur. 
 
All four MNEs operate China-side distribution centres where product is consolidated 
for dispatch to domestic and overseas customers. Park et al (2010) observe that 
holding safety stock at distribution centres enhances risk pooling. In all four MNE 
cases, China-side supply and China market share are important, interrelated 
Figure 28 "suppl*" AND "risk" in the Literature 
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priorities. Regionally dispersed distribution facilities reduce fulfilment risk. According 
to Guinipero and Eltantawy (2004), the traditional method of resolving SC risk is 
buffer inventory. This seems to be the approach used by the China-operating MNEs. 
Their usage of strategically located concentrations of make-to-stock inventory 
contravenes trends in lean practice but provides buffer against demand spikes and 
disruption (creating a basic form of agility). The DCs also function as a risk-reducing 
decoupling point of the sort recommended by Christopher (2010). Prof Christopher 
also acted as a key academic informant in this research. In his interview, he stressed 
that decoupling constitutes the single best practical/structural method of reducing all 
supply chain risk. Both demand- and supply-side risk can, to varying degrees, be 
reduced by use of a decoupling point. 
 
Discussion of risk calculation models dominates a significant proportion of the 
literature on supply risk (e.g. Berger et al, 2004; Blackhurst et al, 2008; and 
Giannakis and Louis, 2011). In the context of evaluating risk in China supply, risk 
models must include relationship quality (especially when SMEs are involved), since 
the findings of this study suggest that relationship quality (although problematic to 
quantify) generally influences supply risk. 
 
The case studies presented in this research support the findings of several heavily 
cited (n=>40) studies into collaboration between supply chain partners: 
Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) found that internal and external integration and 
agility decrease supply-side risk and increase responsiveness to market change. 
Internal integration was also recommended by a key academic informant, so was 
applied in Practitioner Output 1 of this research (Chapter 9). External integration 
refers to interaction with customers and suppliers, which is achieved by China 
supply-operating SMEs primarily through China presence and relationships. A study 
by Camuffo et al (2007) found that relational obligations prevented disagreements 
and encouraged kaizen activities, including the systematic and incremental removal 
of risk. The same was reported by several SME and MNE respondents. 
 
Based on a case study of Japanese manufacturing, Dekker et al (2013) concluded 
that trust is more effective as control practice than transactional interaction. Also 
using case studies, Ellegaard (2008) deduced similarly: relational practices are 
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realistic alternatives to formal modes of reducing SC risk. Three SME respondents 
identified trust as fundamental to successful China-side supply. Management 
relational methods of risk reduction feature in all eight industry studies. The nature 
and composition of the key risk-reducing relationships differs: for MNEs, the key 
relationships are at the organisational level, i.e. with joint-venture partners and 
between supplier managers and managers working at the national or regional office; 
for SMEs, the key relationships are between UK-side managers and/or key China 
people and managers at China-side suppliers. 
 
All four SME informants claimed that in-person China presence and regular 
communication with China-side managers are crucial to effective collaboration and 
risk management. Similar was observed at French companies by Lavastre et al 
(2012): meetings and constant communication achieves effective SC risk 
management. This suggests that the rewards of in-country, in-person presence and 
frequent exchange of information are not unique to the China scenario, so should be 
considered universal good practice. 
 
All respondents indicated their Chinese suppliers provided cost-effective supply at 
satisfactory quality. No adversarial relationships were mentioned. Most of the 
comment from all eight industry sources was positive. Only the AFC respondent 
reported a significant quality issue stemming from China supply, but this was one of 
very few instances he could recall. The positive picture contradicts starkly with the 
popular books (e.g. Midler, 2009) that describe the difficulties that foreigners face 
when trading with Chinese suppliers. 
Supporting the case study and industry key informant findings, Leverick and 
Cooper (1998) and a key informant interviewee (Stuart Emmett) claim that 
adversarial relationships are growing increasingly uncommon as the benefits of 
cooperative relationships grow weightier. 
 
SME and MNE respondents reported that association with large international 
companies brings face advantages to the Chinese partner. Reputation and the 
Chinese concept of face therefore appear similar. Lemke and Petersen (2013) 
proclaim “reputational risk” to be a lesser-known form of SC risk. The preservation of 
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reputation motivates suppliers to perform to expectation. It seems reasonable to 
assume that in the Chinese case, preservation of face motivates good performance.  
 
Olson and Wu (2010) identified two China-specific supply related risks: natural 
disasters and quality issues that resulted in recalls. These authors claim that 
information sharing and improved supplier visibility can reduce the probability of 
quality issues. Two MNE informants claimed that their companies had the supplier 
visibility that they required, but the suppliers have very little visibility into the MNE. 
Favourable power asymmetries seem to be a strong feature of the MNE China 
supply risk management formula. 
 
The performance of pre-shipping quality checks (also known as “acceptance 
sampling”) is recommended by Starbird (1994), but not in the specific context of 
China supply. Two key consultant informants expressed the opinion that when 
ordering product from a new supplier or ordering new product from a known supplier, 
acceptance sampling is good practice. Consultants and China solutions providers 
can introduce buyers to third-party companies that can perform China-side 
acceptance sampling, ensuring that only passed products are shipped and failed 
products are returned to the supplier before payments are transferred. However, no 
industry practitioner informants (MNE or SME) reported use of such services, 
suggesting that confidence in supplier quality was satisfactory and other methods of 
quality risk management were sufficient. 
 
Consultant respondents also claimed that third-party intermediaries, such as a 
specialist consultant or China solutions provider can perform various risk-reducing 
activities, such as supplier selection, supplier monitoring, and supplier-buyer liaising. 
Similar claims are made in the literature: Vedel and Ellegaard (2013) showed that 
intermediaries performed a range of risk-reducing functions, including supplier 
identification, supplier monitoring, supplier-buyer relationship management, cultural 
mediation and delivery security. The risk-reducing capabilities of sourcing 
intermediaries are such that intermediaries should be considered strategic elements 
of supplier management, especially when sourcing in high-risk countries. Neither 
MNE nor SME informants reported usage of sourcing intermediaries. In the case of 
SMEs, similar risk-reducing functions appear to be performed by key China people. 
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In the case of MNEs, high levels of formal control, the presence of local 
representatives, and the heavily clustered, accessible nature of the China-side 
supply base reduces most forms of supply risk. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the findings of this 
research support those of Zhai 
et al (2013) and the SCM 
paradigm generally: SC risk 
associates negatively with SC 
integration. That is, well-
developed supplier-buyer 
relations – provide China SC 
risk reduction.  
 
As predicted prior to the 
literature search, integration 
(indicated by the central red segment in this diagram) is a recurring element 
prominent in all four areas of the literature examined. Integration/collaboration is 
central to the SCM paradigm; integration-facilitation through relationships is the 
dominant recommendation in the literature on China and supply [chain] management 
generally; “guanxi” is mutualism and relational interaction in the Chinese context and 
influences all business strongly; and risk in supply can be reduced by buyer-supplier 
integration and collaboration.  
 
This literature is generally supportive of the foregoing general consensuses, but finds 
that SMEs and MNEs can differ on the degree to which they must use relational 
methods to reduce risk in Chinese supply. SMEs are more dependant than MNEs on 
informal, relational, interpersonal, i.e. guanxi-like methods. MNEs, on the other hand, 
may – by dint of scale, connectedness to government, and buyer influence over 
supply markets – operate using impersonal, formal methods, such as contracts and 
quality standards found effective in developed countries. Furthermore, MNEs 
manage their China supply risk using in-country mediation, which they perform 
Figure 29 A Combined and Intersecting Literature 
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through their regional offices. SMEs, lacking this facility, are dependent on critical 
intermediating individuals. Typically, these individuals are well-networked industry 
professionals, have ties to both suppliers and customers in China, have long-term, 
trust-based relationships with their UK partners, spend time in both countries (but 
more time in China than the UK), possess bilingualism and multicultural experience, 
and are proficient communicators and negotiators. Such individuals are essential 
and their communication with the UK office will be frequent. 
 
The penultimate chapter of this thesis (following) describes the theoretical and 
practitioner-oriented outputs that have developed out of this research.   
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9. Discussion II. Theoretical and Practitioner Contributions 
This chapter reports the four main outputs of this research. Two theoretical outputs 
are presented: system patterns and China presence. Two practitioner outputs are 
then presented: The Four-Step China Supplier Establishment Tool and The China 
Supply Risk Assessment Tools. 
 
Table 25 (following) summarises the findings of this research and tables 16-22 and 
26 provide more detail. Highlighted risks are mitigated similarly; red-boxed mitigation 
methods are unique to MNEs. Both categories of firm encounter similar risks and 
exercise similar methods of mitigation. UK SMEs achieve by informal methods what 
MNEs achieve by formal methods. For MNEs, relationships are premised on prior 
China presence and formal ties with Chinese institutions; for UK SMEs, relationships 
are guanxi-like, i.e. the key China person’s industry connections and family and peer 
network. For both, relationships and physical China presence are inseparable; for 
both, relationships reduce most major forms of supply risk.  
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Table 25 Overview of Findings 
 
Section 3.3.2 provides a quantitative, schematic summary of the thematic analysis. 
(more detail can be found in the Appendix). Some UK SMEs are also MNEs, since 
they source and sell in China and other countries besides their home nation. 
However, the MNE risk-influencing variables mentioned here were derived from the 
MNE sources so likely have most applicability to global MNEs.  The UK SMEs 
studied in this research are modest in their China ambitions. However, SMEs 
strategically targeting the China market could benefit from the risk-reducing 
strategies of MNEs. 
 
Thematic analysis of the case studies and the key informants’ contributions revealed 
similar structural and sociographic patterns (1) in the various business systems 
described, dominant MNE risk-influencing variables (1a), and three overarching pairs 
of interacting factors (1b, 1c, and 2) affecting supply risk for both the global MNEs 
and the UK SMES. Developed from these sets of interacting factors are the five 
major theoretical contributions of this research. This section describes each of the 
Risks 
Mitigation Method 
MNEs UK SMEs 
Quality 
China office Key China person/China 
presence; family and peer 
networks of key China person 
Communication with China 
customers and suppliers 
Supplier selection 
ISO and industry compliance as 
minimum selection standard 
Supplier Power 
Global supply network leverage 
Outright ownership; joint venture 
Acquisition; joint venture 
Family and peer networks of key 
China person Liaising through China office 
General quality and 
efficiency management 
Global factory audit processes 
Monitoring and quality checking 
by key China person/China 
presence 
Process monitoring and product 
testing by China office Family and peer networks of key 
China person 
Logistics  3PL 3PL 
Cultural issues China office 
Key China person/China 
presence; family and peer 
networks of key China person Guanxi (lack of) 
Not important due to scale and 
non-substitutability  
IP Loss Make outside China 
Not important  
Bureaucracy  




five in the following sequence. The five represent the primary theoretical outputs of 
this research.  
1. System patterns (9.1), 
1a. MNE risk-influencing variables (9.1.5), 
1b. Relationship quality and formality (9.1.6), 
1c. Buyer status and the supplier perspective (9.1.7), and 
2. Risk and China presence (9.2). 
 
Also based on the findings of this research, the following two practitioner outputs 
have been developed:  
1. The Four-Step China Supplier Establishment Tool (9.3), and  
2. The China Supply Risk Assessment Tools (9.4). 
 
9.1 Theoretical Output 1. System Patterns  
9.1.1 The MNE Meta-Process 
The block process models of the four global MNEs show a higher degree of similarity 
than the models of the four UK SMEs. The four MNE cases differ only superficially, 
e.g. by the various names the companies use to describe their permanent China 
presence. The MNE buyer-China supplier meta-process model shown here is 
approximately representative of the four MNE systems.  
 
The following model (Figure 30) comprises two roughly symmetrical horizontal 
halves: the upper half (beige) describes the MNE’s China supply activities; the lower 
half (grey) describes the MNE’s supply activities in the rest of the world. The 







The China-located China office of the MNE occupies the upper central block. To its 
right is the MNE’s China-located China customer base; to its left is the China supply 
base. Product flows directly from China-side supplier to China-side customer, 
bypassing the China office, which handles no product. Product flows in response to 
China-side customers’ orders that are received by the China office and then relayed 
to China-side suppliers. Bidirectional communication occurs between the China 
office and the MNE’s China-side customers. Bidirectional communication also occurs 
between the China office and the MNE’s China-side suppliers. Very little direct 
communication occurs between China-side customers and China-side suppliers. 
China-side suppliers will ship product directly to the MNEs’ customers inside and 
Legend 
 
Flow of orders (unidirectional)  
 
International flow of goods (unidirectional) 
 China domestic flow of goods (unidirectional) 
 ROTW to ROTW domestic flow of goods (unidirectional) 
 
Flow of product design and other information (bidirectional) 
 
 
Line thickness indicates approximate volume (thicker line=higher volume) 
 
Total design/manufacturing/logistics solution (if required) 
   Location: China 













































Figure 30 The MNE China/Global Supply Meta-Process Model 
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outside China. Similarly, suppliers outside China will ship product to China-side 
customers.  
 
Communication is limited to within-nation entities. Thus, on behalf of global HQ or 
another national office, the China office places foreign orders with China-side 
suppliers. (In many cases, ordering is automated and occurs via a companywide 
buying system.) Product flow is transnational; communication flow is national.  
Global HQ communicates intensively with national offices around the world. 
National offices communicate between themselves only when projects are 
transnational or when querying issues related to suppliers in other countries. Most 
communication between customer and MNE occurs at the local level, i.e. within-
nation. The closest national or regional office is the point of customer interface. 
Similarly, suppliers interact with the MNE through the nearest within-nation office. 
National offices dispatch experts to both customers and suppliers. National offices 
develop solutions with local customers, ascertaining requirement and crafting 
fulfilment through interaction with both the customer and the supply base. This way 
the MNE remains agile and relevant. 
 
In the case of China, local-to-local interfacing is operationally advantageous and 
culturally appropriate. Both SME and MNE respondents spoke of the need to build 
relationships – interfirm and interpersonal – to reduce various supply-related risks. 
Scale factors separate the two sets of firms, but both operate communicative, 
proximity-creating, relationship-facilitating China-side systems.  
 
The global capabilities and long-term China strategies of all four MNEs are intensely 
supply chain-dependent. All four operate global SCs that are highly China-dependent 
and place China at the centre of their globe-spanning SCs. All four operate a global 
network of regional offices that represent their main markets and sources of supply.  
 
For China-side risk reduction generally, all four favour within-nation supply to China 
customers. All four MNEs prefer to contract with Chinese suppliers who are close to 
their major China markets, and, ideally, located close to coastal industrial clusters, 
since these are well served by logistics companies and ports. These location 
preferences reduce logistical and lead time-related risk. 
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All four MNEs enforce process and product quality across their supply base, 
principally through formal methods, i.e. industry standards and contracts. All four 
MNEs entrust responsibility for tier 2 quality management to tier 1 suppliers. 
 
SFM, AFC, and CT have a modest interest in supplier acquisition (less so FEM), 
preferring to bring to bear scale-related enticements such as high-volume orders, 
association prestige, and long-term arrangements when selecting suppliers and 
negotiating price. SFM, AFC, and CT have built long-term China strategies around 
the continuation and deepening of their Chinese supply bases, despite management 
at each acknowledging that their positions in the Chinese market will decline as the 
capabilities of Chinese suppliers and native industry generally improve. 
 
9.1.2 The UK SME Meta-Process 
All the UK SMEs mitigate risk similarly, i.e. through constant communication with 
customers and their factories. All have a near-constant physical presence in China 
consisting of both formal and informal working relationships. 
 
Although the block processes of the SMEs vary considerably more than those of the 
MNEs, there is sufficient similarity in the supply systems of all four UK SME cases to 
propose an essentially descriptive, meta-process model of UK SME buyer-China 




The central block represents the UK SME, who communicates bi-directionally with its 
customer base (to its right) and with its China-side supply base (to its left). The UK 




















Figure 31 The SME China Supply Meta-Process Model 
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suppliers. Product is make-to-stock, i.e. ordered from Chinese suppliers in 
anticipation of customer orders and then stored, typically at a UK-side facility. Make-
to-order processes are uncommon, due to distance and scale constraints. When 
product from suppliers is physically received at the UK SMEs’ UK-side facilities, the 
UK SME then applies quality checks and modifications if necessary, and then ships 
product forward to customers. If the UK SME exercises a high degree of control over 
its Chinese supplier and the nature of the order permits, shipping may be directly 
supplier-to-customer. 
 
Some UK SMEs obtain all their manufacturing and/or supply from a single China-
side supplier (third-party, wholly-owned, or joint-venture). The single factory China- 
sourcing SME (e.g. OEM) is – at least by the findings of this research – rarer than 
the portfolio China-sourcing SME (e.g. D2C, R-UK, P-S, UKCeram, and 360C).  
A portfolio will likely consist of varying combinations of the following: third-
party suppliers, wholly-owned factory/suppliers, and joint-ventures. The smaller UK 
SMEs (D2C, UKCeram, and 360C) source from several third-party suppliers. The 
larger UK SMEs (R-UK and P-S) source from various third-party suppliers and from 
one or several wholly-owned or joint-venture manufacturers. In the case of portfolio 
China-sourcing SMEs, volume of trade with their wholly-owned or joint-venture 
supplier/manufacturer is larger than the volume of trade with any individual third-
party supplier. Similarly, the volume of communication between the UK SME and its 
wholly-owned and/or joint-venture is also likely to be greater than the volume of 
communication between the UK SME and any of its China-side third-party suppliers.  
 
Risk in China supply lessens in proportion to the buyer’s demonstrated level of 
interaction, particularly in-person interaction, with supplier management. This 
perhaps explains the preference for small China-side supply bases – forming and 
maintaining relationships – although advantageous in terms of supply risk reduction 
– represents a cost and commitment that for a resource-constrained SME might not 
be tolerable. This may influence supplier rationalisation in the context of China (and 




9.1.3 The UK SME China Supply Meta-Sociograph 
The sociographs of all four UK SMEs feature sufficient commonality to form a 




Reflecting the SME meta-process model, the central position in the meta-sociograph 
is occupied by the UK SME. To its right are its customers; to its left is its China 
supply base. In the meta-sociograph however, the central UK SME contains a “Key 
UK person”. Typically this will be an owner or director with direct connections to the 
“Key China Person/People”, who can be direct employees of the SME (P-S), co-
owners (D2C), an informal arrangement of expert friends (OEM), a joint-venture 
manager (R-UK), or a paid China side representative (UKCeram). In all cases, a high 
level of trust and frequent communication characterises the relationship between the 
key UK person and the key China person/people.  
Ideally, the SME retains a key China person/people based permanently in 
China (OEM, R-UK, UKCeram). If the key China person is a direct employee (e.g. 
Ms J at P-S), communication with suppliers by Skype and telephone will be frequent, 

























Figure 32 SME Generic Sociograph 
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The key China person will typically be industry and technology literate, conversant 
with matters of pertinence to supply and suppliers, ethnically Chinese, and fluent in 
English and the various Chinese dialects of the main suppliers or regions of supply 
(true of all cases).  
It is also likely that the key China person will be a member of a valuable 
China-side network of suppliers/manufacturers: the key China person may have 
family and friends who own or manage suppliers/manufacturers of relevant product 
(D2C). This provides the UK SME with a degree of permanent China presence by 
proxy and risk-reducing redundancy. In times of supply interruption, the key China 
person’s network can be utilised to provide resilience. 
 
The key China person effectively manages all of the UK SME’s China-side supply 
related activities: solving problems and minimising quality and logistical risk through 
presence and direct communication with suppliers. In some cases (e.g. UKCeram), 
the key China side person will also double as a sales representative, connecting 
Chinese buyers to the UK SME’s products. In other cases (e.g. R-Hua), the key 
China person directly manages the UK SME’s main China-side source.  
 
9.1.4 Global MNEs and UK SMEs: Differences and Commonalities 
The meta-process block models and the meta-sociograph reveal differences and 
commonalities between UK SMEs and global MNEs in their approach to managing 
risk and relationships in the context of China-side supply (summarised in Table 26). 
Commonalities outnumber differences. China factors, such as infrastructure and 
general macroeconomic influences, are common to both, so may explain some of 
the commonalities noted. However, most of the commonalities relate directly to 
relationships and their bearing on risk.  
 
Both MNEs and SMEs use relationships to reduce risk. Both MNEs and SMEs use 
China-side personnel to represent the larger organisation and, critically, to interface 
and thereby build and retain relationships with managers and other facilitators of 
business. Both MNEs and SMEs use China-side representatives to handle problems, 
communicate information, and develop and maintain relationships with key people at 




The management at both MNEs and SMEs understand that in-person interaction, 
frequent communication, and relational ties increase mutualism. With mutualism 
comes the intertwining of interests. Suppliers receiving regular orders, co-investment, 
and various other benefits that come through association with a strong customer 
seem unlikely to jeopardise continuation by issuing substandard or delayed products. 
Moreover, in-person, direct relationships enforce personal accountability. The 
prevention of face loss and reputation damage is likely to compel managers of 
Chinese suppliers to ensure their companies perform to or exceed expectation. A 
distant, absent, and/or unconcerned, i.e. transactional, buyer is incapable of building 
and holding trust relationships, monitoring facilities in person, interacting with 
managers, being generally responsive, understanding local business conditions, and 
connecting with powerful informal networks. The greater the organisations’ in-China 
presence, the greater its ability to create/maintain quality in relationships and to 
reduce supply related risk through leverage of those relationships. Table 26 
(following) summarises the main differences and commonalities between global 









Global MNEs  UK SMEs 
Source heavily in China to 
achieve strategically critical, long-
term China market ambitions 
Source heavily in 
China but have very 
limited China market 
ambitions 
Source heavily in China 
Main sources are multiple J-Vs, 
multiple owned factories  
Main sources are 
third-party suppliers, 
single owned factory, 
single J-V 
Portfolio approach to China sourcing 
World market-focused UK market-focused  





China- side supply 
Sourcing low to very high tech 
Sourcing low- to 
medium tech 
Sourcing technologies of various levels 
Limit China supply/ outsourcing to 
products that are not IP sensitive 
Willing to tolerate IP 
losses to obtain cost 
advantages of China 
sourcing 
Vulnerable to IP loss 
Importance to Chinese 
government reduces the threat of 
corruption/ bureaucracy 
Low scale reduces 
threat of corruption 
Vulnerable to corruption/bureaucracy 
  
For many categories of product, supply outstrips 
demand, which creates an advantageous buyer’s 
market 
Long-term, mutualist buyer-supplier relations are 
the most effective way of reducing general supply 
related risk 
Buyer-supplier relationship quality improves with 
time and frequency of communication 
China-side presence helps build relationships with 
suppliers 
Quality problems are unusual (these days) 
Logistical problems are unusual (these days) 
Supplier selection is paramount  
Logistical and quality related issues can be 
resolved by good relationships with suppliers 
Most risk in supply management can be reduced 
by relationships 
Good relationships with suppliers can give access 
to other risk-lowering resources, such as contacts 
in local logistics companies 
China office, national/regional HQ 
“Key China 
person/people” 
Use of China-side representative  
From the perspective of the overseas HQ, China 
risk and China-side operations are largely 
managed locally, so are “hands off” 
China-side representative is operationally critical 
Uses government contacts Uses peer contacts 
Use informal contacts/networks to reduce 
risk/improve business 
Formal, e.g. through supplier 
policy agreements, etc. 
Informal, e.g. through 
trust between supplier 
and key China person 
Relationships combine both formal and informal 
methods of control 
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9.1.5 MNE Risk-Influencing Variables 
9.1.5.1 China Strategy and Supply Proximity 
When serving China markets, supply risk appears to decline with proximity of the 
supply base to the China market. In the case of the Chinese MNE (SCMG) and all 
four non-Chinese MNEs, reduced supply risk is achieved by serving China-side 
markets with as much China-sourced product as possible. For SMEs with lower 
strategy-level China ambitions, proximity to their respective China markets has a low 
impact on supply risk. SME and consultant respondents reported customs-related 
complexity as a major efficiency limiter. Consultant respondents also reported 
logistical complexities as more likely when using cheaper and/or remote Chinese 
suppliers. Logistical efficiencies improve with decreased distances between source 
and market. China’s physical logistical challenges can be formidable and Chinese 
logistics firms often lack visibility technologies. Both issues are best addressed by 
decreased proximity or international 3PLs.  
 
The following matrix (Figure 33) provides an approximate indication of the risk 
significance of the relationship between strategic importance of the China market 
and proximity of supply to market. The matrix quadrant figures shown in this chapter 
place the two case studies, six key informant studies, and two comparator UK SME 
firms between axes. The positioning of the firms in all quadrants is approximate, 
derived only from a qualitative interpretation and the present analysis. Companies 
who wished to use these as guides would consider their own cases and position 
themselves in the quadrants according to their company’s situation with regard to the 
variables. For this reason, users should read these as illustrative of possible usage 






Companies who prioritize China markets will likely be able to reduce supply risk by 
sourcing in China, ideally as close to their markets as possible. However, the very 
lowest risk belongs to those companies who are not prioritising China’s markets but 
taking full advantage of China simply as a supplier and using capable suppliers that 
are logistically rational choices, i.e. close to ports and major conurbations. Such 
companies can operate in China without shouldering the long-term investment of 
supplier development and the many sundry costs of gaining proximity to government 
– activities that are risk-fraught and expensive.  
 
In the case of the MNEs studied in this research, FEM, CT, and AFC have made 
extensive, decades-long investments in Chinese government-backed suppliers. 
Their China experience has so far been generally positive, perhaps for these 
reasons but perhaps also because they occupy a position of favourable imbalance. 
All three companies possess technical and operational proficiencies not yet equalled 
by Chinese companies. And in the case of FEM and CT, the Chinese government is 
critically reliant on their products and services for the completion of very large scale 
infrastructure projects. Hence, the nature of a company’s products or services – in 
VERY LOW RISK  








Proximity between Supply Base and China Market 






Figure 33 Risk in Relation to China Market Importance and Proximity of Supply 
260 
 
terms of their non-substitutability, for this appears to influence the power dynamics 
between the MNE and its China partners – must also be considered when estimating 
risk in China supply.    
 
9.1.5.2 Technology and Supplier Availability 
In addition to the quality- and logistics-related supply risks reported by SMEs and 
MNEs alike, MNEs sourcing high technology product in China must contend with 
another risk: the availability of Chinese suppliers. Technology level and potential 
supply base have an inverse relationship: as the level of technology rises, the supply 
base narrows. This narrowing creates a form of “bottleneck” (Kraljic, 1983) for certain 
categories of product. The MNEs lose the favourable power asymmetry – the 
“association benefits” decline, and the supply market is less competitive, creating a 
supply risk, that is to say a price/availability risk, not a supply risk in the quality and 
logistics sense. 
Companies sourcing high technology that have limited non-China sourcing 
alternatives are likely to face this problem. The response of SCMG (the Chinese 
state-owned MNE) is acquisition of suppliers of bottleneck product, wherever they 
might be located. Both CT and FEM practice a similar acquisition strategy, but with 
higher levels of selectivity (they also have many non-China sourcing options, and 
use them). Figure 34 (following) indicates the risk significance of technology level 
and availability of supply. Companies who wished to use such a matrix most 
effectively would consider technology level and supplier availability in terms of 
individual products, so would populate this with specific products or categories of 
product.    
 
According to two MNE respondents, protection of intellectual property is a concern 
for MNEs sourcing strategically critical products in China. Both CT and FEM reduce 
their risk of IP loss by outsourcing the manufacture of sensitive proprietary 





9.1.5.3 The Firm’s Relationship with Government 
The most important risk-reducing relationships for global MNEs are not with 
suppliers. Supplier relationships can impact on the supply risk of specific products, 
but the relationship with the Chinese government impacts on supply- and market-
related risk generally. The performance of China-side suppliers improves roughly in 
proportion to the quality of the relationship between the buyer (MNE) and the 
government. China sales and contract awarding also appear influenced by the 
relationship between the MNE and government (FEM’s and CT’s biggest contracts 
come from local governments).  
Chinese state-ownership of suppliers and manufacturing companies is high. 
State involvement in all large Chinese companies, regardless of ownership, is 
widespread. Therefore, the better an MNE’s relationships with government (usually 
local government), the greater the likelihood of its suppliers meeting quality and 
reliability expectations.  
 
SMEs using small suppliers and not targeting a Chinese market as a core strategic 
concern are less vulnerable to state involvement (no SME cases reported such 
















Figure 34 Risk in Relation to Level of Technology and Availability of China Supply 
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issues). If a significant proportion of an MNE’s China-side suppliers are state-owned 
or their management is state-involved, the benefits of effective interaction with 
relevant officials are likely to be significant. MNEs that are necessary to the Chinese 
government acquire advantages rarely available to MNEs who are seeking China 
market access or low cost supply with which to serve foreign markets. Necessary 
MNEs are those participating in politically-motivated, government-commissioned 
projects, particularly projects that are infrastructure related. Such MNEs obtain the 
protective coverage of the government, so are less exposed to supply risk than 
MNEs who are less integrated in state-backed activity. The Chinese government 
appear to favour foreign MNEs that operate joint-ventures with Chinese companies 
and have an enduring presence in China. All four MNE cases support this point. All 
four operate major joint-ventures, report strong growth in their China business, and 
have few stories of recent supply failure. 
 
9.1.6 Relationship Quality and Formality  
The four UK SME cases and the two industry cases described by the comparator 
firm key informants (UKCeram and 360C) revealed that trust building and 
relationships are powerful methods of risk reduction. In all six SME cases, UK 
managers acknowledged the importance of relationship formation and continuation. 
The relationship of greatest influence is between the UK manager and Chinese 
supplier manager. In most cases, the UK manager acts through a bicultural, bilingual 
proxy, i.e. an employee or a China-side business associate. This proxy performs 
various intermediary roles, interfacing between buyer and supplier, communicating 
on behalf of both parties, making in-person visits, and firefighting when incidents 
occur and problems arise. In the one exceptional case (OEM), the UK manager – a 
seasoned China hand and outright owner of his factory – visits China frequently and 
can mobilize a network of China-based industry experts of his personal acquaintance 
to resolve any issues when he cannot be himself physically present. Despite the 
apparently informal and ad hoc nature of their association with OEM, the existence 
and utility of this China network make its members OEM’s “key China people”. 
In the case of the global MNEs, the breadth and complexity of China-side 
operations are such that no individual or group of people could perform the role of 
intermediary with equivalent efficiency. The scale of the UK SME s’ China-side 
operations is far narrower and thereby manageable by an individual or small number 
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of people. In terms of scale, the global MNEs and the UK SMEs are incomparable 
entities. (For this reason, sociographs of the kind created to describe the UK SMEs 
could not be created for the global MNEs.) Global MNEs use a regional or national 
office to perform the risk-reducing functions that SMEs perform through their key 
China person/people. It is rational to assume however that, like the managers of 
SMEs, managers of MNEs understand the risk-reducing value of building 
relationships with Chinese suppliers.  
 
The relationship between the MNE and the Chinese supplier has a higher level of 
formality than the SME-to-supplier relationship. Formality in the case of MNEs is 
encoded in the application of supplier agreements and/or supplier concept policies 
(such as SFM’s “S-Way”). These take the form of detailed, globally applied, highly 
articulated, prescriptive contracts with which suppliers, regardless of country of 
operation, must formally comply. Most of these supplier agreements are 
standardised so differ little from country to country.  
 
Formality in the case of SMEs is usually restricted to compliance – typically 
compliance with ISO standards and industry-specific certifications. For SMEs 
however, evidence of a supplier’s compliance rarely has a direct bearing on 
sustained supply risk minimisation. Compliance is reliably indicative only of 
manufacturing capability level and adherence to operational standards. The second 
formal method is use of contracts. Although most SMEs will have some form of 
contract with their Chinese suppliers, contracts are seldom enforceable and usually 
ineffectual as methods of reducing risk when dealing with businesses inside China. 
 
SMEs reduce their China supply risk principally through informal methods in 
conjunction with tangible gestures (such as know-how transfers and high volume 
orders). Such methods constitute superior methods of reducing quality and logistical 
risk. Informal methods and tangible gestures increase mutualism, which has a risk-
reducing effect. In the context of this research, “informal methods” describes 
relationships and relational methods of risk management. The main informal method 
of risk reduction is the creation and maintenance of interpersonal relationships 
between managers (usually via the intermediating activities of the key China person). 
Relationships are built primarily through interaction, particularly in-person 
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communication. The risk-reducing efficacy of informal methods persists as long as 
the relationship remains positive for both parties.  
 
At outset, the relationship maybe transactional, i.e. arm’s-length, which is suboptimal 
for risk reduction. If the buyer finds value in the supplier’s goods, mutualism may 
then develop. If mutualism yields satisfactory results for both parties, further 
integration into partnership may then occur. All forms of risk are likely to decline in 
proportion to degree of interaction. In all cases, the managers of UK buyers and 
Chinese suppliers interact extensively, ideally directly, but often through an 
intermediary/proxy (although this is usually an inferior approach – direct one-to-one 
interaction is preferable). The SME interviewees reported that interaction occurs both 
inside and outside the working environment. This interaction continues until sufficient 
trust has been generated, whereupon supply performance improves/risk declines.  
 
SMEs that rely on consultants remain essentially at arm’s-length from their suppliers, 
although some degree of mutualism may be achievable. By dint of their geography, 
contacts, and familiarity with Chinese business practice and causes of supply failure, 
third-party intermediaries (i.e. consultants) are better able to resolve issues than a 
hands-off, transaction-oriented manager based in the UK. For companies seeking a 
long-term, strategic China-side supply base however, the consultant option is likely 
inferior to a direct relationship. The supreme option is a direct buyer-supplier 
relationship – comprising both formal and informal methods – between parties who 
share a common long-term, mutualist, strategic vision. 
 
Even in cases where collaboration and mutualism are minimal, risk can still be 
reduced by frequent communication and maximising visibility. 
 
SMEs are more reliant on informal methods than MNEs, who are more formal. This 
situation is likely unavoidable. The number of suppliers used by global MNEs is too 
high for interpersonal relationships between managers to be standard practice. 
However, the managers of suppliers can have a communicative relationship with the 
MNE’s local representatives. Although this is a proxy relationship, we can assume 
(interviewees lacked knowledge on this aspect of their company’s activities) that the 
quality of this relationship will influence supplier performance and, thus, supply risk. 
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However, it is unlikely that MNEs and SMEs rely to an equal degree on relationships 
to reduce supply risk. For SMEs, relationships are more influential reducers of supply 
risk. This maybe because SMEs cannot offer the enticements of MNEs, managers of 
SMEs are more accessible, and SMEs have lower complexity in their supply 
requirements. 
 
To suppliers, the enticements of MNEs include large orders, prestige, co-investment 
opportunities, acquisition possibilities, and absorption of technology and know-how 
from the world’s best companies. Such enticements likely function as performance 
motivators and thus as forces of risk reduction. Also, for many categories of product, 
the China supply market is highly competitive, which compels suppliers to perform 
competitively.  
 
SMEs and MNEs combine formal and informal methods to reduce risk in their China-
side supply bases. I use the term “functional” to describe the very high risk, zero-
interaction approach of some UK SMEs that was reported by some SME and non-





Single orders, buying on price Arms-length, cost pressure, adversarial  
Non-strategic/commodity outsourcing 
Introductions to resource providers, 
favoured customer status, guanxi, trust-
building through interaction distance 
Supply 
Risk 







Trust, interpersonal factors 
Collaboration, visibility, information & 
knowhow sharing, Ms & As, JVs 





KPIs, SLAs, contracts, risk sharing Formal 
Legal, statutory  
“Win-win”, communicative, interactive Integrated – formally and informally 
Figure 35 Supply Risk, Relationship Quality, and Formality 
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For SMEs, supply risk declines in rough proportion to the quality of the relationship 
between buyer and supplier (whether direct or by proxy). For MNEs, supply related 
risk is less relationship-dependent, but appears to be strongly connected to the 
strategic importance of the Chinese market and the proximity of the supply base to 
the China market, and to the level of technology being supplied and the availability of 
suitable suppliers inside China. 
 
9.1.7 Buyer Status and Supplier Perspective 
It may be useful for foreign companies sourcing in China to consider their status from 
the perspective of their suppliers. On the premise that relationships influence risk, 
buyers seeking low risk should attempt to build relationships with suppliers. The 
perception and business attractiveness of a foreign partner or buyer will likely 
influence the quality of the relationship the two parties share, and therefore, the risk 
borne by the buyer. Based on Booth (2010), Figure 36 (following) describes four 
categories of buyer as seen from the supplier’s position. The ideal category is Most 
Favoured Buyer (MFB). The MFB has earned the supplier’s loyalty and commitment. 
A high degree of mutualism characterises the relationship, so the buyer can consider 
supply risk as low. In risk terms, the most undesirable category is that of Least 
Favoured Buyer (LFB). Because the LFB is short-term focused and places orders of 
low volume, it is perceived by the supplier as having least value. The relationship 
between the supplier and the LFB is characterised by low trust and low mutualism. 
Buyer status and supply risk have an inverse relationship: the higher the buyer’s 
status, the lower the supply risk that the buyer faces. All the MNE cases examined 
appear to have MFB status; the second highest status (“Stabiliser”) describes the 
larger SMEs who place higher volume orders than the smaller SMEs and are 
strongly integrated with a small number of Chinese suppliers via joint-ventures and 
robust relationships. “Limited contributor” status describes the third ranking status. 
The smaller SMEs belong to this category. They place regular but low volume orders 
so are not especially significant customers to their main suppliers.     
 
Figure 36 (following) depicts a matrix in which all the firms examined in this research 






9.2 Theoretical Output 2. Risk and China Presence: The Interfirm 
Relationship 
In the Chinese supplier-foreign buyer scenario, degree of presence in China is 
heavily determinative of interfirm relationship quality: the quality of the interaction of 
key individuals influences the interactional performance of their respective firms, with 
strong implications for risk.  
 
9.2.1 Adapted Bowtie and Diamond Models of Interfirm Relationships 
According to Cooper et al (1997, citing Walton as the original proponent), most 
interfirm relationships can be described using one of two models: classic bowtie (1) 
or classic diamond (2). Of the two, the classic bowtie model is more descriptive of 
the traditional supplier-buyer relationship. The bowtie-versus-diamond model is 
restrictively dichotomous. It reflects little of relevance to the Chinese supplier-foreign 
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R-Hua (JV), OEM (owned) 
P-S (third parties) 
R-UK (third parties) 
D2C (third parties) 
Figure 36 Buyer Status: The Supplier Perspective 
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For this reason, I propose several variants (3 to 8) that are more reflective of the 
case studies and key informant findings. We begin by discussing the original two 
models, before progressing to a discussion of the models developed out of this 
research. 
 
9.2.1.1 Classic Bowtie  
In the bowtie model, the two wings represent 
the two companies. They converge in 
minimalist manner, typically through buyer 
and salesperson. Both sides communicate 
through this single dyad. The relationship 
between the two firms is precariously 
concentrated in a very small number of 
individuals. Communication between the 
various functions of the firms is mediated 
through the interfacing individuals. This bowtie configuration describes arm’s-length 
and transactional relationships. Opportunity for mutually beneficial development is 
limited by the dyadic, point-to-point nature of the interaction. 
 
9.2.1.2 Classic Diamond  
A superior situation is represented in the 
opposite of the classic bowtie, i.e. the classic 
diamond, in which the wings are reversed and 
juxtaposed flush together in perfect vertical 
alignment. In this configuration, the functions of 
both sides are accessible to each other. 
Processes thus become visible, communication 
is direct (not mediated), and increased 
integration and mutualism are inevitable.  
 
9.2.1.3 Remote Bowtie 
The “remote bowtie” (3) describes the near- zero interaction that characterises 
procurement through online platforms. This is the most risk-fraught supply option a 
buyer can take. The buyer is unknown to the supplier and the supplier is unknown to 
Figure 37 The Classic Bowtie 
Model of the Interfirm Relationship 
Figure 38 The Classic Diamond 
Model of the Interfirm Relationship 
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the buyer. In some cases, supplier 
information is obtainable, but 
verification will be challenging. The 
remote bowtie is digitally enabled so 
there is little information besides the 
existence of e-procurement portals 
such as Ali Baba (whose popularity 
suggests e-procurement is fairly 
commonplace). E-procurement as a 
long-term supply strategy is probably a reckless option. Risk-reducing relationships 
have very limited possibility of developing. The interaction is digitally mediated so 
even less mutualist than the classic point-to-point bowtie. Three key informant 
sources reported instances of UK SMEs using e-procurement platforms to acquire 
product from Chinese suppliers; all three expressed the opinion that procuring goods 
from unknown suppliers is risky practice. Both UKCeram and 360C reported first 
hand experiences of failed attempts to source product from Chinese suppliers via 
websites.  
 
9.2.1.4 Overlapping Bowtie 
The overlapping bowtie (4) describes the 
supplier-buyer relationships in which 
interaction and communication between 
parties occurs and is accompanied by some 
degree of mutuality and trust. The parties 
retain a degree of separation but benefit from 
the limited mutualism. This relationship can 
be observed in the third-party supplier 
relationships of   D2C, P-S, R-UK, and all the 
foreign SMEs. These companies practice trust-building and mutualism with all their 
third-party suppliers – via their key China person/people (in the case of SMEs) and 
via their national HQ-based supplier account managers (in the case of MNEs). 
 
Figure 40 The Overlapping Bowtie 
Model of the Interfirm Relationship 
Figure 39 The Remote Bowtie Model 
of the Interfirm Relationship 
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9.2.1.5 Fused Bowtie 
The fused bowtie (5) represents the optimum 
risk-reducing relationship short of a full 
merger or acquisition. In this case, the 
supplier and buyer are collaborating, sharing 
knowhow and technology, co-investing, and 
are strategically interdependent. However, 
they retain partial separation – the buyer, for 
example, does not subsume the supplier; 
both parties retain their own organisational identity; not all functions benefit from or 
require communication with their equivalents in the partner entity (as the diamond 
implies), hence the non-overlapping areas shown in the model. The maximally fused 
bowtie describes joint-venture entities and buyer-supplier relationships in which one 
party is deeply involved to the degree of dedication to the other. Buyers seeking 
long-term, strategic supply options will reduce supply base risk by applying this 
degree of fusion. Likewise, suppliers seeking long-term, dependable orders and the 
contribution of a foreign buyer will find value in this configuration. It is reasonable to 
assume that this state could evolve gradually from the overlapping bowtie, as a 
result of proven mutually beneficial experiences and continuing strategic 
compatibility.    
 
9.2.1.6 Consultant Bowtie 
The consultant bowtie (6), although 
preferable to the classic bowtie, depicts 
the supplier and buyer-linking consultant. 
Communication between the two entities 
occurs through the paid intermediary, 
which could be a China solutions 
provider such as Cargo East Asia or a 
China-specialising consultant such as 
Anderson (both were key informant 
sources interviewed in this research). For SMEs wishing to avoid the lengthy and 
costly process of developing risk-reducing relationships with a Chinese supplier and 
looking instead to simply secure low cost supplies in an arm’s-length fashion, use of 
Figure 41 The Fused Bowtie Model 
of the Interfirm Relationship 
Figure 42 The Consultant Bowtie Model 
of the Interfirm Relationship 
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an intermediating, introducing, problem-solving consultant is probably prudent. For 
SMEs seeking strategic China-side supply, dependence on an intermediary is less 
desirable. Supply strategy must incorporate the cost and complexity of dealing with 
the consultant. Resources might however be more profitably used in the nurturing of 
appropriate risk-reducing relationship with a supplier directly.  
 
For MNEs, the value of intermediating consultants is likely low. If trade is sustained 
into the long-term, the intermediary is likely to become irremovable. The presence of 
the intermediary perpetuates a fixed distance between buyer and supplier. The buyer 
use the intermediary for its capabilities, but dependence on the intermediary could 
become a new risk for the buyer. Buyer and supplier rarely communicate, which 
creates the opportunity for the intermediary to make itself indispensable. The 
intermediary may lack the in-depth industry knowledge required for effective 
communication. As the nature of the product increases in specificity, the pool of 
qualified consultants diminishes. Companies seeking suppliers of highly specialised 
product would be better served by use of an in-house “key China person”, who would 
understand the industry, be personally invested in the buyer’s firm, and whose 
relationship-building efforts will reward the buyer’s firm directly. In the consultant 
bowtie, an individual or small group of individuals relays communication from all 
sections of their respective companies. Unlike the classic point-to-point bowtie, 
which is direct though bottlenecking, interaction in the consultant bowtie model is 
mediated so is indirect. Both sides interact through the intermediary. This 
arrangement puts critical communications in the hands of a third-party who can 
either distort or refine the message to positive or negative effect, depending on their 
expertise and professionalism. This arrangement potentially adds an additional layer 
of risk.  
 
9.2.1.7 Consultant Diamond 
The consultant diamond (7) is a variant on the 
consultant bowtie, but lacks empirical support in 
this research so is entirely hypothetical. In the 
consultant diamond, two companies attempt the 
full alignment represented in the classic 
Figure 43 The Consultant Diamond 
Model of the Interfirm Relationship 
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diamond, but due to proximity issues (geographical and cultural factors), lack the 
requisite modulation and cross-communication capability, so use the services of a 
consultant or China solutions provider.  
 
Thus, this model requires high levels of involvement from a third-party intermediary. 
In this model, communication is not point-to-point as in the consultant bowtie; 
communication is from any individual/function in one firm to any individual/function in 
the other, which necessitates a far greater range and intensity of activity on the part 
of the intermediary. This arrangement amplifies the shortcomings of the consultant 
bowtie, but might also enable risk-reducing mutualism between culturally disparate 
companies with insufficient numbers of key China people.   
 
9.2.1.8 MNE Hexagonal Diamond 
The MNE hexagonal diamond (8) 
describes the MNE approach to China 
sourcing. The right side wing (grey) 
represents the global MNE entity. The 
central vertical block (striped) represents 
the regionally deputised entity, i.e. the 
national headquarters in China (or indeed 
any other country). To the left of this 
block is the Chinese supply base. Joint-
ventures and wholly-owned factories 
(WOFE: wholly-owned foreign enterprises) are strongly aligned with the MNE via the 
national HQ. For this reason, the bases of the triangles representing joint-ventures 
and wholly-owned factories are flush with the China-facing edge of the MNE’s 
national HQ.  
 
Third-party suppliers make up the remainder of the MNE’s China-side supply base, 
but their degree of integration with the MNE, via the national HQ, is limited. For this 
reason, the MNE national HQ and the third-party supply base share a relatively small 
area of interface. The MNE’s connectivity with its wholly-owned factories and joint-















Figure 44 The MNE Hexagonal Diamond 
Model of the Interfirm Relationship 
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party supply base, although significant, is less integrated into the MNE and vice 
versa. By the nature of their ownership, wholly-owned factories and joint-ventures 
with Chinese companies are far more closely aligned with the MNE and under 
greater direct control. The national HQ functions as the nation-specific face and 
presence of the MNE. The MNE interacts with each of its national markets and 
supply bases by deputising its activities. By using a national headquarters that 
manages the national supply base and market activity, the national HQ performs, 
albeit at far larger scale, activities that are roughly the same as the activities 
performed by the key China person in the case of the SMEs.  
 
The hexagonal diamond is conceptually close to the classic diamond: both sides are 
maximally integrated. However, unlike the classic diamond, the hexagonal diamond 
does not imply that the functions of one entity interact directly with the functions of 
another. The MNE is too large and too complex an entity to standardise the practice 
of departments communicating directly with thousands of suppliers. Instead, the 
MNE deputises communication to the national HQ inside the country in which the 
supplier is operating. The hexagonal diamond attempts to show how an MNE – 
through its national HQ – exercises a high level of local control and local 
responsiveness. By deputising its presence to permanently present, local people 
familiar with the local ways of business and national/regional macro-economic 
conditions, the MNE navigates cultural and political conditions that would impede a 
remotely operating organisation. 
The MNE shares the highest degree of visibility with those organisations in 
which it is most deeply invested. Alignment between the MNE and its joint-ventures 
and wholly-owned factories is thus higher than with its third-party suppliers.  
 
9.2.2 The Adapted Bowtie and Diamond Models Summarised 
The remote bowtie (3) is the riskiest China sourcing approach. No relationship exists 
between supplier and buyer, so risk is highest. The overlapping bowtie (4) and the 
maximally fused bowtie (5) describe the better, lower risk approaches of SMEs to 
China sourcing. Some SMEs are more integrated with their Chinese suppliers than 
others. With degree of integration comes a lowering of supply risk. The consultant 
bowtie (6) describes the buyer-supplier relationship when both sides interact through 
a consultant or other intermediary. The consultant diamond (7) is a hypothetical 
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attempt to achieve the integration of the classic diamond through the intensive use of 
a consultant or another intermediary. The hexagonal diamond (8), describes the 
nationally-deputised approach of MNEs to China sourcing.  
 
All the sources interviewed concurred that risk decrease in proportion to the degree 
of buyer’s China presence, since buyer’s presence and relationship quality correlate 
closely. In all SME cases, China presence was a significant factor in relationship 
quality. In-person interaction and direct involvement, especially in problem solving, 
has a positive effect on relationship quality. The lower the buyer’s China presence, 
the fewer the opportunities for trust-building interaction between managers.  
 
Several respondents (UKCeram and various SME instances reported by consultants) 
observed that China market performance is also influenced by China presence. In-
person interaction with customers is interpreted as a gesture of commitment, which 
can help maintain current trade and lead to new business.  
 
Figure 45 describes the relationship between China presence/ relationship quality 
















Figure 45 Risk and China Presence 
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9.3. Practitioner Output 1. The Four-Step China Supplier 
Establishment Tool 
The first two steps of this tool (Alignment 1 and Alignment 2) derive from 
experiences reported by all four SME respondents, and from the recommendations 
of industry and academic respondents. The other steps (Encounter and Operate) are 
also based on the experiences of SME practitioners, but were derived mostly from 
consultant informant input. The tool (depicted below in Figure 46) describes a 
systematic, incremental approach that SMEs might take to acquiring and operating a 




9.3.1 Alignment 1 
Prior to seeking a new Chinese supplier or commencing trade with an already 
identified Chinese supplier, the buying organisation evaluates its degree of internal 
integration. This process consists of the following tasks (ideally sequentially 
performed):  
1. Internal Strength Assessment. An assessment of internal knowledge 
regarding product, market, and industry.  
2. Supply Strategy Statement. The buying organisation reflects on the premises 
of its envisaged China supply strategy: price competitiveness alone; price 
competitiveness in conjunction with China market exploration/penetration; or 
an entirely different strategy. A clear vision of China supply strategy is 
articulated in a statement. 
3. Fitness. The China supply strategy statement is then assessed for fitness with 
the organisation’s overall long-term strategy. The consensus among 
management regarding China supply and its relationship with/criticality to 
long-term strategy is considered. If the degree of fitness is high, i.e. China 
1. Internal Strength Assessment 
2. Supply Strategy Assessment 
3. Fitness 
4. Supply Lessons Learnt 
5. Resources Projections 
6. Advantage Projections 
7. China Business Proficiency 
8. Economic Analysis 
Alignment 1 
1. S(C)M Literacy & Proficiency 






2. Relationship Formation 
3. Integration 
 
Alignment 2 Encounter Integration 
Figure 46 The Four-Step China Supplier Establishment Tool 
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supply serves the organisation’s long-term interests, then management 
proceed to phase 4. 
4. Supply Lessons Learnt. Management reflect on their experiences with 
previous and existing China-side and non-China suppliers: the quality of the 
relationships, the risks, the proven effective methods of risk reduction, the 
degree of interaction, the nature of the most common supply-related problems, 
and all other issues related to supply policy and practice. In short, 
management create an account of lessons learnt concerning relationships 
and risk in the context of non-China supply management.  
5. Resource Projections. The resources required to operate China-side suppliers 
are considered. These will include human resources, plant, and technology 
requirements. This task is similar to a make-or-outsource decision, but will 
incorporate all known China-specific factors and costs.  
6. Advantage Projections. The projected advantages (ideally as quantified as is 
possible) of China supply are carefully weighed against the 
costs/disadvantages of China supply. Information from consultants or industry 
contacts already sourcing in China should be utilised to create as complete an 
information picture as possible. 
7. China Business Proficiency. The organisation then considers how much in-
house knowledge it possesses regarding China business dealings in general. 
This will include an assessment of the presence or absence of relevant 
capabilities within current staff. Steps to address any deficits must be 
considered at this point. 
8. Economic Analysis. A structured analysis of China-specific macro and 
microeconomic influences is undertaken, ideally with information and insight 
provided by impartial outside sources. 
 
9.3.2 Alignment 2 
If all eight tasks of the preceding step yield outcomes that support the prospect of 
China-side supply, the second step can begin. In Alignment 2, the buying 
organisation critically reflects on its general supply chain/supply management 
capabilities: 
1. Supply (Chain) Management Literacy and Proficiency. Considered first is the 
degree of practice and comprehension of established, generic (i.e. non-China 
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specific) methods and philosophies of supply risk management. Examples of 
methods include decoupling, postponement, and mass customisation. 
Examples of philosophies include mutualism, integration, the Four Rs, and 
visibility. 
2. Supply (Chain) Practice Applicability. Next, management reflect on the 
potential application of theoretical and/or practically advantageous, proven 
good supply (chain) management tools and techniques to the envisaged 
Chinese supply scenario. 
 
After completing Alignment 1 and 2, management will have acquired a structured, 
informed report on the organisation’s internal alignment, and thus have achieved an 
understanding of its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the prospect of China 
supply. Assuming management have sufficient confidence to proceed, they can then 




In the third step, management explore the Chinese supply market, identify potentially 
capable suppliers, and then verify the authenticity and capability of the suppliers they 
have selected. 
1. Exploration. SMEs lacking China-side presence or industry contacts can use 
consultants or China solutions providers to help them identify capable 
suppliers. SMEs possessing China-side presence or industry contacts should 
use those organisations or individuals to introduce them to proven-good, 
reliable, authentic, capable Chinese suppliers. The use of a mutually known 
and respected intermediary often accelerates the trust-building process that is 
essential to the risk-impactful relationship between buyer and Chinese 
supplier. When exploring the Chinese supply market, use of contacts and 
networks often saves time and cost. 
2. Identification. Potential suppliers are shortlisted. SMEs can use industry 
certifications, ISO compliance, and any other standards they deem indicative 
of a supplier’s capability to eliminate. Site inspections, sample testing, 
referrals, and any other methods of gauging quality of product and process 
should be performed. 
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3. Verification. If the outcome of the preceding stage is satisfactory to the buyer, 
due diligence and as many forms of background check on the supplier’s 
trading history and credentials as possible should be undertaken. For this 




In the final step, the buyer commences trade with the supplier, wherever possible 
applying proven-good risk reduction practices in combination with advice and 
recommendations by consultants and industry contacts with China supply 
experience. 
1. Trial. Orders should begin small. Order volume can increase pending buyer 
satisfaction with both product and delivery. 
2. Relationship Formation. Concurrent with conditional incremental order growth, 
managers try to establish trust-generating relationships with supplier 
managers. Practitioners concur that relationship strength has a positive effect 
on risk reduction, and that relationship strength increases roughly in 
proportion to time spent in China. While orders are ongoing, foreign managers 
should visit China regularly and reciprocate hospitality. 
3. Integration. When a trust relationship is developing and general satisfaction 
characterises the exchange, tangible gestures of mutualism can grow more 
frequent, leading to increasing integration. Trust relationship-generated, 
tangible integration between supplier and buyer lowers supply risk better than 
formal methods such as contracts or performance agreements. Although the 
buying organisation may insist on the supplier signing contracts, formal 
methods should be considered weak forms of risk reduction and 
unenforceable. Therefore, a relational, mutualist approach is preferable. 
 
9.4 Practitioner Output 2. China Supply Risk Assessment Tools 
This tool is designed to help managers measure their China supply risk. The tool 
contains 25 questions that reflect the most recurrent risk-reducing recommendations 
and practices provided by the participants in this research. The 25 questions can be 
grouped into five categories of risk-influencing activities: 
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China supply risk varies for SMEs and MNEs. For this reason, there are two tools: an 
SME tool and an MNE tool. The tool is usable by companies operating Chinese 
supply and wishing to ascertain indication of risk. The tool can be made usable to 
companies not yet operating China supply by grammatical modification of the 
questions (e.g. “Will we” instead of “Do we”).  
 
Questions 1 to 4 on the MNE tool (1 to 7 on the SME tool) describe practical risk-
reducing procedures. These recommendations have nearly universal applicability. 
Their implementation addresses practical causes of risk, such as customs and basic 
logistical issues, which affect all companies moving goods into, around, and out of 
China. 
 
In theoretical terms, questions 8 to 25 on the MNE tool (11 to 25 on the SME tool) 
are much richer. Questions 5 to 7 on the MNE tool (8 to 10 on the SME tool) reflect 
the consensus of the respondents regarding the low efficacy of legal measures as a 
method of reducing supply related risk. Questions 8 to 16 on the MNE tool (11 to 16 
on the SME tool) stress the criticality of China-relevant internal capability and 
strategic alignment. Questions 17 to 20 (both tools) reflect the importance of the 
buyer having an integrated, mutualist, China-supportive supply strategy. Questions 
21 to 25 (both tools) assess degree of China presence, because all the respondents 
interviewed reported China presence as fundamental to a company’s ability to create 
and maintain relationships with Chinese suppliers. 
 
After reading each question, respondents answer by ticking a “Yes” or “No” box. 
Next to each response box is a numerical value in superscript. This numerical value 
represents a risk weighting. Not all risks are equally impactful, so the higher risks are 
assigned a higher value. After answering all 25 questions, the respondent totals the 
numerical values of his/her responses. The total gives a risk score: “low risk” 
(total=0-28); “moderate risk” (total=29-57); “high risk” (total=58-85). Both risk 
assessment tools require refinement. They are presented here only as prototype 





9.4.1 Global MNE Risk Assessment Tool 
 
Maximum score=85 (5*5+20*3); 85/3=28.3:   
0-28= low risk; 29-57=moderate risk; 58-85=high risk 
 
Global MNE China Risk Assessment Tool 
Yes No 
Q1. Do we use 3PLs to move goods from China to our customers?  0  3 
Q2. Do we check product quality before shipping to customers?  0  3 
Q3. Do we test samples of product before we place high volume orders?  0  3 
Q4. 
When using a new supplier or ordering a new product, do we place low volume orders 
initially and gradually increase order volume if we are satisfied with quality? 
 0  3 
Q5. Do we rely on local Chinese law to manage our suppliers?  3  0 
Q6. Do we employ many people in China?  3  0 
Q7. Do we own land in China or want to?  3  0 
Q8. Are we involved in large-scale joint-ventures with state-owned companies?  0  3 
Q9. 
Do our capabilities make us valuable to the Chinese government (local or central) or to 
major Chinese companies? 
 0  5 
Q10. Do we have formal quality control processes?  0  5 
Q11. Do we have a trusting relationship with the Chinese government or local officials?  0  3 
Q12. Is our business an important part of the local economy?  0  3 
Q13. Do we provide our suppliers with as much visibility as they require?  0  3 
Q14. Do we have stringent, formal conditions of supplier partnership?    0  3 
Q15. Are we making any IP sensitive products in China?   3  0 
Q16. 
Do we (or a third-party company) perform due diligence and/or run background checks 
on prospective suppliers? 
 0  3 
Q17. Do we outsource most of our production to third-parties?  3  0 
Q18. Do we rely on contracts alone to manage our suppliers?   3  0 
Q19. 
Do we use guanxi/contacts to help us manage our suppliers and run other operations in 
China? 
 3  3 
Q20. Is our overall approach to managing our suppliers mutualist and/or collaborative?  0  5 
Q21. 
Do we have a representative or manager permanently based in China and accessible to 
our Chinese suppliers and/or customers? 
 0  5 
Q22. Do we have Chinese-speaking staff on hand to communicate with our suppliers?  0  5 
Q23. Do we have regular communication with our suppliers?   0  3 
Q24 Do we meet our Chinese suppliers in-person at least three times a year?  0  3 
Q25 Do we have a trusting relationship with our suppliers?  0  3 
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9.4.2 SME Risk Assessment Tool 
 
Maximum score=85 (5*5+20*3); 85/3=28.3:   
0-28= low risk; 29-57=moderate risk; 58-85=high risk 
 
The next chapter closes this thesis. Research questions, outputs/contributions, MNE 
and SME risk strategies, and potential extensions of this research are presented.   
SME China risk Assessment Tool 
Yes No 
Q1. 
Do we use the services of a China specialist consultant or a China solutions provider like Li 
and Fung?? 
 0  3 
Q2. Do we use 3PLs to move goods from China to our customers?  0  3 
Q3. Do we use the services a customs clearance broker?  0  3 
Q4. Do we use letters of credit or escrow accounts?  0  3 
Q5. Do we check product quality before shipping to customers?  0  3 
Q6. Do we test samples of product before we place high volume orders?  0  3 
Q7. 
When using a new supplier or ordering a new product, do we place low volume orders 
initially and gradually increase order volume if we are satisfied with quality? 
 0  3 
Q8. Do we rely on local Chinese law to manage our suppliers?  3  0 
Q9. Do we employ people in China?  3  0 
Q10. Do we own land in China or want to?  3  0 
Q11. Have we talked to other people in our business about China sourcing?   0  3 
Q12. Are the longer lead times acceptable to our company and our customers?  0  3 
Q13. Have we read at least one book on doing business with China?  0  3 
Q14. 
Have we researched/considered the costs of shipping from China and paying import duties 
and any other charges? 
 0  5 
Q15. Are we making any IP sensitive products in China?   3  0 
Q16. 
Do we (or a third-party company) perform due diligence and/or run background checks on 
prospective suppliers? 
 0  3 
Q17. Do we outsource most of our production to Chinese third-parties?  3  0 
Q18. Do we rely on contracts alone to manage our suppliers?   3  0 
Q19. Do we use guanxi/contacts to help us manage our suppliers?  0  3 
Q20 Is our overall approach to managing our suppliers mutualist and/or collaborative?  0  5 
Q21. 
Do we have a representative or manager permanently based in China and accessible to 
our Chinese suppliers and/or customers? 
 0  5 
Q22. Do we have Chinese-speaking staff on hand to communicate with our suppliers?  0  5 
Q23. Do we have regular communication with our suppliers?   0  5 
Q24. Do we meet our Chinese suppliers in-person at least three times a year?  0  3 







This final chapter discusses the research questions in light of the research 
undertaken, articulates the theoretical outputs further, highlights the risk-significance 
of strategy to MNEs and of social capital to SMEs, and concludes by presenting 
directions for future research. 
 
10.1 The Research Questions Answered 
This research set out to answer two research questions. They have been answered 
as follows. 
 
1. In the context of China supply chain management and its associated risks, what is 
the nature of the relationship between supplier and buyer? 
 
i. The stronger the relationship between buyer and supplier, the less risk for the 
buyer. 
ii. The more integrated/strategically compliant the buyer and supplier, the 
stronger their relationship, the less risk for the buyer. 
iii. The greater the buyer’s China-side presence, the more opportunity for 
interaction relationship-building, the less risk for the buyer. 
(High trust and mutualism characterise strong relationships.) 
  
2. How do non-Chinese companies manage Chinese suppliers to minimize risk? 
 
i. [a] MNEs: China offices;  
[b] SMEs: key China people. 
Scale is the main difference; both methods are functionally equivalent: local 
people with local business and industry knowhow interact with managers and 
local officials in a locally appropriate manner. Communication is frequent.  
ii. Earning favoured buyer status through  
[a] placing significant orders;  
[b] trust relationships; and  
[c] collaborative interaction  
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([a] and [b] require in-China presence – see 1.iii).  
Ideally, 2.i also. 
iii. Integration/strategic alignment.  
(Requires 2.i and 2.ii also.)  
Co-investment and collaborative working reduce risk. This stage can likely not 
occur before a strong trust relationship has already been built. 
(The practitioner tools proposed in this research might also risk.) 
 
Combined, the case studies and key informant interviews provided thick description 
of Chinese supply management by MNEs and UK SMEs. In Chapter 8, practice and 
theory – as revealed by the case studies, key informant interviews, and the literature 
– were compared. In Chapter 9, the theoretical outputs synthesized and theorized 
the findings.  
 
10.2 Five Theoretical Outputs  
This research produced five theoretical outputs. The five derive from the variously 
interrelated, interacting factors observed to be affecting supply risk for MNEs and 
SMEs sourcing in China.  
 
 Theoretical Output #1: common methods of China supply risk management 
(see 9.1.4)  
 #1a: China supply risk factors unique to global MNEs – three pairs of 
variables identified (see 9.1.5)  
 #1b: risk and relationship quality/formality (see 9.1.6)  
 #1c: risk and buyer status/supplier perspective (see 9.1.7) 
 Theoretical Output #2: risk, China presence, and the interfirm relationship 
(see 9.2)  
 
Table 27 displays the correspondences extant in the aspects of the five theoretical 
outputs. Note that Theoretical Output #1a applies to MNEs only; Theoretical Outputs 




Table 27 The Five Theoretical Outputs of this Research and the Correspondence of 
Their Aspects 
 
10.3 Case Findings  
Based on the MNE cases, it appears that in the case of China, market proximity-
decreasing in-country mediation has created decentralisation, that outsourcing is 
intensive and strategic, and central steering is fairly limited. From our MNE case 
findings, it seems that SC risk is one of many forms of business risk likely reduced 
by organisational structuring. Thus, structural design as SC risk mechanism is likely 
a worthy topic of investigation. 
 
Rose and Sipling (1997) and Hains (2002) argued that firms are pursuing 
differentiation by improving their core services, so will increasingly prefer to 
outsource non-core activities. We saw this seemingly evidenced in both SME and 
MNE cases. By describing their companies as “integrators” of supplier-made product, 
two MNE respondents supported this assertion clearly. 
Also, as firms downsize and focus on their key competencies, the role and 
utility of consultants will increase (Caulkin, 1997). This research showed that 
consultants claim to act as a risk-reducing intermediary buffering the foreign buyer-
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(or are today in fact as necessary as the consultants reported) constitutes a question 
for future research. 
 
10.4 Social Capital 
Social capital theorists such as Baker (1990), Coleman (1998), and Burt (1992), and 
Putnam (2000) claim that social capital, like physical and human capital, is a 
resource generating force that can facilitate firms business activities. Furthermore, 
Yang and Wang (2011) and Wang et al (2014) claim guanxi is the Chinese cultural 
equivalent of social capital. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) identified three dimensions 
of social capital: structural, (information and resources) relational, (trust, 
relationships, and contracts), and cognitive (shared modes of behaviour that 
encourage cooperation). This research revealed some modest insight into the 
structural and relational dimensions of social capital, but only alluded to, so did not 
deeply explore, the cognitive dimension.  
 
This research exposed the importance of the “key China person” in reducing China 
supply risk for SMEs, but could not expand on the social capital significance of the 
key individuals, their specific activities, and the nature of their interaction with 
counterparts. Future studies would examine the issues of guanxi, trust, and face (all 
of which feature strongly in the literature on Chinese business) and relate these to 
SC risk management. If the findings of this study are indicative, social capital is likely 
of less value in China supply risk management by MNEs.  
 
10.5 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
This study bears the weaknesses and the strengths of its principle method, the 
qualitative case study. Since the primary source for each case study was an 
interviewee, the possibility of subjectivity bias is present. To address this, 
interviewee statements were compared with other sources, and exceptions noted. 
There were few exceptions – strong thematic convergence emerged during coding. 
Likewise, the straightforwardness of the creation of the meta-processes revealed 
strong overlaps both within and across the case studies and key informant material. 




The case studies may be too few in number to provide anything beyond limited 
generalisability, making the theoretical and practitioner outputs extensible only as 
suggestions for informing and sensitizing theory and practice respectively.  That is, 
the objective of this research was not to obtain robust generalisability, but to create a 
series of informationally rich, highly relevant accounts of effective risk management 
practices in the specific context of Chinese supply. 
 
The overwhelmingly positive experiences of the respondents suggest that the 
sample itself might be biased. It is possible that only respondents who were pleased 
with their China supply arrangements were willing to participate. This speculation is 
reinforced by the case of the manager at a famous Margate-based toy manufacturer, 
who first accepted and then refused to participate, his refusal coming after their 
much publicised decision to re-shore. 
 
The existence of two categories (SMEs and MNEs) also prompts comparison, which 
might not be useful. A future study might concentrate on SMEs or MNEs only. This 
study was purposefully designed to provide coverage rather than specificity. For this 
reason, companies of various sizes and various industries were contacted. Any 
commonalities revealed by the case studies are therefore likely not attributable to 
factors of industry or size. For researchers requiring studies of risk as it pertains to 
specific industries or sizes of companies, the findings of this research are likely of 
limited value. 
 
The significance of rising oil prices features strongly in post-2010 supply chain 
literature. In 2016, re-shoring and the declining competitiveness of Chinese 
manufacturing are strong currents. The China situation is always changing. Most of 
the practitioners interviewed in this research have been operating China supply for at 
least 10 years, and reported no significant changes in their practice, but stressed the 
rapidly improving quality and reliability of Chinese suppliers. Thus, the picture is 
positive. In 2015, oil prices fell to unexpected lows. Political events in 2016 have 
upset projections regarding the recovery of many of the world’s major economies, 
and Chinese manufacturing capability appears to have reached parity with that of 
most developed countries. However, the relational nature of Chinese business 
appears to persist. Several respondents reported that the importance of strong 
288 
 
relationships has not diminished. For SMEs particularly, the centrality of the key 
China person will remain critical. Future research could examine the prospect that in 
times of political and economic uncertainty, the necessity and advantages of ties to 
business will increase. In all the SME case studies, the key China person was 
ethnically Chinese. Similarly, the in-country employees of the consultants and China 
solutions companies are also Chinese. By contrast, the SCMG respondent claimed 
that only Chinese nationals were allowed to hold senior positions. Future studies 
might investigate the existence and effectiveness of non-ethnically Chinese key 
China people and intermediaries. 
  
Contradicting the literature and the views expressed by the SME and, to a lesser 
extent, the MNE respondents, some key informant respondents expressed 
skepticism about the benefits of China sourcing and integration. According to the 
consultant key informants, most risk in transactional procurement can be eliminated 
by use of third-party services, such as customs clearance brokers, quality assurance 
companies, third-party logistics firms, supplier-buyer matchmakers (e.g. Li and Fung), 
and by sharing production facilities with other companies. The consultants were in 
general agreement that for most companies not willing to make major investments in 
China-side operations or interested in developing China-side markets, arm’s-length 
outsourcing is the best option. Arm’s-length outsourcing/ transactional procurement 
from Chinese suppliers comes with risk, but that risk is only significant for companies 
who are building their strategies around such practices. According to the consultants, 
the biggest supply risk facing foreign companies comes neither from Chinese 
suppliers nor inefficient China-side distribution, but from buyers’ price squeezing. 
Undue pressure on suppliers to reduce cost results in quality compromise, i.e. 
“quality fade”. When cost pressure ceases, in most cases quality returns to the 
required level. Empirical studies on the relationship between cost pressure and 
quality erosion are needed to test this hypothesis. 
 
Further studies are also required to examine the longitudinal picture of Chinese 
supply management, ideally the relationship between supply risk and the duration of 
the supplier-buyer relationship, and the effect of incremental integration on supply 
risk. Case studies of global MNEs with decades of China experience would permit 
identification of the risk reduction methods that are most effective with different types 
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of supplier – arm’s-length strangers, integrated and non-integrated third-party 
suppliers, joint ventures, and wholly-owned factories. 
 
Exploration of the SC issues experienced by non-UK SMEs will provide some 
informative comparison. Risk from the perspective of the Chinese supplier also 
awaits deeper empirical investigation. This study includes one Chinese MNE key 
informant source, but its inclusion was not motivated by the desire to provide 
comparative and contrastive views on supply management risk. The Chinese key 
informant source was included to provide some account, albeit very modest, of 
supply risk as seen from the Chinese side. Any future theses about Chinese supply 
risk could only be enriched by the inclusion of more reverse perspective. As Chinese 
MNEs expand globally, the need for understanding risk as it appears to the Chinese 
increases. Differences between foreign and Chinese management styles have been 
extensively examined in the literature, and much has been written concerning the 
westernisation of Chinese managers, but might not the influence of Chinese MNEs 
overseas result in the Sinicization of management styles? This is an interesting 
question that deserves exploration. 
 
Studies on the risks and advantages of e-procurement will also be necessary, since 
this is the arm’s-length arrangement that should, according to the findings of this 
research and the consensus of the literature, present the riskiest supply option. The 
apparent popularity of e-procurement suggests however that the risks for most 
buyers must be tolerable. If this position is supported by empirical data, the 
argument that trust and relationships reduce risk will be challenged. 
 
The data generated by this research was in some senses deeper than expected, and 
in some senses lighter. For example, no respondents reported their Chinese supply 
base as particularly risky. All respondents spoke generally favourably about their 
China supply experiences, and all remarked that the last decade has seen 
remarkable improvement in Chinese suppliers’ process and product quality and 
delivery reliability. Some MNE respondents identified corruption, nationalism, and 
cynically motivated collectivist behaviour as major sources of risk affecting Chinese 
supply, but requested that the details of their comments be omitted from the 
transcript. Following the formal interview, one SME respondent recounted several 
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problem-solving techniques and methods of managing Chinese staff that he did not 
want reported. These requests were duly honoured. Future research could delve into 
these more problematic but potentially enlightening aspects of Chinese business. 
 
10.6 Summary of Contribution  
By providing a qualitative, non-positivist approach to the subject of supply chain risk 
management, this research develops the empirical supply chain management 
literature. The thesis considers cultural, macroeconomic, government and market 
involvement, and other conditions not typically covered in the literature. It reveals 
China risk strategies used by MNEs and SMEs (differences and similarities), posits 
the significance of the human and intercultural dimension of risk, and demystifies 
some cultural issues regarding Chinese business practices and China risk.  
 
The implications of this research and its outputs also have relevance to other areas 
of business studies, particularly to international business management (liabilities of 
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1. Trade Data 
Source 
All data used in these charts comes from the Office of National Statistics (2015). 
Figures for 2015 and 2016 figures were not available at time of writing. 
  
 
SITC Codes (United Nations, 2015)  
SITC code 6: manufactured goods – paper, textiles, cement, iron and steel, copper. 
SITC code 7: machinery and transport equipment – computer equipment, televisions, 
cars.  
SITC code 8: miscellaneous manufactures – furniture, clothes, footwear, cameras, 









2. Chinese Terms 
Guanxi 
A Chinese word (guānxì: 关系) that is usually interpreted as “relationships” or 
“connections”. Detail regarding the definition of this term is provided in Chapter 2. In 
this thesis, the word is written without tonal diacritics. This is to reduce visual noise. 
See the MSc thesis by Wilkinson (2011) for an overview of the various definitions 
and additional detail on the concept s. 
 
The following list provides details on the Chinese terms that appear in the literature 
discussed in Chapter 2.3.4 of the main thesis. Authors differ in their use and 
definitions of terms. For this reason, the list items are separated by authors’ names.  
 
Barnes et al (2011)  
There are three dimensions of guanxi: “feeling” (gǎnqíng: 感情); “emotion” (rénqíng: 
人情); and “trust” (xìnrèn: 信任). Other authors, such as Jia and Wang (2013), use 
similar terms.  
 
Kriz and Keating (2010)  




Renqing (rénqíng: 人情) is the Chinese term for affection, closeness, emotion, and 
empathy. Has connotations of good will and reciprocation.  
 
Yang and Wang (2011)  
These authors provide no Chinese characters for their terms qing, li, and liyi. Their 
use of qing to mean “emotions” appears appropriate (qíng: 情 is usually translated as 
“emotions” or “feelings”). Modern Chinese has no word for “reciprocation” that is 
pronounced li however, so I am unsure which character/concept the authors are 
using li to represent. Jia and Wang (2013) use bao (bào: 报) to describe “reciprocity”; 
on the other hand, Yan (1996a, b) uses renqing (rénqíng: 人情) to mean “reciprocity” 
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and “empathy”. There are two possibilities:  lǐ (礼) or lǐ (理). The former connotes the 
Confucian conception of proper conduct, favour, and etiquette; the latter can be 
defined as “reason”, “logic”, “arrangement” or, by extension, “management” or similar 
(e.g. guǎnlǐ: 管理). Because reciprocation is a key metaphysical theme in both Daoist 
and Confucian literature, where instances of礼 and理 and their respective concepts 
are abundant, either could be correct. The third term, liyi (lìyì: 利益) is less 
ambiguous. The authors’ usage corresponds with the orthodox definitions, i.e. “profit”, 
“gains”, and “benefits”.  
 
The last term, quanzi (quānzi: 圈子), is usually interpretable as the approximate 
equivalent of “social circle”, so is not a precise match for “networking” (or indeed 
“social capital”, which is translated literally as shèhuì zīběn: 社会资本).   
 
Leung et al (2005)  
These authors use the Chinese word xinyong (xìnyòng: 信用) to mean “trust”. 
 
Jia and Wang (2013)  
According to these authors, there are four associated concepts of guanxi: “favour” 
(rénqíng: 人情); “emotion” (gǎnqíng: 感情); “trust” (xìnyòng: 信用); and “reciprocation” 
(bào: 报). 
 
Buckley et al (2006)  





3. Terms in Other Languages 
Alston (1989) Chapter 2.3.17 
In Japanese, wa is written using the following kanji (Chinese character): 和, which 
means “harmony”. The Japanese also have a modern term that connotes personal 
connectivity with instrumental advantages: コネ, pronounced “kone”, and is short for 
the English term “connections”. 
 
In Korean (hangul), inhwa is 인화. In Chinese characters, it is 人和, which means 
“human/people harmony”. 
 






4. Systematic Literature Search Method  
4.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
For each literature search, five databases were interrogated. These databases vary 
considerably in the degree of search condition specificity available, hence the 
following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to eliminate articles that were 
grossly irrelevant. Table 1 and 2 specify the inclusion and exclusion criteria used and 
the rationale behind their usage. Table 3 provides the figures of articles initially 
retrieved and finally remaining after elimination according to these criteria. 
 
Table 1 Article Inclusion Criteria 





Ensures two-star academic quality/peer-review 









Ensures coverage of most recent research. 
4. International 
Ensures cross-nation scholastic input and 
representation of the international knowledge 
base. 
5. Quantitative Captures divergent forms of empirical evidence 
– within predefined boundaries of relevance 
(see Exclusion Criterion no. 3). 
6. Qualitative 
7. Editorials 
In journals meeting Inclusion Criterion no. 1, and 
discussing relevant concepts, research, theory, 
or literature.  
8.  
Number of Citation Counts 
= >40 
Identifies articles that are well-cited* so can be 
considered influential. *See Inclusion Criterion 
no. 9 (below). 
9. 
Number of Citation Counts = 
<40 but title, abstract, or 
conclusion indicate moderate 
high relevance 
Identifies articles that are less cited due to 
recent publication but whose content is relevant 
nonetheless. Ensures recent but relevant 





Table 2 Article Exclusion Criteria 
 
Table 3 Articles Eliminated By Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Search 
Total No. of 
Articles 
Retrieved 
No of Articles Eliminated 
by inclusion\Exclusion 
Criteria 
No of Articles Remaining after 
Inclusion\Exclusion Criteria 
LS1 2262 2004 258 
LS2 781 507 274 
LS3 2808 2674 134 
Combined 5851 5185 666 
 
4.2 Criteria of Classification 
Articles that were not eliminated by the inclusion/exclusion criteria were further 
filtered by quality criteria, which were imposed to determine the suitability of each 
article’s content and increase the literature’s specificity to the research question by 
eliminating uninformative articles. This process filtered the literature according to 
pertinence: directly relevant (A), partially relevant (B), and least relevant (C). This 
way, only articles deemed from a reading of their abstract as directly relevant were 
included. The following table lists all the quality criteria applied and the classifications 
thus determined.  
Criterion no. Criterion Rationale 
1. 
No articles published before 
1984 
Captures contemporary research rather than 
legacy. 
2. 
No industry sources (including 
extracts) 
Prevents inclusion of potentially biased 
data/reduces influence of interest effects. 
3. 
No non-relevant journals  
 
 
(Excluded disciplines: music 
studies, performing arts, 
archaeology, art history, 
medicine, classics, antiquity 
studies, literature, natural 
sciences, mathematics, and 
computing.) 
Excludes divergent emphases by limiting scope 
to relevant academic disciplines. 
 
(Included disciplines: business and 
management studies, organisation studies, 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, Asia-
Pacific studies, political science, international 
studies, communication studies, and 
behaviourial science.) 
4. 
No non-English language 
articles 
Obviates hermeneutic hazards/attain 
linguistically unconditional repeatability. 
5. 
Citation counts = <40 and title, 
abstract, or conclusion indicate 
low relevance. 
Eliminates articles that are not well-cited and 
whose content lacks relevance, so cannot be 
considered influential or insightful for this 
research. (See Inclusion Criterion no. 8 and no. 
9 in the preceding table.) 
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Table 4 Quality Criteria and Classification of Articles 
Quality criterion 
Classification 
A B (B1) C (&B2) 
1. 
Relevance to 
[keywords]* [Keyword] is the central 
theme/topic of research. 
Draws upon a rich and full 
comprehension of the 
relevant literature. Tests 
currents in established 
theory or presents 
valuable, informative, 









Theories relate and/or 
are relatable to 
[keywords], but 
partially. 
Are not mentioned, are 
mentioned indirectly, or 
are only alluded to. If 
existent, discussion of 
[keywords] or a 
comparable concept by 
another name is 
cursory or incidental. 
The subject matter is, 
on the whole, not 
related and not 
relatable to [keywords]. 
*LS1 keywords:  
[suppl* AND 
chin*] 
*LS2 keyword:  
[guanxi] 









Very highly relevant. The 
conceptual components 
identified constitute 




of [keywords] are 
identifiable, though not 
central to the 
discussion. With 
investment on the part 
of the researcher, 
there is conceptual 
content of relevance 




unidentifiable, or are 
identifiable only through 
inference. If relevant 
concepts are 
discussed, they are 















Research design is 
robust. Theory is built 
upon strong, relevant 
conceptual foundations. 
Theory and data are both 




Concepts discussed are 








augmentation of the 
theory/concepts 
presented would be 





based on weak 
premises, or drawn 
from inaccurate data or 
a flawed research 
design. Overall, theory/ 









and develops the subject 
considerably. Provides 
lucidity, and/ or potential 
for conceptual advances. 
Generalizability and 
conceptual import is 




could be improved. 
Very limited. Sample 
was confined, or 
concepts are 
inadequately relatable 






Application of the theory 
proposed could yield 
significant benefits. 
Theoretical contribution is 
similarly substantial. 
Sources or recycles 
the ideas of other 
researchers. Enriches 
the study of 
[keywords], albeit 
moderately so. 




Class A articles were automatically included; class B articles were reviewed in more 
depth (beyond the abstract) and accepted if sufficiently relevant (reclassified as B1) 
or rejected if insufficiently relevant (reclassified as B2); class C articles were 
automatically rejected. Due to the highly specific nature of the search conditions 
(keywords in title, abstract, or article’s keywords), most articles returned were highly 
relevant and were thus class A articles. The following table reports the total numbers 
of articles per search according to classification, and the numbers of articles 
accepted and rejected per search and in total. Due to replication of content , 
appropriateness to the research questions, and word count limitations, around 50% 
of the total number of articles were eventually referenced in the final literature review.  
 
Table 5 Articles Retrieved: Totals per Classification, Total Accepted 
Search 

























LS1 258 249 6 5 1 3 254 
LS2 274 252 7 3 4 15 255 
LS3 134 129 2 1 1 3 130 
Combined  666 630 15 9 6 21 639 
 
4.3 Literature Search 1 
The following table reports the sources interrogated (academic databases) and the 
search conditions applied to retrieve the articles on which the first phase of the 
























“chin* “ AND/OR “suppl* “ 
Source Academic journals only (full articles) 
Discipline(s) 

























(OR when multiple) 
TI-AB-KWs TI-AB TI-AB-KWs TI-AB-KWs Topic 
Period (date range) All years to present 
Filter by discipline √ √ unavailable √ √ 
 
For all searches, wildcards (*) were used to maximise catchment while staying within 
the parameters of relevance: “chin*” invokes “China” and/or “Chinese”; “suppl*” 
invokes “supplier(s)” and/or “supply”. Search filtering options vary according to 
database, with some databases allowing more precise conditions than others (“Ti”: 
“title”; “AB”: “abstract”; “KWs”: “keywords”).  
 
The following table reports the numbers of articles per database that were returned, 
by the searches described above. The inclusion/exclusion criteria were then applied. 
Duplicate articles were also eliminated at this stage. 
 
Table 7 Literature Search 1: Articles Returned, Eliminated, and Retained 
Search No. Database Date of 
Search 
No. of Articles 
Returned 
No. of Articles 
Eliminated 





30/04/2014 135 9 126 












09/05/2014 131 107 24 
Totals 2262 2004 258 
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The articles retained following filtration by the inclusion/exclusion criteria were then 
reviewed for suitability and summarised in the following table. Once summarised, 
each article was graded for quality and relevance to the current study. All unmarked 
and uncoloured entries are classified as A for quality.  
 
Literature Search 1 returned a total of 258 articles. Of this total, 249 articles were 
classed as “A”, six as “B”, and three as “C” (rejected). At second-stage review, one 
“B1” article was downgraded to “B2” and rejected. Therefore, four articles were 
eliminated from the original 258, leaving 254 accepted for inclusion. (See Table 5 for 
details.) 
The following table reports the literature statistics with these adjustments 
reflected (pre-quality filter figures are inside parentheses). 
 
Table 8 Literature Search 1: Article Counts by Year 1984-2014 
 Search No. 
Year LS 1.1 LS 1.2 LS 1.3 LS 1.4 LS 1.5 Total 
1984  1    1 
1991  1    1 
1994 1     1 
1995 1  1   2 
1997 1  2 1  4 
1998  1 3 3 2 9 
1999 2  3   5 
2000 2  1 2  5 
2001 2     2 
2002   2   2 
2003 5 2 2 1 1 11 
2004 8  2 1  11 
2005 10 1 3 1 1 16 
2006 20 (22)  10 (11) 1 2 33 (36) 
2007 12  4 2  18 
2008 10 2 2 2 2 18 
2009 12 1 11 1 3 28 
2010 15 1 5  3 24 
2011 10  9 2 4 25 
2012 6 1 12 2 2 23 
2013 2  3 2 3 10 
2014 5    1 6 
Total 124 (126) 11 75 (76) 21 24 254 (258) 
 
In the preceding table, figures in parentheses indicate the article count prior to 




4.4 Literature Search 2 
The following table reports the sources interrogated (academic databases) and the 
search conditions applied to retrieve the articles on which the second phase of the 
literature review was based.  
 





















Source Academic journals only (full articles) 
Discipline(s) 

























(OR when multiple) 
TI-AB-KWs TI-AB TI-AB-KWs TI-AB-KWs Topic 
Period (date range) All years to present 
Filter by discipline √ √ unavailable √ √ 
 
Search filtering options vary according to database, with some databases allowing 
more precise conditions than others (“Ti”: “title”; “AB”: “abstract”; “KWs”: “keywords”).  
The following table reports the numbers of articles per database that were returned, 
by the searches described above. The inclusion/exclusion criteria were then applied. 




Table 10 Literature Search 2: Articles Returned, Eliminated, and Retained 
Search 
No. 
Database Date of 
Search 
No. of Articles 
Returned 
No. of Articles 
Eliminated 
No. of Articles 
Retained 
LS 2.1 Science Direct 09/06/2014 82 19 63 
LS 2.2 Jstor 09/06/2014 53 20 33 
LS 2.3 Ingenta Connect 09/06/2014 165 59 106 
LS 2.4 Emerald Insight 09/06/2014 114 95 19 
LS 2.5 Web of Science 11/06/2014 367 314 53 
Totals 781 507 274 
 
The articles retained following filtration by inclusion/exclusion criteria were then 
reviewed for suitability and summarised in the following table. Once summarised, 
each article was graded for quality and relevance to the current study. All unmarked 
and uncoloured entries are classified as A for quality.  
 
Literature Search 2 returned a total of 274 articles. Of this total, 252 articles were 
classed as “A”, seven as “B”, and 15 as “C” (rejected). At second-stage review, four 
“B1” articles were downgraded to “B2” (rejected). Therefore, 19 articles were 
eliminated from the original 274, leaving 255 for inclusion. (See Table 5 for details.) 
The following table reports the literature statistics with these adjustments 




Table 11 Literature Search 2: Article Counts by Year 1984-2014 
 Search No. 
Year LS 2.1 LS 2.2 LS 2.3 LS 2.4 LS 2.5 Total 
1989 1     1 
1992    1  1 
1994  2    2 
1995 1 1    2 
1996  5   1 6 
1997 1  1   2 
1998  1 (2) 3 1 (2)  7 (9) 
1999 1 2 2  1 6 
2000 3 3 7   12 (13) 
2001 1 2 5  2 10 
2002 1 2 7 1 2 12 (13) 
2003 2 3 8 2 2 13 (17) 
2004 1 4 2 1 2 8 (10) 
2005 1 1 7 2  10 (11) 
2006 3  13 1 1 17 (18) 
2007 1 2 4 3 3 13 
2008 7 1 6 4 4 22 
2009 2 4 10  2 17 (18) 
2010 1  8 2 5 16 
2011 10 1 13  9 32 (33) 
2012 4 1 9 1 8 22 (23) 
2013 10 1 10 1 9 29 (31) 
2014 11  2  1 14 
Total 63 33 106 19 53 255 (274) 
 
In the preceding table, figures in parentheses indicate the article count prior to 
elimination of articles later classified as B2 or C during the final review and then 
rejected.  
 
4.5 Literature Search 3 
The following table reports the sources interrogated (academic databases) and the 
search conditions applied to retrieve the articles on which the third phase of the 
























“suppl” AND “risk” 
Source Academic journals only (full articles) 
Discipline(s) 

























(OR when multiple) 
TI-AB-KWs TI-AB TI-AB-KWs TI-AB-KWs Topic 
Period (date range) All years to present 
Filter by discipline √ √ unavailable √ √ 
 
Search filtering options vary according to database, with some databases allowing 
more precise conditions than others (“Ti”: “title”; “AB”: “abstract”; “KWs”: “keywords”).  
The following table reports the numbers of articles per database that were returned, 
by the searches described above. The inclusion/exclusion criteria were then applied. 
Duplicate articles were also eliminated at this stage. 
 
Table 13 Literature Search 3: Articles Returned, Eliminated, and Retained 
Search 
No. 
Database Date of 
Search 
No. of Articles 
Returned 
No. of Articles 
Eliminated 
No. of Articles 
Retained 
LS 3.1 Science Direct 23/06/2014 29 0 29 
LS 3.2 Jstor 23/06/2014 10 1 9 
LS 3.3 Ingenta Connect 23/06/2014 17 1 16 
LS 3.4 Emerald Insight 23/06/2014 34 0 34 
LS 3.5 Web of Science 23/06/2014 44 2 42 
Totals 134 4 130 
 
The articles retained following filtration by inclusion/exclusion criteria were then 
reviewed for suitability and summarised in the following table. Once summarised, 
each article was graded for quality and relevance to the current study. All unmarked 




Literature Search 3 returned a total of 134 articles. Of this total, 129 articles were 
classed as “A”, two as “B”, and three as “C” (rejected). At second-stage review, one 
“B1” article was downgraded to “B2” (rejected). Therefore, four articles were 
eliminated from the original 134, leaving 130 for inclusion. (See Table 5 for details.) 
 
The following table reports the literature statistics with these adjustments reflected 
(pre-quality filter figures are inside parentheses). 
 
Table 14 Literature Search 3: Article Counts by Year 1984-2014 
 Search No. 
Year LS 3.1 LS 3.2 LS 3.3 LS 3.4 LS 3.5 Total 
1994  1    1 
1998   1   1 
1999  2  1  3 
2000    1 2 3 
2001 1  1   2 
2003 2  1   3 
2004 1 1  6 2 10 
2005 1  1  2 4 
2006 1 1  2 2 6 
2007 2 2 (3) 2 1 1 8 (9) 
2008 2 1 2 (3) 4 2 11 (12) 
2009 2  1 3 2 8 
2010 2  2 1 4 9 
2011 3  2 4 4 13 
2012 2   2 8 12 
2013 4 1 1 8 9 23 
2014 6  2  7 (2) 15 (17) 
Total 29 10 (13) 17 34 44 (42) 130 (134) 
 
Figures in parentheses indicate the article count prior to elimination of articles later 
classified as B2 or C during the final review.   
 
The following figure graphically depicts the evolution of the literature between 1984 






Literature Search 1: “Chin*” AND “suppl*” 
Literature Search 2: “guanxi” 
Literature Search 3: “suppl* AND risk” 
  
The table beneath Figure 2 (following) indicates thematic overlaps in the literature 
returned by the systematic searches (darker shaded topics indicate stronger 
thematic relatedness). A small number of articles were returned by all three searches. 
Such articles constitute the most obvious content of the red point of common 
intersection in the Venn diagram. However, convergence was broad, and 
categorising relationships as distinct from networking and/or collaboration, for 
example, was extremely challenging (and, possibly, unnecessary). For this reason, 
many more articles than the few that occupy the central hotspot could be considered 


















































Literature Search 1 Literature Search 2 Literature Search 3 
Guanxi 
Relationships 
Collaboration and Integration 
Networking 
The Role of Intermediaries 
Informal Control is Insufficient 
Collaboration and Integration 
Quality Quality 
Strategic Supply Management 
(SCM) 
Supplier Selection 
Liabilities of Foreignness Risk Management Strategies 
UK Companies in China Guanxi in Decline 
Contracts 
State Involvement Government 




Risk Calculation Models 
Ethnicity and Cross-Cultural 
Implications 
Risk Frameworks 
Global Sourcing and 
Outsourcing 
Gift-Giving 





Supply Chain Complexity 
Single Versus Multiple Suppliers 
Ownership Negotiations 
 




















SUPPLY / SUPPLIER 
MANAGEMENT, 
RISK 
CHINA / CHINESE 
BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT 






5. Case Study Literature 
In the following lists of case study literature references, for anonymity, the company 
names have been changed. The two items marked [*] indicate documents that 
provided contextual information that was indirectly contributory to the case study 
writing process.   
 
5.1 Case Study 1: French Electrical Manufacturer (“FEM”, Global 
MNE) 
[S1] French Electrical Manufacturer Energy and Sustainability Services (2015) Six 
Trends for 2016: Global Energy Market Trends. [French Electrical Manufacturer 




[S2] French Electrical Manufacturer (2004) French Electrical Manufacturer in China 
and Asia Pacific: French Electrical Manufacturer – Building a New Electric 
World. [Shareholder Presentation]. Available at: http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/presentation/en/local/2006/12/Presentation_APAC_EN
.pdf.  
[S3] French Electrical Manufacturer (2004) Acquisitions Development: French 
Electrical Manufacturer – Building a New Electric World. French Electrical 
Manufacturer Shareholder Presentation. Available at: http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/presentation/en/local/2006/12/Acquisitions%20Develop
ment%20121604_EN.pdf.  
[S4] French Electrical Manufacturer (2014) Creating Shared Value: Strategy and 
Sustainability Highlights 2013 – 2014. French Electrical Manufacturer 




[S5] French Electrical Manufacturer (2013) The French Electrical Manufacturer 2012 






[S6] French Electrical Manufacturer (2014) The French Electrical Manufacturer 2013 




[S7] French Electrical Manufacturer (2015) The French Electrical Manufacturer 2014 




[S8] French Electrical Manufacturer (2006) Ultra Terminal, Merlin Gerin, Square D, 
Telemecanique: French Electrical Manufacturer – Building a New Electric World. 
[Shareholder Presentation]. 
[S9] French Electrical Manufacturer (2011) French Electrical Manufacturer forges a 
distribution partnership with NVC Lighting to expand coverage in China and 




[S10] Financial Times (2015) French Electrical Manufacturer hit by weaker demand 
from China. [Press release]. 7 July. Available at: 
www.ft.com/fastft/2015/07/29/schneider-electric-hit-weaker-demand-from-
china.html.     
[S11] French Electrical Manufacturer (2011) French Electrical Manufacturer acquires 
Leader Harvest Power Technologies, one of the leading players in medium 








[S12] French Electrical Manufacturer (2007) French Electrical Manufacturer in China. 
[Internal presentation]. Available at: http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/presentation/en/local/2006/12/Presentation_APAC_EN
.pdf.  
 [S13] French Electrical Manufacturer Investor Relations (2016) Record results 
thanks to quick adaptation in a challenging environment and balanced 
exposure to end-markets and regions. [Financial Report]. 17 Feb. Available at: 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160216006886/en/Schneider-
Electric-2015-Results-Record-Results-Quick.  
[S14] Gelin, P. and Milusheva, M. (2011) ‘The secrets of successful communities of 
practice: real benefits from collaboration within social networks at French 
Electrical Manufacturer’, Global business and organizational excellence, July-
August, pp. 6-18. 
[S15] French Electrical Manufacturer (2015) Half-Year Results. French Electrical 
Manufacturer. French Electrical Manufacturer [Corporate 
Shareholder/Stakeholder Report]. 29 July. Available at: http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/press-releases/en/shared/2015/07/20150729-release-
hy-15-en.pdf.  
[S16] French Electrical Manufacturer (2016) Annual Report. French Electrical 
Manufacturer. [Corporate Shareholder/Stakeholder Report]. 19 February. 
Available at: http://www2.schneider-electric.com/documents/financial-
results/en/local/2015-full-year-results/20160217-release-fy-15-en.pdf. 
[S18] French Electrical Manufacturer (2014) Annual Report. French Electrical 
Manufacturer. [Corporate Shareholder/Stakeholder Report]. 17 February. 
Available at: http://www2.schneider-electric.com/documents/financial-
results/en/local/2014-full-year-results/20150219-release-fy-14-en.pdf.   
[S*] French Electrical Manufacturer (October 31, 2007) French Electrical 
Manufacturer Finalizes the Formation of Delixi Electric, the New China 







[S*] French Electrical Manufacturer (2006) French Electrical Manufacturer plans to 
enter in [sic] a new China partnership in Low Voltage products. [Press release]. 
18 December. Available at: http://www2.schneider-
electric.com/documents/press-
releases/en/shared/2006/12/Delixi%20Electric_EN.pdf.   
 
5.2 Case Study 2: Canadian Transport (“CT”, Global MNE) 
[B1] Canadian Transportation (2012) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: 




[B2] Canadian Transportation Consulting (Shanghai) Company, Limited (2014) 
Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: Shanghai, China. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/content/dam/Websites/bombardiercom/Sites/suppo
rting-documents/Bombardier-Transportation-SiteFactSheet-IPO-China-en.pdf.   
[B3] Canadian Transportation (2012) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: 
Suzhou, China. Available at: 
http://www.FEM.com/content/dam/Websites/bombardiercom/Sites/supporting-
documents/Bombardier-Transportation-SiteFactSheet-Suzhou-China-en.pdf  
[B4] Canadian Transportation (2011) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: 
Beijing, China. Available at 
http://cn.bombardier.com/about_bombardier_in_country.html  
[B5] Canadian Transportation (2012) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: 




[B6] Canadian Transportation Railway Transportation Equipment (Shanghai) 
Company, Limited (2014) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: Shanghai 






 [B7] Bertling, L. (2015) Canadian Transportation: Successful Positioning of Global 
Players in China by Dynamically Adapting to a Changing Market Environment. 
Rotary Club Presentation and Group Strategy Report, Version 6.0 (internal). 
Delivered 03/03/2015. Available at: 
http://www.rotary1940.de/berlin_alexanderplatz/05_clubleben/Vortragsunterlag
en/bt-in-china---rotary-0315.pdf.  
[B8] Friedman, A. (2006) The Canadian Transportation Perspective on Doing 
Business in China. Canadian Transportation Group Report. March, 2006. 
Available at: http://www.docfoc.com/a-bombardier-perspective-on-doing-
business-in-china-andres-friedman-analyste.  
[B9] Canadian Transportation Group China (2014) Canadian Transportation in 




[B10] Canadian Transportation and Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) 
Canadian Transportation Facilities in China: Three Manufacturing Joint 




[B11] Canadian Transportation Group (2015) Sharpening Our Focus: 2014 Activity 
Report. Canadian Transportation Group Report. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/content/dam/Websites/bombardiercom/supporting-
documents/Sustainability/Reports/CSR/Bombardier-Activity-Report-2014-en.pdf. 
[B12] JRTR staff author (2005) ‘Canadian Transportation – A Global Transportation 
Leader’, Japan Railway and Transportation Review, 42 (December), pp. 17-25.  
[B13] Canadian Transportation (2011) Canadian Transportation Site Fact Sheet: 






China-en.pdf.     
[B14] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) Local Partners and Suppliers. 
Available at: www.cn.bombardier.com/local_partners.html. 
[B15] Canadian Transportation Group China (2014) Canadian Transportation in 
China: Overview. Available at: 
http://www.cn.bombardier.com/about_bombardier_in_country.html.  
[B16] Canadian Transportation Group China (2016) Canadian Transportation: China 
Sites.  Available at: http://www.cn.bombardier.com/sites_transportation.htm. 
[B17] Canadian Transportation Inc. (2015) Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders 




[B18] Canadian Transportation Group Compliance Office (2015) Canadian 
Transportation Supplier Code of Conduct. Canadian Transportation Group 
Compliance Standard. 
[B19] Canadian Transportation Group China (2014) CT’s Catina-Free Tram 
Technology Enables Start of Passenger Operations During Summer Youth 





[B20] Canadian Transportation Group (2012) Basel Places Biggest Order in 116-
Year History with CT. [Press release]. 31 January. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.32111-basel-places-
biggest-order-in-116-year-history-with-bombardier.bombardiercom.html. 
[B21] Canadian Transportation Group China (2013) Canadian Transportation 
Releases its Fourth Sustainability Report: “Shaping the Future of Mobility, 





[B22] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) CT’s Joint-Venture Awarded 
Another Contract to Build Eighty High-Speed New Generation Sleeper Train 
Cars for China. [Press release]. 18 December. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.bt-20151218-
bombardiers-joint-venture-awarded-another-contract-t.bombardiercom.html.  
[B23] Canadian Transportation Group China (2010) Canadian Transportation and 
China’s Ministry of Railways Sign a Multilevel Strategic Cooperation Agreement. 




[B24] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) Canadian Transportation’s Joint-
Venture Completes MOVIA Metro Fleet Deliveries for Shanghai Line 12 in 
China. [Press release]. 21 December. Available at: 
http://cn.bombardier.com/press_release_12212015.htm.  
[B25] Canadian Transportation Aerospace (2010) Canadian Transportation C Series 
Aircraft Program Reaches Another Milestone. [Press release]. 25 March. 
Available at:  http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.836-
bombardier-cseries-aircraft-program-reaches-another-
milestone.bombardiercom.html.  
[B27] Canadian Transportation Aerospace (2015) Canadian Transportation 
Commercial Aircraft Touches Down at Beijing’s Aviation Expo/China 2015. 
[Press release]. 15 September. Available at 
http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.bombardier-
commercialaircraft-20150915-bombardier-commercial-air.bombardiercom.html.    
[B28] Canadian Transportation Aerospace (2010) Canadian Transportation 
Announces Aggressive Plan to Bolster Support in Asia-Pacific. [Press release]. 




[B29] Canadian Transportation Group China (2012) Canadian Transportation Wins 
Order for Propulsion and Control Equipment from Dongguan Rapid Railway R2 






[B30] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) Canadian Transportation 
Expands Rail and Control Signalling Presence In China. [Press release]. 10 





[B31] Canadian Transportation Group China (2012) Canadian Transportation 
Announces Strategic Partnership with Shanghai Shentong Metro Group. [Press 




[B32] Canadian Transportation Group China (2012) Canadian Transportation Signs 
Technology License Agreement to Take State-of-the-Art Tram Technology to 
China. [Press release]. 5 July. Available at: 
http://cn.bombardier.com/press_release_07052012.htm. 
[B33] Canadian Transportation Group China (2013) Canadian Transportation Partner 
CSR Puzhen Wins Order for Low-Floor Trams in China. [Press release]. 10 
January. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.41232-bombardier-
partner-csr-puzhen-wins-order-for-low-floor-trams-in-china.bombardiercom.html. 
[B34] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) Canadian Transportation’s Joint-
Venture Wins Contract to Build 15 Very High Speed Trains for China. [Press 




[B35] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) Canadian Transportation’s 
Newly Established Chinese Joint-Venture Wins First Contract for an INNOVIA 





[B36] Canadian Transportation Group China (2015) CT’s Joint-Venture Wins 
Contract to Provide Propulsion and Control Equipment in China. [Press release]. 




[B37] Canadian Transportation Group China (2014) INNOVIA Monorail 300 Opening 
Ceremony at InnoTrans. [Press release]. 24 September. Available at: 
http://cn.bombardier.com/press_release_10092014.htm. 
[B38] Canadian Transportation Group (2013) Canadian Transportation Partner CSR 




[B39] Canadian Transportation Group China (2009) Canadian Transportation Sifang 
Wins Contract to Build 80 Very High Speed Trains for China. [Press release]. 
28 September. Available at: 
http://www.bombardier.com/en/media/newsList/details.883-bombardier-sifang-
wins-contract-to-build-80-very-high-speed-trains-for-china.bombardiercom.html. 
[B40] Canadian Transportation Group China (2012) Canadian Transportation 
Redefines Mobility for Rail and Road with PRIMOVE Technology. [Press 




[B41] Canadian Transportation Group China (2010) Canadian Transportation Sifang 
Awarded Fourth Contract for 40 Additional CRH1 High-Speed Trains in China. 
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6. Semi-Structured Interview Template 
The template for the semi-structured interview was derived mainly from pre-reading, 
the formal review of the literature, and the NVivo coding of the abstracts of the 
articles retrieved by the systematic search.  
 
In many cases, strict adherence to the script was not required. Each interview was 
preceded by an e-mail exchange, skype or telephone call, or a face-to-face 
conversation. At the pre-interview encounter, the purpose of the interview was 
explained. The prospective interviewee then declined or accepted. Hence, in the 
interview itself, little was required in the way of context or introduction. Also, in the 
course of the interview, many interviewees address the questions without prompting. 
However, the industry key informant interviews were conducted to purposefully 
explore issues revealed during preceding interviews in more depth. Hence, the 
format changed from interview to interview, depending on the specific information 
required. 
 
Findings from the case studies highlighted various areas of theoretical and practical 
interest that were appropriate for more detailed investigation via key informant 
interviews. In this way, the key informant interview supplemented and contrasted 
with the findings of the case studies. 
 
As the interviews progressed, the interviewer had less need for the script: in most 
cases, a general idea of the topics to be explored was sufficient. Many interviewees 
resisted conversational steering, so the question set allowed the interviewer to make 





Tell us briefly about your company. 




Do you use Chinese suppliers? 
(YES – already known) 
 
How long have you been using suppliers in China? 
(SINCE__________________) 
 
How did you select your Chinese suppliers? 































































Have you had any intellectual property issues with your Chinese suppliers? 











What would you say are the strengths/key qualities of your Chinese suppliers?  
(PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY, ABILITY TO LEARN, PRODUCTION CAPACITY, LOW MATERIALS COSTS, LOW 
LABOUR COSTS, CONVENIENCE, ACCESS TO CHINESE MARKETS, OPPORTUNITY TO SNIFF OUT 




Does your company maintain physical presence at your Chinese suppliers? That is, do you have a 


























Could your suppliers run their operation without this person being physically present?  
 
 























Besides operational issues, what kind of challenges do you face when dealing with Chinese suppliers? 
(Do you have to establish connections with the Chinese government, for example? Are there bribes 




Do you have a purchasing or operations management office in China? 
------------------------------------ 
[IF YES] How much independence that they have in decisions relating to China manufacturing and 




What kind of auditing processes do you r run on your Chinese suppliers?  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 










If I said to you the words “risk” and “China” in connection with your Chinese supply activities, 




























Have you yourself had any difficulties managing Chinese supply? 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 













How would you describe the relationship between you and your Chinese suppliers? 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* How would you think your Chinese managers perceive you and your company’s management?  


















7. Coding Tables 
7.1 Thematic Analysis by Coding 
The schematic shown in the Methodology chapter of the main work reports the 
coding applied in the analysis of the aggregated primary data, the number of sources 
in which each code was reported, the frequency (total number of instances) of usage 
of each code, and the thematic dominance that emerged when coding.  
 
Coding for themes was done using NVivo and according to the methods described 
by Richards (1999), Saldaña (2009), O’Neil (2013), and Silver and Lewins (2014) 
and the concepts espoused by Taylor and Bogdan (1998) and Flick (2015). 
 
Coding revealed themes that could be divided into three main groups: 1. 
Relationships; 2. Macroeconomics; 3. Strategy. In the schematic, the first figure 
inside parentheses indicates the number of sources in which a code was reported. 
The second figure indicates the frequency of the code across all sources, i.e. the 
total number of instances to which the code was applied.  
In many cases, the frequency reported for the parent node is greater than the 
sum of the child nodes. This is because some areas of transcripts were coded with 
the parent node alone – when the parent node was more descriptive than the child 
nodes or the text too general to merit the specificity of an available child node.  
  
Table 15 Parent Themes: Ranking by Frequency 
 
In the schematic, each theme (“node”) is ranked according to its frequency. Themes 
that appear higher in the tables occurred more frequently than themes that appear 
lower. Thus, the coding ranked “1” is the most frequently occurring within its 
grouping. The five most frequently applied codes in each grouping are enclosed in 
the bold border at the top of each of the 13 frequency tables that follow the 
schematic.  
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) Sources Frequency of Codes Ranking 
Parent 
Strategy all 1477 1 
Relationships all 674 2 
Macroeconomics all 221 3 
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In cases where multiple codes were reported with the same frequency, the first 
number in parentheses (the number of sources) determined the ranking. The code 
reported by more sources is ranked higher.  
 
In cases where multiple codes were reported in the same number of sources and 
with the same frequency, a qualitative approach was applied to determine ranking: 
the transcript was reassessed for broader thematic messages, and the code that 
corresponded most closely with the dominant or most emphatically expressed 
messages elsewhere in the same source was assigned the higher rank. When there 
was insufficient thematic correlation or support, similarity to or deviation from other 
codes was considered. Codes that corresponded to similar themes or discussions 
outside the source were ranked higher. Only six codes had to be ranked this way. 
The purpose of the code ranking was to highlight prominence, and thereby focus the 
subsequent theoretical discussion on the themes that dominated the information 
obtained from all 17 sources.   
 
The 17 are sources broadly divisible into two categories: case studies and key 
informant sources. Both categories are sub-divisible. The following table provides the 
category, classification, descriptive details, and identification code (ID) of each 
source. Source IDs are used in the subsequent tables to identify the sources in 




Table 16 Sources: Category, Classification, Description, and Identifying Code 






French Electrical Manufacturer “FEM” CS1 













Swedish Furniture Manufacturer “SFM” IK1 
American Food Conglomerate “AFC” IK2 
  
UK SMEs 
Direct2Customer “D2C” IK3 





Stuart Emmett  AK1 
Martin Christopher at Cranfield  AK2 
  
Consultants 
Anderson Consulting  CK1 
Cargo East Asia CK2 
Cargo East Asia, China-Britain Business Council Hong Kong 





SCMG (China MNE) FK1 
360C (UK SME) FK2 
UKCeram (UK SME) FK3 
  
Practitioners  LinkedIn Discussion (various supply chain professionals) LKs 
 
7.2 Frequency Tables 
The following 13 tables report the frequencies of the coding applied to the 
aggregated data of all 17 sources.   
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Relationships (17; 674) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) Source 
Count 







Cooperative working  8 
IK2; CS2; IK3, IK4, IK6; AK1, 
AK2; CK2  
57 1 
Key China person  10 
IK3, IK5, IK6; CK1, CK2, 
CK3; FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs  
54 2 
Trust (positive) 11 
IK1, IK2, IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; 
AK1, AK2; CK1; FK1, FK2  
46 3 
Communication  8 
IK1,  IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, 
IK4, IK5, IK6; AK1, AK2; 
CK1, CK2, CK3; FK1, FK2, 
FK3; LKs  
41 4 
China presence  10 
IK3, IK5, IK6; AK2; CK1, 
CK2, CK3; FK2,FK3; LKs  
40 5 
Relationship building 8 
IK3, IK4,IK5, IK6; AK1; CK1; 
FK2, FK3  
38 6 
Valuable expertise 6 
IK3, IK4; CK1, CK3; FK2; 
LKs  
36 7 
Business networks 9 
IK3, IK6; AK2; CK1, CK3; 
FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs  
33 8 
Contracts 11 
IK1, IK2, CS1; IK4, IK6; AK2; 
CK1, CK2; FK1, FK2; LKs  
29 9 
Informal practices 6 IK2, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK6; FK3  25 10 
Long-term relationships   9 
IK2, CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5, 
IK6; FK1, FK2  
24 11 
Intermediaries 7 
CS1; IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; CK1, 
CK2  
21 12 
Hands-off management 5 CS2; IK3, IK5, IK6; FK2  19 13 
Dispute resolution 7 
CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4; CK1; 
FK2; LKs 
18 14 
Buyer power 6 IK1, IK2; CS1; AK1,2; FK3 17 15 
Negotiation 5 IK2; IK6; AK1; CK1; FK2  17 16 
Personal factors 6 IK2; IK3, IK4, IK5; FK2, FK3  15 17 
Consultants 7 
IK2, CS1, CS2; IK6; CK1, 
CK3; LKs  
13 18 
China visits 6 
IK3, IK4; CK1, CK2; FK1, 
FK2  
12 19 
Chinese staff 3 IK5,IK6; CK1  11 20 
Relationships as risk management 2 AK1, AK2  7 21 
Formal power 1 IK2  7 22 
Soft skills 1 AK1  5 23 
Matchmaking 1 CK1  4 24 
Ethnic divisions 2 CS1; IK4  3 25 
Arms-length relationship  1 AK1  3 26 
Word-of-Mouth 2 CS1; CK3 2 27 
Relationship-driven supply chains 1 AK1  2 28 
Short-term relationships 1 CK1  2 29 
Mutual advantage  1 AK1  1 30 




Table 18 “Macroconomics” Parent Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Macroeconomics (17; 221) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) Source 
Count 








IK1, IK2; IK4; AK1, AK2; CK1, 
CK2; LKs 
34 1 
China low cost attractive  9 
IK2; CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; FK1, 
FK2, FK3 
25 2 
Government connections  4 IK1, CS1; IK6; FK1 25 3 
China market growth  5 IK2; CS1, CS2; IK4; FK3 20 4 
China costs rising  8 
CS1; IK3, IK5; CK1, CK2, CK3; 
FK3; LKs 
19 5 
BRICs  7 
CS1, CS2; IK5; CK3; FK1, FK2, 
FK3 
19 6 
China not unique  6 IK2; IK6; CK1, CK2, CK3; LKs 18 7 
China growth  6 IK1; CS1, CS2; IK4; CK1, CK3 16 8 
China not yet international 2 CK1; FK1 7 9 
China infrastructure  3 IK1; CS2; FK1 5 10 
China not Asian priority  2 CS1; FK3 5 11 
Emerging country threat  2 CS1; FK3 5 12 
Government double standards  1 CK1 4 13 
China stability 2 CS1; IK3 3 14 
China attraction decline  1 IK1 1 15 
Rapid China changes 1 IK1 1 16 
 
Table 19 “Strategy” Parent Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy (17; 1477) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) Source  
count 






China   17 all 678 1 
Risk  17 all 385 2 
Supplier management  17 all 309 3 






Table 20 “China” Child Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
 
Table 21 “Cultural Issues” Sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > China > Cultural Issues (17; 223) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 
Sources Frequency  Ranking 
Parent Strategy 
Child China 
Sub Cultural Issues 
 
Trust problems  12 
IK1; CS1, CS2; IK4, IK5; AK1, AK2; 
CK1, CK2; FK2, FK3; LKs 
51 1 
Language issues  12 
IK2; CS1; IK3, IK5, IK6; AK1; CK1, 
CK3; FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs 
44 2 
Face 6 CS1, CS2; IK4; CK1, CK3; LKs 13 3 
Good work ethic 6 CS1, CS2; IK3, IK5, IK6; FK3 11 4 
Interpersonal factors  2 AK1, AK2 7 5 
Cultural ignorance 1 CK1 7 6 
Pride 2 CS1, CS2 5 7 
Cultural learning  1 CK1 2 8 
 
Strategy > China (17; 678) 
Themes (Nvivo: “nodes”) 
Source  
Count 






Cultural issues  17 all 233 1 
Manufacturing  15 
CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; 
AK1, AK2; CK1, CK2, CK3; FK1, 
FK2, FK3; LKs 
148 
2 
Government involvement  10 
IK1; CS1, CS2; IK5, IK6; CK1, 
CK3; FK1, FK2; LKs 
42 3 
Long-term China strategy  8 
IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK5, IK6; 
CK1; FK3 
33 4 
China standards improving  11 
IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, 
IK5; CK1, CK2; FK2; LKs 
32 
5 
China office  autonomy  4 IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2 26 6 
Chinese managers  10 
IK1, CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK6; 
AK2; CK1,3; FK3  
22 7 
China office  5 IK2; CS1, CS2; CK1, CK2 18 8 
Human resource lag  7 




China-savvy strategizing  7 
IK2; CS1, CS2; IK4; CK3; FK2, 
FK3 
12 10 
Expat managers  4 CS1, CS2; IK5; FK3 11 11 
China as buyer  3 IK5; CK2, CK3 11 12 
Chinese ambitions  4 CS1, CS2; FK1, FK3 10 13 
Foreign company prestige 3 CS1, CS2; CK1 10 14 
China made for China market  4 IK1; IK6; FK1; LKs 9 15 
China staff training  3 CS1, CS2; IK5 8 16 
Early China entry  5 CS1; IK4, IK5; CK1, CK2 6 17 
Human capital wealth 4 CS1; IK4; AK1; CK1 6 18 
Joint venture problems 2 CK1; FK1 6 19 
Work conditions  4 IK1; CS1; IK3; CK1 5 20 
Foreign expectations unrealistic 1 CK1 5 21 
Foreign impatience 1 CK1 4 22 
Joint ventures 2 CK1; FK1 3 23 





Table 22 “Manufacturing” Sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > China > Manufacturing (15; 148) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 





Intellectual property issues  12 
CS1, CS2; IK4, IK5, IK6; AK2; CK1, 
CK2; FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs 
33 
1 
Technology lag  6 CS2; AK2; CK1, CK3; FK3; LKs 21 2 
High tech  9 
CS1, CS4; IK4,IK5, IK6;  AK2;  FK1, 
FK2, FK3 
15 3 
Reshoring  4 IK5; AK2; FK3; LKs 12 4 
“Made in China” reputation  5 IK4,IK6; FK2, FK3; LKs 8 5 
Manufacturing power  2 IK3; FK1 7 6 
Highly varied products 4 CS1; IK4; FK1, FK2 6 7 
Lead time reduction  2 AK1, AK2 5 8 
Cost-cutting and fair price  1 CK1 5 9 
Product imitating  3 AK2; CK1; FK1 4 10 
Flexibility reduces risk  1 AK2 4 11 
Inventory  1 AK2 3 12 
Efficiency lag  2 CS1, CS2 2 13 
Agile  1 AK2 2 14 
One-stop 3rd party solutions  1 CK1 2 15 
Lean and agile  1 AK2 2 16 
OEM partnerships  1 CS1 1 17 
Focussed factories  1 AK2 1 18 
Just-in-time (JIT) 1 AK2 1 19 
Quality and low price 1 FK1 1 20 
 
Table 23 “Risk” Child Theme: Sources and Frequencies  
Strategy > Risk (17; 358) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”)  
Source  
count 






Quality  17 all 222 1 
Supply chain  11 
IK2; CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5; AK1; CK3; 
FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs 
56 2 
China-specific risks  3 CS1; AK2; FK3 10 3 
China Easy for Business  4 IK6; CK1,2; LKs 9 4 
Risk planning  1 AK2 7 5 
Disintermediation  3 IK6; CK2; FK2 5 6 
Extended supply chain risk  1 AK2 5 7 
Risk spreading  2 AK2; CK1 4 8 
Resilience  1 AK2 3 9 
Other China risks  2 IK2 2 10 
Risk limitation by design  1 AK2 2 11 
Buying on price  1 AK2 2 12 
Customs problems  1 CK1 2 13 
Environmental issues 1 IK1 1 14 
Expat flight 1 IK1 1 15 







Table 24 “Quality” Sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > Risk > Quality (17; 222)  
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 





Quality failure  10 
IK1, IK2; CS2; IK4, IK5; AK2; CK1; 
FK2, FK3; LKs 
41 1 
Unsophisticated work  7 CS1, CS2; IK4,IK5; CK1,3; FK2 30 2 
QC visits  9 
IK2; CS1, CS2; IK4, IK5, IK6; AK1; 
CK3; LKs 
23 3 
Quality (positive) 10 
IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; 
CK2; FK2, FK3 
22 4 
In-house quality standards  7 IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK5; FK2 22 5 
Quality standards  11 
IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5; 
AK1, AK2; FK2, FK3 
21 6 
On-site QC people 8 
CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; CK2; 
FK2 
21 7 
China quality ahead of 
ROTW  
6 IK3, IK4; CK1, CK2; FK1, FK2 11 8 
QC by Specs  5 CS1, CS2; IK4, IK5, IK6 10 9 
Quality (general) 5 IK1; CS2; CK1; FK1, FK2 8 10 
Global QC practice 4 IK1, IK2, IK4, IK5 4 11 
Reworking outside China  4 IK2, IK4, IK5; FK2 4 12 
China quality is mixed 2 IK2; CK1 2 13 
QA companies  1 CK1 1 14 
  
Table 25 “Strategy” Child Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > Supplier Management (17; 309) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source 
count 
Sources Frequency Ranking Parent Strategy 





Suppliers  17 all 214 1 
Ownership  10 
IK1; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK4, IK5; CK1; 
FK1, FK2; LKs 
38 2 
Supplier control  5 IK1; CS2; IK3, IK4; AK1 14 3 
KPIs  2 IK2; AK1 7 4 






Supplier push  2 IK4; FK2 4 7 
Iceberg costs  1 CK1 4 8 
Customer pull 2 IK4; AK2 3 9 
Supplier opportunism  1 AK2 3 10 
Overseas supplier visits 1 AK1 3 11 
Demand risk 1 AK2 2 12 
Decoupling  1 AK2 2 13 







Table 26 “Suppliers” Sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > Supplier Management > Suppliers (17; 214) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 
Sources Frequency  Ranking 
Parent Strategy 
Child Supplier Management 
Sub Suppliers 
 
Supplier selection 10 
IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK6; AK1; CK1; 
FK1, FK3; LKs 
44 1 
Transparency 12 
IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK5; AK1, 
AK2; CK2, CK3; FK2, FK3 
40 2 
Unethical practice  10 
CS1, CS2; IK5; AK1, AK2; CK1, CK2, 
CK3; FK3; LKs 
32 3 
Strategic management 7 IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK3, IK6; AK1 13 4 
Monopoly supplier 3 IK2, CS1; AK1 13 5 
Supplier power  5 IK3, IK2; AK1, AK2; FK2 12 6 
Strategic acquisition 3 CS1, CS2; FK1 10 7 
Supplier monitoring  4 IK1, IK3, IK4; AK1 9 8 
Supplier investment  6 CS1; IK4, IK5, IK6; AK1, AK2 8 9 
Collective bargaining 3 IK1; AK1, AK2 7 10 
Regional variance  4 IK2; CK1, CK3; LKs 6 11 
Tier 2 involvement 2 CS2; AK2 6 12 
Reverse marketing  3 CS1; AK2; CK3 5 13 
Specialist suppliers 3 IK1; IK3, IK5 4 14 
Selective suppliers 2 CS1; AK1 2 15 
Mutual visibility 1 IK2 1 16 
 
Table 27 “Supplier Management” Sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > Supplier Management > Ownership (10; 38) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 
Sources Frequency  Ranking 
Parent Strategy 
Child Supplier Management 
Sub Ownership 
 
Wholly owned 5 IK1; CS1, CS2; IK3; CK1  20 1 
Joint venture 2 FK1; LKs 2 2 
Shared factory 2 IK4; CK1 2 3 
 
Table 28 “Supplier Selection” Sub-sub Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > Supplier Management > Suppliers > Supplier Selection (10; 44) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”) 
Source  
count 
Sources Frequency  Ranking 
Parent Strategy 
Child Supplier Management 
Sub Suppliers 
Sub-sub Supplier Selection 
 
Supplier background checking 1 CK1 4 1 
Supplier auditing 2 IK6 2 2 









Table 29 “MNEs” Child Theme: Sources and Frequencies 
Strategy > MNEs (14; 105) 
Themes (NVivo: “Nodes”)  
Parent Strategy Source  
count 






Global practices & standards 
10 IK1, IK2; CS1, CS2; IK4, IK5, IK6; 
AK2; FK2, FK3 
32 1 
Corporate culture 2 IK1; AK1 21 2 
HQ authority 3 IK2; CS1, CS2 8 3 
Global markets 5 CS1,CS2; IK5; FK1, FK3 7 4 
Local compliance 4 IK1, IK2; CS1; CK1 7 5 
Local procurement 3 IK1, IK2; CS1 5 6 
Design services 3 IK3, IK2; FK2 4 7 
Ethical business policy 1 IK1 4 8 
Highly global presence 2 CS1; IK4 3 9 
Global procurement model 1 IK2 3 10 









NB. In this figure, relative thematic dominance is represented by circle size 
(millimetres diameter):  








 3.1 China 
 3.1.1 Cultural Issues 
3.1.2 Manufacturing 
 3.2 Risk 
 3.2.1 Quality 
 3.3 Supplier Management 
 3.3.1 Suppliers 
 3.3.1.1 Supplier Selection 
 3.3.2 Ownership 
 3.4 MNEs 

















7.3 Most Frequent Codes by Sources 
The following tables report the five most frequently occurring codes according to the 
various sources. 
 
Table 30 Most Frequent Codes: All Sources (n=17) 
Sources: CS1, CS2; IK1, IK2, IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6; AK1, AK2; CK1, CK2, CK3; FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs 
































































Table 31Most Frequent Codes: Case Studies Only (n=2) 
Sources: CS1, CS2 




















































5 Intermediaries China costs rising 
Long-term 
China strategy 








Table 32 Most Frequent Codes: All Industry Key Informants (n=6) 
Sources: IK1, IK2, IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6 
















China low cost 
attractive 









































Table 33 Most Frequent Codes: All Other Key Informant Sources (n=9) 
Sources: AK1, AK2; CK1, CK2, CK3; FK1, FK2, FK3; LKs 














China not unique 
Cultural 
issues 


















































Table 34 Most Frequent Codes: Case Study and MNE Key Informants (n=4) 
Sources: CS1, CS2; CM1, CM2 




























































Table 35 Most Frequent Codes: UK SME Key Informants (n=4) 
Sources: IK3, IK4, IK5, IK6 UK SME Industry Key Informant Sources Only (n=4) 






























































Table 36 Most Frequent Codes: Academic Key Informants (n=2) 
Sources: AK1, AK2 














Corruption Cultural issues Quality Suppliers 
Corporate 
culture 

















































Table 37 Most Frequent Codes: Consultant Key Informants (n=3) 
Sources: CK1, CK2, CK3 


















China growth Manufacturing Supply chain Iceberg costs 
Local 
compliance 










China costs rising 
Chinese 
managers 
China easy for 
business 
Supplier control HQ authority 
5 China visits 















Table 38 Most Frequent Codes: Firm Comparator Key Informants 
Sources: FK1, FK2, FK3 














China low cost 
attractive 

































5 Trust (positive) 









Table 39 Most Frequent Codes: LinkedIn Discussion Key Informants* 
Source: LKs 














China not unique 
Cultural 
issues 
Supply chain Suppliers 
Highly global 
presence 
2 Communication Corruption Manufacturing 
China easy 
for business 





































*This collective source was an online discussion started by the research author. All 
participants were supply chain and procurement professionals active on an access-
restricted Linked-In forum. The topic of the discussion was China supply risk. The 
number of participants was 27. Three participants sent extended, highly detailed 






8. Interviewee Details 
With the exception of authors and academics, all names in this thesis have been 
changed. Non-anonymized exchanges occurred in online forums. Case study and 
key informant company names have also been changed. 
 
